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Abstract 
Venture Capital firms (VCs), compared with other sources of financing, are known to be a 
value-adding source of finance for high-growth entrepreneurial firms. Venture capital has 
transitioned  from a local to an international subject in recent years. In this thesis , I address 
three important aspects of the international venture capital research area. 
In the first essay, I answer these questions: do venture capital firms decide to invest in a 
cross-border company based solely on their own international experience, or do they also 
decide based on other venture capital firms’ behavior in investing in that country? I address 
these questions by investigating vicarious and experiential learning in the venture capital 
context, focusing on US cross-border venture capital investment data from 2000 to 2013. The 
analysis indicates that, on average, venture capital firms use both experiential and vicarious 
learning strategies in making their cross-border investment decisions. Moreover, the effect of 
experiential learning is greater than that of vicarious learning, and a venture capital firm’s 
size moderates this effect. 
In the second essay, I answer this question: do government venture capital funds crowd-in 
or crowd-out international private venture capital investment? The crowding-in effect arises 
when international private venture capital benefits from government subsidies through the 
enhancement of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and investment syndication. The crowding-out 
effect arises when government venture capital competes with private venture capital, bidding 
up deal prices and lowering returns, thereby spurring local private venture capitalists to 
invest internationally. I examine data from 26 countries from 1998 to 2013. The analysis 
indicates that, on average, more mixed-structured government venture capital investments 
than pure-structured government investments in a country crowds-in domestic and foreign 
private venture capitalists internationally. Moreover, the effect of both structures is greater on 
domestic private venture capitalists than on foreign ones. 
 v 
 
In the third essay, I investigate whether government venture capital practices in Canada 
promote a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem, by analyzing the effect of these practices on 
domestic and cross-border venture capital investments by private venture capital firms 
separately.  I research the following two questions in parallel: a) Does Canadian government 
venture capital investment attract private venture capital firms to invest in the domestic 
market? b) Does Canadian government venture capital investment lead to, or prevent, 
domestic private venture capital firms from investing in other countries? I find that Canadian 
government venture capital investment has no measurable impact on private venture capital 
firms’ decisions to invest in the domestic market. I also find that certain of the Canadian 
government’s venture capital programs have displaced private venture capital, although with 
negligible impact, towards cross-border VC markets, primarily to the United States.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 Introduction 
 
Venture Capital firms (VCs), compared with other sources of financing, are known to be a value-
adding source of finance for high-growth entrepreneurial firms, mainly because venture 
capitalists play a value adding role, such as by giving administrative advice, providing human 
capital, networking, etc., on top of providing financial resources to their investee companies 
(Cumming and Knill, 2012; Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Venture capital has transitioned from 
being a local to an international concept in recent years, with internationalization of VC 
investments on the rise (Dai et al., 2012) since the late 1990s (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011), 
significantly impacting growth-oriented technology companies in various markets that have 
limited domestic VCs (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). The three core essays of this thesis address 
important aspects of international venture capital research. In the first essay, I analyze venture 
capital firms’ cross-border investment decisions in connection with organizational learning 
theories. In the second essay, I investigate the effect of different types of government venture 
capital investment structures on private venture capital internationalization. In the third essay, I 
address the Canadian government’s venture capital efforts in regards to private venture capital 
localization and internationalization. 
 
 2 
 
1.1 Organizational Learning and 
Venture Capital Internationalization 
Research on cross-border venture capital (VC) has attracted many scholars in recent years and  
has suggested that international experience is critical for  VC firms’ subsequent cross-border 
investments (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Dimov and Milanov, 2010; Li et al., 2014; Liu and Maula, 
2016; Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). VC firms’ previous international experience in 
entrepreneurial firms in culturally distinct countries has been found to explain the propensity of 
VC firms to partner with local venture capital firms, and to predict the success of VC firms in 
their exit from investee companies (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Liu and Maula, 2016; Meuleman and 
Wright, 2011). Although these studies provide useful insight, they do not address whether the 
possession of such experience in a specific country impacts VC firms’ decision to invest again in 
that country. Also, the studies do not examine whether VC firms will follow other VC firms in 
deciding to invest in foreign companies. Therefore, a major research gap exists in relation to 
whether VC firms rely only on their own recent experience, or whether they imitate the cross-
border VC investment behaviour of others, and if they do, to what extent, and how. 
In the first essay, I extend prior work on cross-border VC research by proposing that VC 
firms’ international investment decisions can be explained by considering both experiential 
learning, which is generated by reactions to historical activities that relate to the firm's previous 
actions, and  vicarious learning, which is an observational method that entails imitation of other 
businesses (Bingham and Davis, 2012; Levitt and March, 1988). Previous research has 
established the relationship between experiential and vicarious learning by suggesting that firms 
under certain conditions imitate the strategies of first movers or larger competitors in other fields 
of study, for example in international mergers and acquisitions (Malhotra et al., 2015; Oehme 
and Bort, 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2009), or in chain acquisitions (Baum et al., 2000). In the VC 
context, Baum and Silverman (2004)  considered venture capitalists to be, to some degree, 
“scouts” when they vicariously select investee firms in biotechnology. Keil et al. (2008) showed 
that corporate VC firms adopt disembodied experimentation learning, which is a combination of 
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vicarious and active participation learning. However, to the best of my knowledge, the essay 
presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis is the first to investigate the effect of both vicarious and 
experiential learning in VC cross-border investment. 
 
1.2 Government Venture Capital and Venture Capital 
Internationalization 
Many government bodies around the world spend over a billion dollars per year subsidizing 
venture capital (VC) funds (Alhorr et al., 2008; Alperovych et al., 2016, 2015, Bruton et al., 
2009, 2005, Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, 2003; Lerner, 2009; Li and Zahra, 2012; Luo and 
Junkunc, 2008; Megginson, 2004). The rationale for such support typically includes the potential 
for substantial innovation amongst small firms, the creation of positive externalities from 
innovation, and the creation of a VC ecosystem with experienced VC managers, who provide 
administrative, financial, strategic, and human resource advice, as well as a network of contacts 
to suppliers, investment bankers, accountants, lawyers, and other strategic investors(Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2006; Peng, 2012).  Furthermore, government intervention attenuates the excess risk 
aversion of many entrepreneurs and their private investors that would otherwise result in 
insufficient private investment in entrepreneurship and innovation. It also promotes employment 
creation and attracts foreign private investment capital. While prior work has offered substantial 
insights into many aspects of government venture capital (GVC), there has been a comparative 
dearth of work on the relationship between GVC and private venture capital (PVC) investment 
internationally. In the second essay, I describe the possible theoretical arguments that may point 
to various results pertaining to why GVC may crowd-in or crowd-out PVC internationally, and I 
then conduct empirical tests. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to 
investigate the effect of GVC on international PVC investment. 
GVC may crowd-in domestic and international PVC through the creation of a domestic VC 
ecosystem, through encouraging greater institutional investment in PVC funds, and through 
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investment syndication. Conversely, GVC may displace domestic and international PVC if GVC 
competes with PVC, bids up deal prices, and lowers investment returns, thereby causing an 
outflow of domestic VC to other countries and a reduction in the inflow of foreign PVC. In 
theory, either or both effects are possible, and it is, therefore, worthwhile to carry out empirical 
analysis. Recent studies have found that GVCs have successful outcomes in a mixed-structured 
investment (i.e., when they syndicate with PVC funds), and unsuccessful outcomes in a pure-
structured investment (i.e., when they are the sole investor) (Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Grilli 
and Murtinu, 2014). The aforementioned studies do not include the international perspective of 
GVC investments. In the second essay, I investigate the effect of mixed- and pure- GVC 
investment on international PVC investments. 
 
1.3 Canadian Government Venture Capital  and  
localization versus internationalization of private VCs 
Since 1980, Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) and the Business 
Development Bank of Canada (BDC) have been Canada’s major programs supporting 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, but they have been criticized for inefficient investments. Besides 
being inefficient, government VC in Canada has engendered academic interest in whether 
government VC funds in Canada are performing as intended to promote an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem?  
The literature offers two competing explanations. The first suggests that adverse practice of 
government VC may ‘crowd out’ domestic private VCs. Crowding out, in this instance, means 
pushing private funding away, yet it is a vital source of development; that is, too much 
government VC would deny other venture capitalists opportunities to invest or compete 
favorably (Cumming et al., 2016; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007, 2006). In the third study, the 
focus is? on whether the aggregate pool of domestic VC investments and cross-border venture 
capital investments is disregarded (Cumming and Johan, 2013; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). 
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The competing explanation suggests that adverse practice of government venture capital may 
displace domestic private VC instead of crowding-out private VC; i.e., bad government VC 
practices may force domestic private VCs to transfer their efforts to other countries. The main 
motivation behind this reasoning comes from Lerner’s (2009, p. 122) unproven claim that 
adverse government venture capital practices may compel non-GVCs to invest internationally, 
but further exploration of this claim is necessary. 
 Although, there is no doubt that either explanation conveys the idea of harmful effects of 
government VC programs in Canada, the latter is less damning than the former explanation. The 
third essay adds to the limited extant empirical studies on the existence of a link between 
inefficient government VC practices and international private VC investment flows. In the third 
study, I will analyze the effect of government VC on domestic and cross-border private VC 
investments in parallel to each other.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2, the first essay, explores organizational learning 
and VC internationalization; Chapter 3, the second essay, examines government VC and cross-
border investment; Section 2.3, the third essay, discusses Canadian government VC and the 
internationalization or localization of Canadian private VCs. 
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Chapter 2 
 
How Experiential and Vicarious Learning Shape 
Venture Capital firms’ Cross-Border Investment Decisions: 
The Case of the US Venture Capital Industry 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on cross-border venture capital (VC) has attracted many scholars to investigate 
international experience in VC firms’ cross-border investment decisions (Dai and Nahata, 2016; 
Dimov and Milanov, 2010; Li et al., 2014; Liu and Maula, 2016; Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). 
Mostly, these scholars have focused on how VC firms’ previous international experience in 
entrepreneurial firms in culturally distinct countries affect the propensity of VC firms to partner 
with local venture capital firms (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Liu and Maula, 2016; Meuleman and 
Wright, 2011). I will address a major research gap in relation to whether VC firms rely on their 
own recent experience, or imitate the cross-border VC investment behaviour of others, and if 
they do, to what extent, and how. I extend prior work on cross-border VC research by proposing 
that VC firms’ international investment decisions can be explained by considering both 
experiential learning, which is generated by reactions to historical activities that relate to the 
firm's previous actions, and  vicarious learning, which is an observational method that entails 
imitation of other businesses (Bingham and Davis, 2012; Levitt and March, 1988).  
This essay explores experiential and vicarious learning on the market-selection decisions of 
VC firms in their cross-border investments. Theorist in organizational learning highlight that 
when firms internationalize, they tend to overestimate the appropriateness of their recent action, 
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and therefore, they are more likely to increase their international participation in that market 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991; Miller and Friesen, 1980). Other researchers have 
also noted that imitation occurs when the frequency of specific routines’ incidence by certain 
firms increases the chance that the same routine will be adopted by similar firms in uncertain 
settings (Baum et al., 2000; Fernhaber and Li, 2010; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Huber, 1991; 
Levitt and March, 1988). Drawing on these theories, I predict that VC firms with recent 
international investment experience in a country are more likely to reinvest in that focal country. 
Moreover, VC firms are also more likely to invest in that focal country if there are other VC 
firms investing in that country. Likewise, I argue that VC firms with recent international 
experience, who also face such patterns of investments by others, tend to over-weigh their recent 
investment, in deciding to reinvest in that country. In addition, I find that smaller VC firms tend 
to be influenced more by investment pattern of others rather than their own recent experience. To 
test these conjectures, I use cross-border investments by U.S venture capital firms between 2000 
and 2013. I analyze the data using event history analysis based on annual observations of a 
unique unit of observation: the combination of US VC firms, investee companies’ countries, and 
the industry SIC codes of investee companies. The data indicate that both experiential and 
vicarious learning affect cross-border venture capital investment decisions. The evidence shows 
that, in general, the effect of experiential learning is greater than the effect of vicarious learning. 
My study contributes to the literature in two main areas. First, it sheds light on the effect of 
vicarious learning and experiential learning plus their interplay on international market-selection 
decisions of VC firms. Prior research on these topics has examined only the effect of venture 
capitalists’ past international experience on their subsequent performance and local partner 
selection (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Dimov and Milanov, 2010; Liu and Maula, 2016; Tykvová and 
Schertler, 2014). Second, my study uses a unique ordered triplet of ‘VC firm-country-industry’ 
as the unit of analysis, which enables a more-deliberate analysis and the ability to track more 
details compared with previous studies. Using this unit of analysis enables me to show that 
industry-related international experience has a greater effect than solo? international experience, 
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and that vicarious learning from geographically closer resources has a greater effect than farther-
off resources on cross-border VC investment decisions.   
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses related studies and articulates 
hypotheses development; Section 2.3 introduces the methodology of the study; Section 2.4 
covers results; and Section 2.5 provides concluding remarks.  
2.2 Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses 
In this section, I first review previous studies on cross-border venture capital investments. Then, 
I develop a theoretical framework pertaining into my hypotheses on experiential learning, 
vicarious learning, and their interplay.  
2.2.1 Cross-border Venture Capital Investments 
Considerable research describes why VCs internationalize through investing in foreign ventures, 
and these studies of cross-border VC investments can be categorized into macro-level studies, in 
which the focus is towards the fact that aggregated cross-border VC investment activities are 
greater in countries with suitable macroeconomic factors, and micro-level studies, in which the 
focus is on investigating the instrumentalities that can explain the why and the how of cross-
border VC investment practices (Wright et al., 2005). The aggregate VC investment flows 
between different countries have been described by factors such as positive GDP  growth, 
research, and development activities, stock market capitalization (Schertler and Tykvová, 2011), 
size and dynamism of market legal factors, and government policies (Guler and Guillén, 2010a). 
Micro-level studies, on the other hand, analyze the factors that influence internationalization 
strategies by the VCs including: Geographical and cultural differences, relational and 
institutional trust between the VC and the entrepreneurial firm, previous experience in either or 
both domestic and international VC investment, the role of local VC partners in host countries, 
and the social capital or network advantage of the VCs (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Hain et al., 2015; 
Liu and Maula, 2016; Mäkelä and Maula, 2008; Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). The remaining of 
this section will review these factors in more details. 
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Geographical, institutional (cognitive, normative, and regulative) (Tykvová and Schertler, 
2014) and cultural distances are some of the hurdles faced by cross-border VC investors (Hain et 
al., 2015). While convergence in culture enhances negotiations (Dai and Nahata, 2016), 
differences in culture discourage the formation of partnerships between local VCs and foreign 
ones. However, such differences have beneficial effects such as producing synergies to alleviate 
the effects of geographical distance. The lower confidence levels, due to such distances, between 
VCs and investee companies, affect the nature of financial contracting, increase the severity of 
potential conflicts and diminish the overall performance of the investment (Dai and Nahata, 
2016). Schertler and Tykvová (2014) suggest that geographical distance has a larger effect on the 
relationship between the foreign VC and the venture than that of the foreign and a local VC 
because to some degree, VCs follow almost similar business models and network advantages. 
VC investment in a venture is staged in rounds that progress as the company progresses from a 
start-up to later stages wherein the firm can self-sustain (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). The 
investment rounds may attract multiple investors to share investment rounds, a process called 
syndication. Syndication seeks to reduce risk by diversifying and exchanging information in 
selection, resource pooling, and reciprocation of deal flow (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). During 
syndication, one VC acts as the lead investor, having more monitoring roles while the others play 
lesser but significant roles; the foreign VC may choose to involve local VCs in the syndicate.  
Syndication with local VCs helps overcome the effects of geographical distance, obtain deal 
access more efficiently, improve the distribution of risk, and reduce costs of information 
(Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). Uncertainty at the firm level 
increases the need for local VC involvement, but uncertainty at a country level discourages it 
(Liu and Maula, 2016). Meuleman and Wright (2011) examined the role of institutional learning 
and institutional context in private equity1, syndications. The results of their study indicated that 
institutional context and organizational learning have significant relevance with the use of cross-
border syndicates, and that private equity firms use learning to reduce institutional barriers. 
                                                     
1 Private equity investments is a general categorization of private investments and Venture Capital (VC) 
investments is a subset of it. VC financing targets early stage companies. 
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Cross-border VC investments’ behaviour can also be enlightened by institutional trust, which 
refers to trust in the firm structure and sincere behavior of the people of a country where a new 
venture exists, and relational trust, which is the gradual improvement of confidence between 
parties through frequent communications (Hain et al., 2015). Institutional trust encourages cross-
border VC from developed to emerging economies and helps overcome the reputation factor that 
prevents VCs from developed economies from investing in emerging economy ventures so as not 
to diminish their reputational capital. Relational trust, on the other hand, mitigates the risks that 
come with the lack of proximity through the frequent, persistent and transparent exchange of 
information and over time reduces the perception of uncertainty by improving information 
symmetry. Their effects, however, depend on whether the investment is foreign only, or both 
international and local and also on whether the host economy is emerging or developing. 
Likewise, social capital or network advantage is another factor that affects the investment 
process. Social capital refers to potential resources that come with the network of relationships 
that an entrepreneur or a firm has, and international social capital relates to the cross- border 
manifestations of social capital (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). Global networks provide exposure to 
opportunities, complementary skills (Hain et al., 2015), connections, learning, and advice, 
assistance in foreign negotiations, new markets, and resource gathering. Iriyama et al. (2010) 
found that these networks not only positively affect VC investment but also the flow of ideas, 
formation of the enterprise and flow of investments. Those advantages acquired by VCs in their 
home country help reduce the risk associated with foreign investments, but the same may not be 
said for brokerage benefits (Guler and Guillén, 2010b). 
2.2.2 Experiential Learning and Cross-border VC 
Over the years, research has continuously supported the significance and prevalence of direct and 
indirect learning processes in organizations (Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Huber, 1991; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Miner et al., 2001). Experiential learning is  a direct learning process and is 
defined to be the repetition and/or the modification of subsequent actions by organizations, based 
on the recognition of historical patterns and/or the conception of previous performance (Bingham 
and Davis, 2012). It is in essence the knowledge that is obtained through reflections on 
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undertaking the organizational routines and strategies (Levitt and March, 1988), and helps the 
learner to acquire awareness from outcomes of those routines and strategies (Miner et al., 2001).  
Theorists highlighted the prevalence of organizational search processes within experiential 
learning framework; that is, the routines that helps organizations to survive in their external 
environment (March, 1991). Specifically, in the search processes, organizations typically make a 
balance between two major actions: exploitation, which is the process of adopting current 
routines through local searches, versus exploration, which is the process of exploring new 
routines (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). Conversely, putting more weight on 
exploitation can cause the selection of unsound procedures, whereas focusing more on 
exploration is associated with an increase in pertinent expenditures (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
March, 1991). Theorist highlight that there exists a bias towards exploitation rather than 
exploration, since organizations tend to emphasize on the reasonability of their recent choices in 
their subsequent decisions and the level of such self-reinforcing bias tend to be spoiled by 
growing experience and confidence of decision-makers (Miller and Friesen, 1980).  They 
consequently, tend to place more trust in the success of their previous strategies rather than take 
the risk of failure without searching for new and untested routines (Levitt and March, 1988). In 
effect, utilizing one pattern in organizational processes can quickly become routinized, and 
prevent organizations from exploiting newer frontiers (March, 1991). 
VC firms investing in foreign ventures have always been faced with the challenge of the 
information gap, which is, in part, a result of the cultural and institutional differences between 
the information they possess and the one they require to operate successfully in the foreign 
environment (Liu and Maula, 2016; Meuleman and Wright, 2011; Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). 
Empirical evidence supports that experience does allow VC firms to fill such gaps by improving 
their abilities and capabilities through forms of repetition. According to one study, VCs that have 
previous experience in domestic and international investment are more open to cross-border VC 
(Tykvová and Schertler, 2011). Having international experience has been found to increase 
chances of US VCs investing in other countries because these firms have better access to social 
capital, and are more familiar with the hurdles of institutional and legal differences (Guler and 
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Guillén, 2010b). Also, VC firms international experience helps them in adjusting their strategies, 
calculations and assessments for their subsequent international investments (Dai et al., 2012). 
International experience of VCs has been showed to affect the partner-selection decisions (Liu 
and Maula, 2016; Meuleman and Wright, 2011), the investment amount and number of stages, 
and the likelihood of successful exits (Dai and Nahata, 2016). However, these studies do not 
address whether the possession of recent international experience in a specific country impacts 
VC firms’ decision to invest again in that country. 
Once a VC firm invests in a cross-border company, insights from the experiential learning 
framework suggest that VC firms gain knowledge about the regulations, institutions, and cultural 
aspects related to the host country (Dai and Nahata, 2016). The reported bias towards the 
exploitation processes of organizational search (March, 1991) suggests that VC firms tend to 
exploit their host-country-related knowledge gained through previous investment, rather than, 
explore new opportunities in other countries with new cultural and institutional settings. I argue 
that VC firms with past international experience in a country are able to develop the capability of 
entry, and can also deal with constraints and obstacles that they may encounter only in that host 
country. Under these settings, I hypothesize the effect of a VC firms’ recent experience on its 
subsequent cross-border VC investment decisions as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: A focal VC firm’s recent experience in a host country positively influences its 
propensity to further invest in that country. 
A VC firm’s international investment, on top of providing specific knowledge gained related 
to country-level settings, will also acquire knowledge about the industry of the investee 
company. As discussed earlier, due to the exploration bias discussed above, this experience can 
similarly act as a bias for venture capitalists that have already realized the potential of the 
country and the industry through previous international investments. I argue that the recent 
international experience of a VC firm in a specific country and specific industry, will affect the 
VC firm’s subsequent decision to invest again. Under these settings, 
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Hypothesis 1b: A focal VC firm’s recent experience in a host country and an industry 
positively influences its propensity to further invest in that country-industry. 
Although prior county-related knowledge does influence the VC firms’ decision to invest in a 
country, the bias towards exploitation rather than exploration suggests a VC firm will not tend to 
search for new investment opportunities in a different industry within the same country, as it may 
face higher more exploration costs. Consequently, the combination of recent industry-level 
knowledge and country-level knowledge is more important than country-level knowledge alone 
in deciding to invest again in that focal industry-country. 
Hypothesis 2: Overall, a focal VC firm’s propensity to invest in a country-industry is 
influenced more by its international experience in the host country-industry than its international 
experience in the host country. 
2.2.3 Vicarious Learning and Cross-border VC 
With vicarious learning, a common indirect learning process, One learns from others’ experience 
(Baum et al., 2000; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988). In an organizational learning 
framework, vicarious learning can be defined as an organization’s behavioral change in response 
to certain strategies employed by certain competitors (Kim and Miner, 2007). Imitation of what 
others have done in similar situations is a form of vicarious learning, in which learners observe 
what others do and mimic their course of actions (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Inter-organizational imitation, as a form of vicarious learning, has been visited by theorists 
from different angles. It mostly occurs when the practices of one or more firms tempt other 
organizations to adopt them (Fernhaber and Li, 2010; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). The concept 
is supported by neoinstitutional theory, in which it is assumed that organizational strategies 
reflect not only technicalities and resources, but also the social norms of organizations’ 
environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Neoinstitutional theory, by highlighting the influence 
of social environment on organizations, provides grounds for frequency-based imitation, in 
which it is assumed that common practices of organizations in an environment can become a 
source of knowledge for others, as well as for trait-based imitation, in which it is assumed that 
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practices of organizations with specific characterizations can become a source of knowledge for 
other firms (Fernhaber and Li, 2010). Moreover, organizational learning theories  provide 
grounds for outcome-based imitation; that is, the fact that certain actions resulted from certain 
performance levels motivates other firms to adopt them (Cyert and March, 1963). Furthermore, 
institutional isomorphism theory can support mimetic isomorphism, which is imitation due to 
behavioral similarity, and assumes that firms deliberately imitate other firms , 1) if they believe 
that the strategy of the original player is legitimate, and 2) if they believe that the original player 
is similar, either logically or socially, to themselves (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Haunschild 
and Miner, 1997). Finally, rivalry theories can also support inter-organizational imitation, by 
assuming that firms imitate their rivals to sustain their relative competitive advantage in their 
market (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). 
Some research suggests that vicarious learning may be an important initial learning process for 
organizations faced with insufficient information; that is, organizations rely on others’ 
experiences to cover their understanding deficiency (Baum et al., 2000; Henisz and Delios, 
2001). Research also shows that vicarious learning is particularly valuable in new industries and 
when uncertainty is high; for example, vicarious learning may take place as firms introduce new 
products in nascent markets (Srinivasan et al., 2007). International business literature shows that 
mimetic behavior, on top of an existing alliance experience, has a substantial role in reducing the 
impacts of uncertainties associated with cross-border operations (Yeniyurt et al., 2009). 
Moreover, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been found to use network-enabled 
learning approaches to imitate the internationalization modes of their peers in their network 
(Oehme and Bort, 2015). Also, the maturity and density of the location of firms have been found 
to influences internationalization of new ventures, by providing access to rich, imitable patterns  
for new ventures (Fernhaber et al., 2007). In contrast, other research suggests that vicarious 
learning may not be a good initial learning process because inexperienced firms are not able to 
internalize the knowledge gained through imitation (Henisz and Delios, 2001; Zahra and Dess, 
2001). 
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In the VC context, it is shown that, to some extent, VCs decide to invest in entrepreneurial 
firms based on vicarious learning; that is, VCs are shown to have a combination of picking and 
building abilities in their selection and management of promising entrepreneurial companies 
respectively (Baum and Silverman, 2004). Baum and Silverman (2004) show that VCs 
vicariously decide, to some degree, on selecting promising entrepreneurs in the biotechnology 
sector. Moreover, Keil et al. (2008) show that corporate VC firms adopt “disembodied 
experimentation learning”, which is a combination of vicarious and active participation learning 
in making their investment decisions. However, there is a gap in exploring whether VC firms 
imitate the cross-border market selection behaviour of other VC firms. Because VC firms face 
different types of uncertainties when making a cross-border VC investments, due to many 
cultural and institutional differences (Liu and Maula, 2016), imitation could be a standard 
response. VC firms’ imitation of others’ investment behaviour can be a tempting strategy for 
overcoming such uncertainties. 
Frequency-based imitation (Fernhaber and Li, 2010) supports the fact that a known pattern of 
cross-border investments by VC firms in a specific country and industry can be a source of 
knowledge for a focal VC firm considering the same country-industry. Additionally, rivalry 
theory supports the idea that focal VC firms following the investment pattern established by VC 
firms located in the same home country, generally find themselves in a weaker competitive 
position than their competitors (i.e. those VC firms that established such patterns of investment) 
(Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). This position is partly because of the accessibility of international 
investment data through informal sources and private institutions such as Thomson Reuters, all 
of which can be obtained with a subscription. Consequently, a focal VC firm gain more 
confidence when they see a flow of initial VC firms to a specific country and industry. They are 
thus inspired to follow others in investing in the same country-industry, even though the 
potential opportunity in the country-industry may not be promising. They are more likely to 
imitate this pattern of investment to retain their competitive position, consequently, I 
hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 3a: The number of VC firms located in one country and recently investing in a 
cross-border investment in a specific country-industry positively influences the propensity of a 
focal VC firm located in that same country to invest in the same country-industry. 
Moreover, following a similar argument, the pattern of cross-border investments in a country-
industry by VC firms located in one state/province is also trackable by VC firms in that 
state/province. Therefore, I expect that increase in such patterns of investments by home 
state/province firms, will also increase the probability that this pattern will be imitated by other 
VC firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: The number of VC firms located in one state/province and recently investing a 
cross-border investment in a specific country-industry positively influences the propensity of a 
focal VC firm located in that same state/province to invest in the same country-industry. 
Based on organizational learning theories, organizational search processes are typically 
conducted on nearer organizational routines (Ingram and Baum, 1997), since closer choices and 
actions, tend to be given more credence than distant untested choices and actions. Familiar 
searches of recognized contexts and locations also take precedence (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Levitt and March, 1988). A VC firm can assess the home state/province patterns of VC firms’ 
international investments in a host country-industry more easily than such patterns by home 
country competitors. Therefore, it is more likely that a focal VC firm will imitate VC firms that 
are located in its closer vicinity, which - in my case - is the province/state of the focal VC firm. 
Hypothesis 4: Overall, a focal VC firm’s propensity to invest in a country-industry is 
influenced more by imitating other VC firms located in the same state/province than by imitating 
other VC firms located in the same country, and recently investing in that same country-industry. 
2.2.4 The interplay of vicarious and experiential learning 
Vicarious learning, as an indirect form of learning, is taking advantage of the behaviors of 
others by concentrating on their experiences (Baum et al., 2000; Haunschild and Miner, 1997) In 
contrast, experiential learning, which is a direct form of learning, is more costly and time-
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consuming than imitation (Cyert and March, 1963). The distinctions for organizations regarding 
these types of learning depend on their resources, time, and commitment. Firms having adequate 
time and resources to explore the market environment are more likely to select experiential 
learning, whereas those in an uncertain environment will adopt imitation. 
Empirical research shows that firms have the choice of adopting either of the experiential and 
vicarious learning processes, but mostly, a combination of both suffices. For instance, in the 
international business area, Guillén (Guillen, 2002; Guillén, 2003) shows that both experiential 
and imitation learning methods shape joint venture practices in the expansion of South Korean 
companies into China. His research indicates that experience and imitation in a business group 
from the same home country positively impacts foreign expansion (Guillen, 2002; Guillén, 
2003). 
As I discussed above, there exists a self-reinforcing bias towards exploitation rather than 
exploration in organizations, because they tend to emphasize on their recent actions’ validity in 
their current behavior (March, 1991; Miller and Friesen, 1980). In my context, when the 
existence of a VC firm’s recent experience in investing in a cross-border country-industry 
coincides and matches with other VC firms’ investment flow to the same country-industry, the 
focal VC firm is more compelled to reinvest in that country-industry. The effect of such a self-
reinforcing bias from the focal VC firm’s recent experience is greater than that pertaining to 
competitive advantage, due to imitation effect. I hypothesise the effect of international 
experience in the country-industry versus imitation effect of other VC firms’ investment in the 
same country-industry as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Overall, the VC firm’s propensity to invest in a country-industry is affected 
more by its recent international experience in that country-industry than imitating other VC firms 
located in the same state/province and investing in that same country-industry. 
Evidence from previous studies shows that small organizations imitate their larger 
counterparts, mainly because of the visibility of the latter’s’ actions (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). Baum et al. (2000) show that, in the chain acquisition context, large organizations are 
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imitated by other organizations. Moreover, empirical research in international business highlights 
that when smaller companies gain awareness of how to penetrate new countries through viewing 
the pattern of strategies and performance results of large firms or first movers in an industry,  
they may mimic steps employed by their competitors as a common response to approach the 
uncertainty on how the global market runs (Fernhaber and Li, 2010). In fact, it is quite possible 
that small VC firms’ likelihood of investing in a certain country-industry is less affected by their 
recent experiential learning that it is by larger VC firms’ investment patterns to that country-
industry. Smaller VC firms are reported to employ more rigid assessments and decide more 
cautiously when considering the soundness of an investment opportunity, as they tend to gain the 
trust of their institutional investors for future fund raising by managing to have more successful 
exits from their investee ventures (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Therefore, in my context, the 
self-reinforcing effect of a recent experience of a small VC firm is weaker than imitation effect, 
and the existence of a pattern of investment in a specific country-industry has more influence in 
investing again in that country-industry. 
Hypothesis 6: A focal VC firm’s propensity to invest in a country-industry is affected more by 
imitating other VC firms located in the same state/province and investing in that country-
industry than by its recent experience in that country-industry, if that focal VC firm is smaller 
than the average size of other VC firms located in the same state/province and investing in that 
same country-industry in the previous years. 
Figure 2-1 summarizes all of six hypotheses introduced in the section 2.2. 
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Figure 2-1 Theoretical model and summary of hypotheses 
 
2.3 Methodology 
In this section I develop my methodological framework, which are the process of downloading 
and generating database for analysis and analytical methodology. 
2.3.1 Data 
The data are from Thomson ONE Private Equity database. The database includes private equity 
investments, buyouts, mergers, and acquisitions for more than 100 countries from 1971 to the 
present. The data is the most comprehensive source of worldwide VC investment and has been 
extensively used in VC cross-border investment research (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Guler and 
Guillén, 2010a, 2010b; Liu and Maula, 2016). My empirical setting is venture capital firms in the 
United States, which engage in VC cross-border investment. From the database, I retrieved all 
cross-border investments by U.S VC firms between 2000 and 2013. I focused only on U.S VC 
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firms because the U.S is the largest market and supplier for VC capital investments (Oehme and 
Bort, 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2009). I excluded investment observations in which the VC firm’s 
name, venture’s name and/or venture’s country was not disclosed. I used independent venture 
capital funds and corporate venture capital funds as two major types of VC investor types in the 
Thomson database. I also limited the database only to “Venture Capital” deals (i.e. I excluded 
“Buyouts”, “Real Estate” and “Other” as types private equity investments). Since VC 
investments are usually staged and main decision of a VC firm occurs at the first stage (later 
stages are conditional on performance of ventures), I limited my sample to the first round of 
investments, to avoid bias due to emphasizing later rounds of investment. 
To test the effect of vicarious versus experiential learning on cross-border VC cross-border 
investment, I use ordered triplet of ‘VC firm-venture’s country-venture’s SIC code, as the unit of 
analysis in my study; that is, all possible combinations of VC firms, countries of investee 
companies, and SIC codes in the data. Between 2000-2010, 1,141 VC firms invested in total of 
4,787 cross-border VC investment in 79 different countries and 380 different SIC codes. I set up 
an event history for the ordered triplet unit of analysis, which is ‘VC firm-venture’s country-
venture’s SIC code’ (I will use VC-Country-industry to address my unit of analysis), starting 
with the date of its first international cross-border investment. Then I arrange the data into yearly 
observations of the unit of analysis. Obviously, there is not an observation for all of my ordered 
triplet unit of analysis in all times; i.e., not all VC firms invest in all countries and all industries 
every year between 2000-2010. Consequently, I need to track the effects of vicarious and 
experiential learning on cross-border investments for those times that there are missing 
observations in my dataset (i.e. when there is no cross-border investment). I track changes on VC 
firms experience for experiential learning, other VC firms aggregate experience for vicarious 
learning, and macroeconomic metrics on the unit of analysis when there are missing 
observations. This method enable us to truly identify the effect of my independent on dependent 
variables. My final sample includes 60,164 observations. 
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2.3.2 Analytical Method 
I use event history analysis (survival analysis) as a suitable analytical method, since, I am 
analyzing the effect of experiential and vicarious learning on VC firms’ propensity to invest in a 
country and industry. Similar studies analyzing the effect of experiential and vicarious learning 
in international measures and acquisitions (Oehme and Bort, 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2009) and in 
venture capital context (Bertoni and Groh, 2014; Guerini and Quas, 2016) used event history 
analysis. I assume an event occurs when a VC firm invests in a venture in a specific country and 
industry. Each company is considered at risk (i.e. is likely to invest in a cross-border venture in 
the country-industry) the year after its last event (the year a cross-border investment occurs) and 
until the next event. If the VC firm does not have a new cross-border VC investment in a country 
and industry that it had before, until 31 December 2013, then that unit of analysis is considered 
right-censored. 
I analyze my dependent variable, i.e. the propensity of a VC firm investing in a foreign venture 
in a specific country and industry, by the hazard rate model (Allison, 2010; Tuma and Hannan, 
1984) . The hazard function is defined by: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑡𝑛) =  lim
𝑡→𝑡𝑛
𝑃(𝑡𝑛 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡𝑛 + 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡𝑛)
𝑡 − 𝑡𝑛
, 
which determines the instantaneous rate at which the international investment occurs at time t, 
given that the VC firm’s previous investment in that country and industry was at time 𝑡𝑛 
(Allison, 2010). P denotes the discrete probability of a VC firm chooses an international investee 
company in that country-industry. I then employ the Cox model to identify the effects of my 
independent variable on the hazard rate: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑡𝑛) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝑋(𝑡)
′β),      𝑡 > 𝑡𝑛 
where 𝑋(𝑡) is the vector of covariates. The Cox model is a semi-parametric method in event 
history analysis. Semi-parametric methods make few restrictions on the probability distribution 
function of hazard rate (in my study the probability of engaging in a cross-border investment by 
a U.S VC firm) (Blossfeld, 2001). 
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2.3.3 Variables 
2.3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Whether to Invest in a cross-border Venture 
To test my hypotheses, I set my dependent variable to be the VC firm’s decision on whether to 
invest in a country and industry.  
2.3.3.2 VC firm’s experiential learning 
For a focal U.S VC firm, in a specific country, and, in a specific industry I define two variables 
to track the experiential learning effect. First, I use the cumulative number of first round 
investments of that VC firm in a foreign country within the past two years, to be the experience 
of the VC firm in that specific country. Second, I use the cumulative number of first round 
investments of a VC firm in that foreign country and industry within the past two years, to be the 
experience of the VC firm in a specific country-industry. I focus on the past two years’ data since 
I am willing to investigate the recent experience and imitation effect. Using 1-year time window 
may result in an under-estimation the effect of my independent variables, as the circulation of 
information in the market may take more than one year. Although my results are stable by 
generating variables with one-year time window. 
2.3.3.3 VC firm’s vicarious learning 
Regarding vicarious learning for a focal U.S VC firm, in a specific country, and industry I define 
two variables. First, I count investments by other U.S VC firms investing in a foreign venture in 
a country and industry within the past two years. Second, I count US VC firms headquartered in 
the same state as the focal VC firm, investing in a specific country and industry. 
 
2.3.3.4 VC Firm Size 
I define the VC firm’s size to be the sum of the all of VC funds’ size under its management.   In 
limited partnership structure, a VC firm is the general partner and the institutional investors are 
the limited partners of a VC fund. VC firms act as the advisory role of a VC fund and can 
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provide professional management resources to the VC funds. A VC firm can have multiple VC 
funds under management. Thomson Private Equity database reports VC funds size, rather than 
VC firm size. VC funds size is defined to be the equity under management of VC funds that 
invest in the investee companies.  
2.3.3.5 Control variables 
I need to control for macroeconomic factors that influence the VC firms’ decision to invest 
abroad. VCs internationalize to either complement or upgrade their capabilities, so it makes 
sense that they would choose ventures in countries/markets with highly developed innovation 
systems and advanced technology. They are also attracted to a developed stock market, high 
capitalization and low corruption levels. Investors will also go for countries with legal protection 
of investors, favorable government policies, converging business ethics and practices and 
political stability and similar institutional settings. (Guler and Guillén, 2010a, 2010b; Schertler 
and Tykvová, 2011; Tykvová and Schertler, 2011). Based on the above discussion, I use 
macroeconomic metrics of the destination country of VC investment to control for a VC firms’ 
decision to invest in a cross-border venture. I use GDP per capita in 2014 U.S dollars, stock 
market capitalization, research and development expenditures, number of patent granted to 
residents, venture capital legal score, cultural distance, and institutional distance as control 
variables the detailed explanation and source of these control variables can be found in Table 
2-1. 
Institutional distance is based on a longitudinal database of worldwide governance indicators 
on the six dimensions of governance quality. The six dimensions in the database are: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Each dimension has a score between −2.5 and 2.5 
for each dimension, with higher values representing higher quality. These dimensions are 
commonly used to measure country-level institutional quality and bilateral country level 
institutional distance (e.g., see Dai et al., 2012; Malhotra et al., 2015; Tykvová and Schertler, 
2014). I will measure the institutional distance between country pairs as follows: 
 24 
 
Institutional Distance = ∑
(𝐾𝑈𝑆,𝑗 − 𝐾𝐷,𝑗)
2
6×𝑉𝑗
6
𝑗=1
 
Where 𝐾𝑈𝑆,𝑗 and 𝐾𝐷,𝑗 are the Kaufmann et al.'s dimension j for US and the destination country 
of investee firm respectively.  
Cultural distance is measured using Hofstede's (1984) culture dimensions. This framework has 
been broadly used in many studies (e.g., see Dai et al., 2012; Dai and Nahata, 2016; Liu and 
Maula, 2016). I measure the cultural distance between the US and the investee’s country by 
using the Cartesian distance of Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (i.e. individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance, and masculinity) 2 
Cultural Distance = ∑
(𝐻𝑈𝑆,𝑗 − 𝐻𝐷,𝑗)
2
4
4
𝑗=1
 
Where 𝐻𝑈𝑆,𝑗 and 𝐻𝑇,𝑗 are the Hofstede's cultural dimension j for the US and the destination 
country of investee firm respectively.  
I measure the geographical distance between the VC firm and investee company by using the 
latitude and longitude points provided in the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) portal 3 (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). The detailed explanation and source 
of all variables can be found in Table 2-1. 
  
                                                     
2 I obtain the data from http://geerthofstede.com/ 
3 I get the data from the CEPII website. Please see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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Table 2-1--Variable descriptions. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
 Variable name Description Source 
Main Variables 
 Cross-border VC investment 
event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t  
A dummy variable equals one for each VC 
investment by the US VC firm Fi in a foreign 
venture in country Cj and the industry SICk 
Thomson ONE 
 Foreign Experience (Cj) t ♣ Foreign Experience of VC firm in the country 
Cj. It is cumulative number of venture capital 
investment in the country Cj during 2 years 
before year t 
Thomson ONE 
 Foreign Experience (Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 
Foreign Experience of VC firm in the country 
Cj and industry SICk. It is cumulative number 
of venture capital investment in the country Cj 
and industry SICk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
 Country-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t ♣ 
Number of US venture capital firms other than 
focal venture capital firm that invested in the 
country Cj and industry SICk during 2 years 
before year t 
Thomson ONE 
 State-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t ♣ 
Number of US venture capital firms other than 
focal venture capital firm and located in the 
same state as the focal venture capital firm that 
invested in the country Cj and industry SICk 
during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
 Small VC firm (Cj, SICk) t  A dummy variable equals one, when the size of 
the focal VC firm investing in country Cj and 
industry SICk is smaller than the average size of 
other VC firm that are located in the same state 
and investing in country Ci and industry SICk 
during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
Control Variables 
 GDP (Cj) t ♣ GDP per capita investee companies’ country 
(Cj) in the 2014 U.S. dollar (lagged one period 
of time). 
World Bank 
 Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ Stock Market capitalization of listed companies 
as percentage of GDP investee companies’ 
country (Cj). (lagged one period of time). 
World Bank 
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 Variable name Description Source 
Main Variables 
 R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ Business Research and development 
expenditure (% of GDP) for investee 
companies’ country (Cj). (lagged one period of 
time). 
World Bank 
 Patents(Cj) t ♣ Number of patent granted to residents relative 
to countries’ GDP per capita in the 2014 U.S. 
dollar for investee companies’ country (Cj) 
(lagged one period of time).  
World Bank 
 VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ Venture capital legal score (Venture capital is 
easily available for business) for investee 
companies’ country (Cj) (lagged one period of 
time). 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
 Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ Cultural distances between the capitals of 
venture capital’s country (US) and investee 
companies’ country (Cj)(time invariant) 
(Hofstede, 1984) 
 
 Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ Institutional distances between the capitals of 
venture capital’s country (US) and investee 
companies’ country (Cj). 
WGI 
 Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ Geographical distances between the capitals of 
venture capital’s country (US) and investee 
companies’ country (Cj). 
CEPII 
 
 
2.4 Results 
Table 2-2 covers the descriptive statistics and correlations. All correlation coefficients of 
variables that used in my regression analysis were less than 0.5. 
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Table 2-2—Correlation Matrix. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
ID Variables mean SD/ ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Cross-border VC investment 
event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t  
0.080 0.271 
1.00 
     2 Foreign Experience (Cj) t 
♣ 0.186 0.538 0.14*** 1.00 
    3 Foreign Experience (Cj, SICk) 
t 
♣ 
0.004 0.061 
0.22*** 0.18*** 1.00 
   4 Country-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 
0.596 1.036 
0.09*** 0.02*** 0.11*** 1.00 
  5 State-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 
0.224 0.640 
0.11*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.68*** 1.00 
 6 Small VC fund (Cj, SICk) t  0.004 0.060 0.21*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 1.00 
9 GDP (Cj) t 
♣ 9.557 1.470 -0.00 -0.20*** -0.02*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.02*** 
10 Market Capitalization (Cj) t 
♣ 4.319 0.630 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 
11 R&D Expenditures (Cj) t 
♣ 1.945 0.981 0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
12 Patents(Cj) t 
♣ 8.122 18.804 0.02*** 0.33*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.13*** -0.00 
13 VC legal score(Cj) t 
♣ 5.520 1.108 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 
14 Cultural Distance(Cj) 
♣ 2.239 0.765 -0.00 -0.16*** -0.02*** 0.19*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 
15 Institutional Distance(Cj) t 
♣ 0.712 1.703 -0.03** -0.25*** -0.03*** 0.04*** -0.05*** 0.01*** 
16 Geographical Distance(Cj)
 ♣ 8.527 1.062 -0.01 -0.17*** -0.02*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 
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Correlation Matrix (continued) 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
ID  mean SD/ ID 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Cross-border VC investment event 
(Fi,Cj,SICk)t  
0.08 0.271         
2 Foreign Experience (Cj) t 
♣ 0.186 0.538         
3 Foreign Experience (Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 0.004 0.061         
4 Country-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 
3.022 7.595         
5 State-level Imitation  
(Cj, SICk) t 
♣ 
0.88 3.547         
6 Small VC fund (Cj, SICk) t  0.596 1.036         
7 GDP (Cj) t 
♣ 9.557 1.47 1.00        
8 Market Capitalization (Cj) t 
♣ 4.319 0.63 0.42*** 1.00       
9 R&D Expenditures (Cj) t 
♣ 1.945 0.981 0.54*** 0.14*** 1.00      
10 Patents(Cj) t 
♣ 8.122 18.804 -0.47*** -0.17*** -0.19*** 1.00     
11 VC legal score(Cj) t 
♣ 5.52 1.108 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.37*** -0.3*** 1.00    
12 Cultural Distance(Cj) 
♣ 2.239 0.765 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.00 -0.4*** 0.30*** 1.00   
13 Institutional Distance(Cj) t 
♣ 0.712 1.703 0.82*** 0.35*** 0.29*** -0.6*** 0.21*** 0.69*** 1.00  
14 Geographical Distance(Cj)
 ♣ 8.527 1.062 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.03*** -0.3*** 0.25*** 0.62*** 0.44*** 1.00 
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Table 2-3 presents the regression analysis for the effect of experiential learning on venture 
capital firms’ market selection decision. The experience variable has a stable effect over different 
models. Both recent foreign experience in the focal country, and experience in focal country-
industry of investee company determine the propensity of the VC firms to invest in a cross-
border company, and the coefficients are statistically significant. I will transfer the linear effects 
in all of regression results tables to marginal results for a 10% increase in the independent 
variables on my dependent variable. Model (1-a) shows that, on average, 10% increase in 
country-specific experience of a VC firm is equivalent to 4.7% increase in the hazard rate of a 
VC firm to invest again in that focal country. The corresponding figure in model 1_b shows that, 
on average, 10% increase in country-industry specific foreign experience of a VC firm is 
associated with 58% increase in that VC firm’s propensity to reinvest in that focal country-
industry. These inferences provide grounds to support  Hypothesis 1a and 1b. 
To do the analysis for both of experience variables, I remove the country-industry portion from 
country specific foreign experience in model 2 in Table 3. The results show the effect of 
experience in country-industry is greater than country specific experience and these effects are 
statistically significant (p<0.001). Consistently I can infer that 10% increase in country and 
country-industry experience is associated with 3.86% versus 21.2 % increase in the probability 
of the focal VC firm invest again Therefore, hypothesis 2 is strongly supported by the results 
from model (2) in Table 2-3. 
 Table 2-4 shows the regression results for vicarious learning of US VC firms. The results from 
models (3-a) and (3-b) show both country-level and state-level imitation separately affect the VC 
firm’s propensity to invest in a country-industry and these effects are statistically significant at 
1% level. W. model (3-a) and (3-b) show that 10% increase in the imitation variable at country-
level and state-level separately, is associated with 1.4% and 1.6% increase in the VC firm’s 
propensity to invest in the focal country-industry.  
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Table 2-3— The Experiential learning effect. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and 
SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable: Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t  
Model: (1_a) (1_b) (2) 
Covariates    
Foreign Experience (Ci) t ♣ 2.2745*** 
 
2.0426*** 
 (0.124) 
 
(0.110) 
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
 
16.7336*** 6.7384*** 
  
(2.254) (0.999) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.2221*** 1.1676*** 1.2207*** 
  (0.050) (0.040) (0.048) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.1283*** 1.2102*** 1.1288*** 
  (0.045) (0.054) (0.045) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.8558*** 0.8221*** 0.8451*** 
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.1165** 1.2155*** 1.1214*** 
  (0.048) (0.039) (0.046) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.5115*** 1.8068*** 1.5081*** 
  (0.165) (0.246) (0.161) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9321 0.9180*** 0.9348 
  (0.040) (0.025) (0.040) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9294** 0.9412*** 0.9317** 
  (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 1.0022 0.9773** 0.9989 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
Number of observations 40,186 40,186 40,186 
Number of Clusters 1,046 1,046 1,046 
Number of Events 3,067 3,067 3,067 
𝜒2 259.183 744.688 711.761 
Degree of Freedom 9 9 10 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.010 0.018 
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Table 2-4— The Vicarious learning effect. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and 
SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable:  Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t 
Model: (3_a) (3_b) (4) 
Covariates    
Country-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
1.3689*** 
 
1.1938*** 
 (0.025) 
 
(0.026) 
State-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣  
1.6085*** 1.3467*** 
  
(0.041) (0.042) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.2238*** 1.1992*** 1.2211*** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.1997*** 1.1983*** 1.1924*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.7411*** 0.7889*** 0.7563*** 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.2440*** 1.2196*** 1.2296*** 
  (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.6699*** 1.7163*** 1.6547*** 
  (0.240) (0.245) (0.236) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.8506*** 0.8771*** 0.8560*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9435*** 0.9450*** 0.9450*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9055*** 0.9275*** 0.9063*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Number of observations 40,186 40,186 40,186 
Number of Clusters 1,046 1,046 1,046 
Number of Events 3,067 3,067 3,067 
𝜒2 412.162 519.120 562.052 
Degree of Freedom 9 9 10 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.008 0.009 
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Table 2-5— The Experiential and Vicarious learning effects. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable: Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t 
Model: (5) (6) 
Covariates   
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣ 9.8320*** 
 
 
(1.377) 
 
State-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
1.4731*** 
 
 (0.033)  
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣×  
Small VC fund (Ci, SICj) 
 1.6817** 
  (0.394) 
State-level Imitation (Ci, SICj) t ♣ × 
Small VC fund (Ci, SICj) 
 3.6906*** 
  
(0.193) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.2014*** 1.1581*** 
  (0.042) (0.042) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.1883*** 1.2212*** 
  (0.053) (0.054) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.7914*** 0.8257*** 
  (0.039) (0.043) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.2088*** 1.2279*** 
  (0.039) (0.043) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.6776*** 1.8805*** 
  (0.229) (0.275) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.8906*** 0.9115*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9432*** 0.9402*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9408*** 0.9626*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Number of observations 40,186 40,186 
Number of Clusters 1,046 1,046 
Number of Events 3,067 3,067 
𝜒2 1,002.844 908.646 
Degree of Freedom 10 10 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.007 
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Moreover, from model 4, I control for both of imitation effects at the same time by subtracting 
the state-level imitation portion from the country-level imitation. The results from model (4) 
shows that the state-level imitation has greater impact on the hazard rate, considering the fact 
that the 99% confidence intervals for my competing variables do not overlap. 10% increase in 
the state-level and country-level imitation variables is associated with 1.81% versus 0.47% 
increase in the hazard rate respectively. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is supported by the results from 
model (2) in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-5 shows the results for the analysis of experiential and vicarious learning effects 
together. Overall, the results show that foreign experience in a country and industry is more 
important than the state-level imitation effect. In unrestricted model (model 5), 10% increase in 
country-industry experience is associated with 32% increase in the hazard rate, while 10% 
increase in state-level imitation is associated with 1.47% in the hazard rate. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is supported based on the results. Moreover, the results support the moderating 
effect of VC firm size. The results show, when the size of a VC firm investing in a country-
industry is smaller than average size of other VC firms investing in the same country and 
industry, then the effect of vicarious learning is greater than experiential learning. These results 
are significant in 1% level. Consequently, these results offer grounds to support my hypotheses 5 
and 6. 
2.4.1 Robustness Tests 
I test for robustness by using different structures in generating the variables for experiential and 
vicarious learning. The original variable arrangement is based on the past two years’ activity of 
the focal VC firm or other VC firms’ activities. The foreign experience of VC firm in a country 
and in a country-industry, will be measured by the cumulative number of venture capital 
investments in that unit during past four years. Moreover, imitation effects also are measured for 
the past four years. Table 2-6, Table 2-7, and Table 2-8 show that the results remain stable over 
the same specifications as discussed above for my regression results. 
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Table 2-6—Robustness test for the Experiential learning effect. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and 
SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable: Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t 
Model: (1_a) (1_b) (2) 
Covariates    
Foreign Experience (Ci) t ♣ 1.8589*** 
 
1.7071*** 
 (0.080) 
 
(0.073) 
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
 
13.2104*** 6.4944*** 
  
(1.594) (0.776) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.1495*** 1.1079** 1.1490*** 
  (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.0690 1.1247*** 1.0634 
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.047) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.9351 0.9056* 0.9179* 
  (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.0418 1.1428*** 1.0478 
  (0.043) (0.038) (0.039) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.4150*** 1.7065*** 1.4179*** 
  (0.172) (0.257) (0.168) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9588 0.9444** 0.9606 
  (0.040) (0.024) (0.041) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9585 0.9749 0.9610 
  (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 1.0263* 0.9927 1.0225 
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
Number of observations 28,166 28,166 28,166 
Number of Clusters 826 826 826 
Number of Events 2,483 2,483 2,483 
𝜒2 258.847 732.688 619.982 
Degree of Freedom 9 9 10 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.010 0.018 
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Table 2-7— Robustness test for the Vicarious learning effect. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and 
SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable: Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t 
Model: (3_a) (3_b) (4) 
Covariates    
Country-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
1.3097*** 
 
1.1660*** 
 (0.021) 
 
(0.020) 
State-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣  
1.4608*** 1.2626*** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.1921*** 1.1521*** 1.1839*** 
  (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.1116** 1.1174** 1.1086** 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.8011*** 0.8572*** 0.8162*** 
  (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.1896*** 1.1533*** 1.1704*** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.5061*** 1.5779*** 1.4981*** 
  (0.230) (0.245) (0.229) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.8718*** 0.8932*** 0.8729*** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9679 0.9776 0.9729 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9025*** 0.9345*** 0.9069*** 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Number of observations 28,166 28,166 28,166 
Number of Clusters 826 826 826 
Number of Events 2,483 2,483 2,483 
𝜒2 414.847 449.169 536.810 
Degree of Freedom 9 9 10 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.008 
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Table 2-8— Robustness test for the Experiential and Vicarious learning effects. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects on the propensity of VC firm invests in country Ci and 
SICj. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals one when a VC firm invests in country Ci and SICj. . 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
♣ shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value. 
Dependent Variable: Cross-border VC investment event (Fi,Cj,SICk)t 
Model: (5) (6) 
Covariates   
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣ 8.4011*** 
 
 
(1.107) 
 
State-level Imitation  
(Ci, SICj) t ♣ 
1.3609*** 
 
 (0.024)  
Foreign Experience (Ci, SICj) t ♣ ×  
Small VC fund (Ci, SICj) 
 2.0773*** 
  (0.539) 
State-level Imitation (Ci, SICj) t ♣× 
 Small VC fund (Ci, SICj) 
 2.6855*** 
  
(0.099) 
GDP (Cj) t ♣ 1.1482*** 1.1054** 
  (0.048) (0.048) 
Market Capitalization (Cj) t ♣ 1.1061** 1.1323*** 
  (0.050) (0.050) 
R&D Expenditures (Cj) t ♣ 0.8597*** 0.9126* 
  (0.044) (0.049) 
Patents(Cj) t ♣ 1.1385*** 1.1552*** 
  (0.038) (0.043) 
VC legal score(Cj) t ♣ 1.5442*** 1.7754*** 
  (0.230) (0.284) 
Cultural Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9078*** 0.9385** 
  (0.024) (0.025) 
Institutional Distance(Cj) t ♣ 0.9764 0.9704 
  (0.021) (0.022) 
Geographical Distance(Cj) ♣ 0.9499*** 0.9789* 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
Number of observations 28,166 28,166 
Number of Clusters 826.000 826.000 
Number of Events 2,483.000 2,483.000 
𝜒2 874.511 1,015.719 
Degree of Freedom 10 10 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.006 
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2.5 Discussion 
In this, I focused on two components of organizational learning theory, namely experiential 
learning and vicarious learning, to explain how venture capital (VC) firms make international 
investment decisions. I showed that the recent history of international VC and the recent 
international investment patterns of other VC firms are knowledge sources that can be used for 
future decision to invest in that country-industry. 
This study makes several contributions to the application of learning theories in the VC 
context, and is the first attempt to investee vicarious and experiential learning in the cross-border 
VC research stream. I show that VC firms, tend to rely on their recent investment experiences in 
their cross-border investment decision makings. Liu and Maula (2016) and Dai and Nahata 
(2016) showed that the experience of the lead VC in a syndication team, or experience of other 
VC members in the syndication team, increases the propensity of VC firms to partner with local 
VC firms in that same country in a cross-border investment, whereas Meuleman and Wright 
(2011) provide an opposite result based on private equity data. Moreover, such experience 
increases the aggregate amount of investment and he probability of a successful exit from cross-
border VC investments (Dai and Nahata, 2016; Liu and Maula, 2016).  These results are based 
on the rational effect of experience on subsequent decisions. Learning theories show that 
dominant organizational routines resulting from continuous strategies often cause mistaken 
decisions in searching for new opportunities and threats (Levitt and March, 1988). Building on 
the phenomena of exploration and exploitation processes in organizational learning (March, 
1991), I show that the reported bias towards the exploitation process, arising from the experience 
of firms,  tempts VC firms to reinvest in ventures in the same country, and also the same 
country-industry that matches their recent experience. 
Moreover, my study adds to extant literature on the role of heuristics in the VC context. VC 
firms are reported to decide vicariously in their selection of entrepreneurial firms to target (Baum 
and Silverman, 2004). By performing a case study, Keil et al. (2008) showed that corporate VC 
firms adopt a combination of vicarious and active participation learning. This study verifies the 
insights from the case study presented by Keil et al. (2008), by uncovering the role imitative 
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behaviour in the cross-border VC investments. The results also restate the role of imitative 
behaviour in international business literature; mimetic behavior has a considerable effect in 
reducing the impacts of uncertainties associated with cross-border operations (Fernhaber and Li, 
2010; Oehme and Bort, 2015; Yeniyurt et al., 2009). I showed the pattern of cross-border 
investment in a country-industry, signals a potential opportunity in that country and industry, and  
compels that other VC to follow that pattern. Moreover, VC firms rely more on information 
spill-over from VC firms that are located in the closer vicinity.  
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Chapter 3 
  
Government Venture Capital and  
Cross-Border Investment 
3.1 Introduction 
Governments around the globe have shown a pronounced interest  in VCs ability to finance 
innovation (Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2014; Cumming, 2007). Traditionally, market 
failures occur (Hall, (2002) because investors, as agents, are often not competent to deal 
effectively with entrepreneurs, who know the business better than the investors. This reasoning 
provides the motivation for government intervention in venture capital to address market 
failures. These interventions are categorized in Cumming and Li (2013) as direct and indirect 
public expenditure programs and institutional settings. Government venture capital (GVC) is one 
direct method of intervening to address market failure, and governments worldwide have 
allocated a relatively large amount of funds towards venture capital. Moreover, the latest 
statistics by the European Venture Capital Association show that, in 2013, about 40% of all 
funds raised by venture capital investors (VCs) in Europe came from government (EVCA, 2014).  
While prior work has offered substantial insights into many aspects of government venture 
capital (GVC), there has been a comparative dearth of work on the relationship between GVC 
and private venture capital (PVC) investment internationally. In this essay, I describe the 
possible theoretical arguments that may point to various results pertaining to why GVC may 
crowd-in or crowd-out PVC internationally. Recent studies found that GVCs have successful 
outcomes in a mixed structured investment (i.e., when they syndicate with PVC funds), and 
unsuccessful outcomes in a pure structured investment (i.e., when they are sole investors) 
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(Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). In this study, I investigate the effect of 
mixed- and pure- GVC investment on international PVC investments. 
To test these conjectures, I use worldwide VC investment data from 1998 to 2013 from 26 
countries. I address endogeneity by using an extensive set of macroeconomic controls, a unique 
set of fixed effects, and dynamic panel data analysis. The data indicate that the presence of GVC 
in a country is a determinant of both incoming and outgoing cross-border VC investment. The 
data further indicate that domestic mixed-GVC investment crowds-in cross-border PVC and 
pure-GVC investments crowds-out cross-border PVC. The evidence shows that the crowding-in 
effect is stronger than the crowing-out effect. 
This study contributes to the literature in two main areas. First, it highlights the intersection 
between GVC, cross-border VC investment, and the effects of institutions on VC industry 
research streams, as in the extensive work by Alperovych et al. (2015); Leleux and Surlemount 
(2003); Vanacker et al. (2014); Colombo et al. (2014), who highlight GVC, Liu and Maula (Liu 
and Maula, 2016); Dai and Nahata (2016); Guler and Guillén (2010a, 2010b); Hurry et al. (1992) 
and Iriyama et al. (2010), who highlight cross-border venture capitalists, and Bruton et al. 
(2004); Bruton et al. (2009); Cumming and Knill (2012); Guler and Guillén (2010a), who 
highlight the effect of institutions on the VC industry. Second, I contribute to the literature on the 
crowding-out and crowding-in of different structures of GVC investments. Prior evidence on this 
topic has examined crowding-in or crowding-out without distinguishing between domestic and 
international investment flows (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2013). 
Lerner (2009, p. 122) argues that GVC may be linked to international PVC investment flows, but 
suggests that further evidence is warranted. 
This essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related studies and hypotheses 
development; Section 3.3 introduces the data, variables, and methodology of the study; Section 
3.4 covers results; and Section 3.5 contains concluding remarks 
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3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Government Venture Capital 
Recently, Government venture capital as a type of public intervention has resulted in a 
substantial academic discussion. The initiatives of GVCs entail the generation of venture capital 
finances that are funded and controlled through government-linked agencies. GVCs focus on 
promoting commercial start-ups by injecting financial resources. The principal rationale for such 
a policy intervention is the equity gap.  New entrepreneurial ventures often face challenges in 
obtaining the required funds to advance their companies. However, according to Kortum and 
Lerner (2000), private venture capital finances are the most suitable to offer seed and growth 
funding for entrepreneurial projects. Private venture capital funds are private financial 
organizations that obtain funds from investors (private institutional investors, pension funds, etc.) 
that they then channel to new entrepreneurial ventures linked with high risks. While PVCs invest 
in new ventures,  there are some characteristics of a business that may be unappealing, such as a 
very early stage venture.(Bertoni et al., 2015). Dealing with this market failure is a distinct 
approach that government authorities take. There are two key mechanisms available to 
government authorities (Guerini and Quas, 2016). First, the government could indirectly 
intervene in the entrepreneurial funding market by tinkering with  the legal and fiscal settings 
that impact PVCs (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Knill, 2012). Second, the 
government could directly invest in the VC industry. In this study I define GVC fund as 
government-affiliated agencies that aim to provide funding to start-ups and companies because 
of their unappealing characteristics.  GVCs attempt to close the gap in the supply of equity for 
innovation and new business growth by directing these funds to high-risk companies, or 
companies at a very early stage of development that may be overlooked by PVCs. 
Nevertheless, such interventions by the government raise concerns since it would be 
counterproductive if government intervention substitutes for private investment (Leleux and 
Surlemont, 2003). This concern resulted in various studies that attempted to gauge whether 
government interventions in the VC industry bear a negative or positive impact on the volume of 
VC finances obtained from a macro perspective.  GVC is a complex phenomenon because such 
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programs possess varying geographical scope, objectives and structures (Bertoni and Tykvová, 
2015; Buzzacchi et al., 2013; Munari and Toschi, 2015). Studies have found mixed evidence for 
the impact of GVC on portfolio companies. For instance, Cumming and Macintosh (2006) and 
Armour and Cumming (2006) found  negative impacts in Canada and Europe respectively. On 
the other hand, Guerini and Quas (2016), have discovered a positive impact of government 
investments in the VC industry development.  
 Prior studies utilize various performance measures to show that GVC has no positive impact 
especially if they participate alone (Grilli and Murtinu, 2014).The study focused on GVC 
performance in countries within Europe by analyzing negative and positive exit outcomes. 
According to Grilli and Murtinu (2014), individual investments by GVC finances have no 
substantial effect on portfolio firms concerning employee and sales growth. This is also evident 
in patenting activities (Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015). Furthermore, solo GVC funds negatively 
impact efficiency and result in underperformance in PVC activities with regards to the possibility 
of an efficient exit through Trade Sale or IPO (Alperovych et al., 2015). 
 Nonetheless, other studies imply that GVCs can have positive effects. First, PVCs and GVCs 
syndication is beneficial to the businesses’ exit performance, sales growth, innovation and 
patenting activity (Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). Brander and his 
colleagues(2015) , makes a distinction between VCs that are government owned and VCs that 
are supported by the government. Results from such differences reflect that VCs supported by 
the government performed better as compared to the government-owned ones. This was with 
regards to the total funding of a portfolio company and also its successful exit. Besides, GVC 
could just add value through supporting companies until the next financing phase by increasing 
the investee’s possibility to obtain private venture capital due to a certification outcome (Guerini 
and Quas, 2016; Lerner, 2002). 
3.2.2 Cross-Border Venture Capital  
Hain, Johan, and Wang define venture capitalists as emissaries who blend their technological and 
financial skills to support new ventures (Hain et al., 2015). Venture Capital investment was 
found to be more localized, with most venture capitalists having a preference for investment in 
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new ventures within their home countries. Equity traders in the U.S. grant almost 94% of their 
funds to domestic companies, despite the fact that their equity market is only 48% of the global 
total (Cumming and Johan, 2013). Some VCs decide on their investments based on a “20-minute 
rule,” which discourages funding of start-up companies seeking venture capital that are more 
than a 20-minute drive away from the offices of the VC (Cumming and Johan, 2013). This is 
because internationalization and cross-border VC investment are regularly associated with 
uncertainty, due to opaqueness and increased information asymmetry between the VC and the 
venture and monitoring costs (Dai et al., 2012; Hain et al., 2015; Tykvová and Schertler, 2011).  
With the increasing trend of internationalization studies show that VCs are attracted to new 
ventures in countries or markets that are suitable for doing business (Cumming et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the factors are mainly macroeconomic, and they affect both whether and how the 
cross-border venture capital investment will take place. The factors include GDP growth, 
research and development activities, stock market capitalization (Schertler and Tykvová, 2012, 
2011), size and dynamism of the market, legal factors, and government policies (Guler and 
Guillén, 2010a). VC firms go international to complement or better their capabilities with new 
knowledge so institutions in environments with highly developed innovation systems and 
advanced technology will attract cross-border venture capital investment.  
A developed stock market combined with high capitalization and low corruption levels also 
encourage cross-border venture capital investments (Hain et al., 2015; Schertler and Tykvová, 
2012). Schertler and Tykvová argue that these factors affect cross-border venture capital from 
three perspectives; the country pair, the VC perspective, and portfolio company perspective. The 
first claims that expected growth differences between the VC’s state and the firm's country 
positively relate to the number of cross-border venture capital deals that can take place between 
them. The second, which is expected GDP growth in the VC’s home country, discourages cross-
border venture capital due to increased localization; and high market capitalization positively 
affects both domestic and international investments; and the third, that cross-border venture 
capital deals increased when their GDP and market capitalization are expected to increase 
(Schertler & Tykvová, 2012). 
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As for legal factors, markets or countries with legal protection of investors and government 
policies that enforce it are critical for cross-border venture capital investors (Guler and Guillén, 
2010b). Underdeveloped investor and property protection is a challenge VCs looking to 
internationalize experience (Cumming and Knill, 2012; Hain et al., 2015). So are diverging 
business ethics and perceived corruption and/or political instability in certain areas(Hain et al., 
2015). Guler and Guillén (2010a) suggest the introduction of improvements across such regions, 
in scientific, political and financial sectors, to benefit all and not just a few firms and 
entrepreneurs. The institutions themselves, too, affect the choice and strategy of the VCs; their 
effects will be discussed later. 
The micro analysis of the literature on cross-border VC, shows the factors that influence VC 
internationalization strategies. These include geographical and cultural differences, relational and 
institutional trust between the VC and the venture, previous experience in domestic and/or 
international VC investment, the role of domestic VCs in host countries, and social capital or 
network advantage of the VCs. Convergence in culture enhances negotiations (Dai and Nahata, 
2016), but divergence discourages the formation of partnerships between domestic and foreign 
VCs even though such collaborations produce synergies, alleviating the effects of geographical 
distance. The effects of geographic distance are more greatly felt between international VCs and 
the firms than between the foreign and domestic VCs (Tykvová and Schertler, 2014). The 
analysis also showed that syndication affects the decision to internationalize; this is where 
investors share investment rounds with either one strictly as the leader or in reciprocation, where 
they alternate the lead position. Syndication distributes risk, reduces information costs and  
allows more efficient access (Liu and Maula, 2016). However, the differences in corporate 
management strategies of various institutions do not permit syndication to solve the issue of 
institutional distance. VCs with previous experience in domestic and foreign investment are 
more open to cross-border venture capital since they are more networked and more familiar with 
geographical distance (Liu and Maula, 2016; Schertler and Tykvová, 2011). Institutional and 
relational trusts affect cross-border venture capital depending on whether there is a domestic-
foreign VC partnership involved and whether the firm’s economy is developing or emerging. 
Confidence in the company’s structure (institutional), encourages cross-border venture capital 
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from developed to developing countries while relationship trust reduces information asymmetry 
(Hain et al., 2015). Social capital or network advantage, which are the resources that come with 
the network of relationships that an entrepreneur or firm has, provide exposure to opportunities, 
complementary skills, connections, learning, resource gathering and access to new markets (Hain 
et al., 2015; Iriyama et al., 2010). They also influence the exit strategies of the firms 
(Jääskeläinen and Maula, 2014). 
3.2.3 Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we provide the grounds to hypothesize that the structure of government VC 
investments can be a factor that can affect the flow of investments by both domestic and 
international private VC funds to make a cross-border VC investment.  
First, we will argue that the structure of government VC investments can influence the 
international activity of domestic private VCs. We address the study by Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006), who investigated Canadian government VC practices. Cumming and Johan 
(2013) analyze Canada’s government VC--called ‘Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital 
Corporations’ and report that they outbid other funds in the market by weakening the expected 
returns, as the they receive inexpensive tax subsidies, and consequently, institutional investors in 
the market reduced their fund commitment. Because of  bidding-up of private VCs’ rate of 
returns, it is possible that private VCs will be forced in lower investments, as they can not 
compete with government VCs who have access to cheap tax funds. As suggested by Lerner 
(2009, p. 122) private VCs who face competition with government VCs may look for investment 
opportunities in  cross-border destinations. Consequently, international activity of domestic 
private VC funds is tied up into the activities of government VC practices.  
Second, regarding the relation between the structure of government VC investments and 
foreign private VC attraction/ discouragement, we address the arguments by Guler and Guillén 
(2010a) and Makela and Maula (2008).  According to Guler and Guillén (2010a), the choice 
made by a VC firm to invest in an environment greatly depends on the quality and nature of its 
institutions. Therefore, the presence of institutions plays a vital role in influencing cross-border 
VC investments. According to  Guler and Guillen (2010a), legal systems can have an impact on a 
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country’s attractiveness to venture capital firms. Legal institutions can thus be used to estimate 
the possibility of a foreign company from a country bearing substantial investor protections will 
finance an investment in a nation that lacks a legal regime offering such protections. Moreover, 
the study conducted Makela and Maula (2008) further established that domestic venture capital 
investors impact cross-border VC , as the presence of prominent domestic venture capitalists is a 
good sign to potential cross-border VC investors (Mäkelä and Maula, 2008). Consequently, we 
claim that the structure of government venture capital, as the public institutions mostly related to 
the VC market, and as one of the significant domestic investors in any country, can be a 
determinant of both domestic and foreign private VC investment flows. 
We then claim that the direction of such effects depends on the structure of government VC 
investments, building on recent literature that shows government VCs have successful outcomes 
in mixed structured investments and unsuccessful outcomes in pure structured investments  
(Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2014; Grilli and Murtinu, 
2014). In mixed structures, government VC funds leverage the available funds of private VCs to 
a ratio greater than or equal to one, and will provide promotional benefits for private investors in 
case of profitable investments. For example, the IIF program in Australia divides profits in a nine 
to one ratio between the government and private VCs (Cumming, 2007).  Consequently, mixed-
structured investment by government VCs can be a vehicle that promotes the domestic private 
VC ecosystem and attracts both domestic and foreign private VC for more investments. We also 
argue that pure-government VC investments crowd-out private VC internationally, by forcing 
outgoing and preventing incoming cross-border private VC investments. Destructive pure-
government VC may compete with private VC, bidding up deal prices, and lowering investment 
returns, thereby making the domestic VC market unattractive for international private VCs, and 
forcing domestic private VC funds to go international. 
We argue that more mixed structured government VC investment in a country inhibits 
domestic private VCs from investing in cross-border destinations, and attracts foreign private VC 
funds to invest in that country, by making that focal country’s VC market more attractive. On the 
other hand, we expect more pure-structured government VC investment in a country discourage 
domestic and foreign VC funds from investing in that country. We hypothesize the effects of 
 47 
mixed- and pure-government VC investments on incoming and outgoing private VC investment 
flows as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: more mixed-government VC structured investment in a country will crowd-in 
outgoing private VC investments. 
Hypothesis 1b: more mixed-government VC structured investment in a country will crowd-in 
incoming private VC investments. 
Hypothesis 2a: more pure-government VC structured investment in a country will crowd-out 
outgoing private VC investments. 
Hypothesis 2b: more pure-government VC investment in a country will crowd-out incoming 
private VC investments. 
Furthermore, in a country that has multiple government VC programs with a combination 
of mixed and pure we expect that more mixed-government VC investment compared to pure-
government VC investment will crowd-in (both incoming and outgoing) private VC investors. 
Conversely, increasing number of pure-structured VC investments will crowd-out private VC 
investors. Under these settings, we hypothesize the effect of mixed and pure-government VC 
investments on cross-border private VC investment flows in the hypothesis 3, as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: more mixed-government VC structured compared with pure-government VC 
structured investments in a country will crowd-in outgoing private VC. 
Hypothesis 3b: more mixed-government VC structured compared with pure-government VC 
structured investments in a country will crowd-in incoming private VC. 
Hypothesis 4a: more pure-government VC structured compared with mixed-government VC 
structured investments in a country will crowd-out outgoing private VC. 
Hypothesis 4b: more pure-government VC structured compared with mixed-government VC 
structured investments in a country will crowd-out incoming private VC. 
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3.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
The data are from Thomson Reuters, specifically Thomson ONE Private Equity. The database 
includes private equity investments, buyouts, mergers, and acquisitions for 106 countries from 
1971 to the present. From the database, I use all VC investments between 1998 and 2013. I 
exclude outlier data at the lowest fifth percentile of sample countries in the global VC investment 
data for which there is, at least, one domestic VC fund that has, at least, one investment. This 
action is identical to include countries in the sample that have more than 200 new investment 
rounds over 1998-2013 period.  In my study, a GVC fund refers to government funding and 
Retail venture capital funds in the Thomson database, and a PVC fund refers to independent 
venture capital funds and corporate venture capital funds. I focus on source countries whose VC 
funds create investments as well as the destination countries, mainly because my aim is to test 
the GVC effect on the investment location of PVC funds at the source and destination of VC 
flows. I also solve the problem of subsidiary VC funds, which are reported to be a domestic VC 
fund in a country, but they are a subsidiary fund of other VC firms in another country. After 
matching and cleaning, the data contains 125,310 new VC investment rounds originated by 
13,034 VC funds and 7,213 VC firms worldwide, located in 26 countries. Overall, 84% of all 
new investment rounds are domestic; i.e., they originated from domestic VC funds into domestic 
companies. 
I use a bilateral country-level as my analytical framework, in which I focus on VC investment 
flows between different countries, i.e. on the overall investment activity for each country pair in 
each year. The advantage of this analysis, relative to a country-level perspective, is that I can 
control for both destination and source country VC investment, which leads to a superior 
analysis of cross-border investment. In this case, I have a panel of 10,400 observations (26 
countries as source and destination of VC flows, and 16 years). 
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Figure 3-1—  Bilateral country-level framework 
(1) represents cross-border VC flows from VC funds of VC funds in a source country to VC investees in 
country A as a destination country, and (2) represents cross-border VC flows from VC funds in country A 
as a source country into VC investee companies in a destination country (both arrows (1) and (2) 
represent variables 1-3 in Table 2). 
 
3.3.2 Variables 
The main dependent variable in the analysis is the number of new investment rounds annually. 
VC investments usually take place in multiple rounds. As the main decision of VC funds occurs 
in the first round, I focus on the first round of investment to remove possible bias in counting VC 
investment flows in multiple round investments. In particular, I focus on the number of new 
cross-border investment rounds by PVC as the main dependent variable. The independent 
variables are the number of mixed or pure domestic new investment rounds by GVC. As shown 
in Figure 3-1, a cross-border new investment round can be counted multiple times based on the 
number of countries that at least one VC fund invests. Another aspect that might influence the 
analysis is the size of the domestic VC market. Countries are extremely different in terms their 
VC markets. For example, the US is by far the best and largest VC market for both domestic and 
international VC funds. Consequently, large cross-border deals might lead to biased analysis 
without correcting for the size of the domestic VC market. We, therefore, standardize cross-
border PVC investment by dividing by the average of domestic new investment rounds in the 
source and destination countries. 
In order to limit biased estimation, for example, due to an idiosyncratic investment, or a 
special interest of a fund in a country, I test the effect of GVC on two other groups of dependent 
variables in the robustness tests section: the number of new enterprises, and the number of funds. 
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Regarding different dependent variables, I use count variables of new enterprises, and VC funds 
as dependent variables to test if the results are sensitive to counting the number of new 
investment rounds as the dependent variable.  
A country can also experience growth in both mixed- and pure-GVC investments, and this 
might lead to biased results. In order to avoid such bias, I use the percentage of mixed and 
percentage of pure investments to total GVC new investment rounds for each country-year, and I 
track if the change of mixed-GVC investments over pure-GVC investments affects the pool of 
domestic and cross-border PVC investments. Combining groups of variables and the above 
classification of cross-border investments yield three dependent variables in the bilateral 
country-level framework.  
To control for country-level factors that might affect domestic, outgoing cross-border and 
incoming cross-border VC investments, I include several control variables based on the literature 
regarding macroeconomic conditions. Base on the major studies in the field of cross-border VC 
(e.g. Guler and Guillén, 2010a; Schertler and Tykvová, 2012, 2011), I control for GDP per 
capita, stock market capitalization, research and development expenditures, corporate tax rate, 
patents, and VC legal score. The variable descriptions and summary statistics can be found in 
Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1--Variable descriptions and summary statistics. 
S and D are one of 26 countries in the sample as the source country and destination country, respectively. 
All of the variables in the main variables section are yearly basis and for each year between 1998-2013.  
All of the variables are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable value.  
 
 Variable Code Description Source N Mean SD Min max 
Main Variables 
1  PVCSD NNIR The percentage of number of bilateral cross-border new 
investment rounds participated by PVCs in country S into 
country D, to average of domestic number of new investment 
rounds by PVC in country S and D. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.257 0.545 0 3.948 
2  PVCSD NE The percentage of number of new enterprises in country D 
funded by PVCs from country S, to average of domestic 
number of distinct domestic enterprises funded by PVC in 
country S and D. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.223 0.494 0 3.645 
3  PVCSD NF The percentage of number of PVC funds in country S which 
has done at least one investment in the country D, to average of 
domestic number of distinct domestic PVC funds making at 
least one investments in country S and D. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.238 0.508 0 3.730 
4  GVC mixed-NNIR The percentage of number of domestic mixed-new investment 
rounds participated by GVC funds in the source or destination 
country to total number of domestic new investment rounds by 
PVC. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.916 1.233 0 5.762 
5  GVC pure-NNIR The percentage of number of domestic pure-new investment 
rounds participated by GVC funds in the source or destination 
country to total number of domestic new investment rounds by 
PVC. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 1.188 1.345 0 5.429 
6  GVC mixed-PCT The percentage of number of new investment rounds of mixed-
GVC investment to domestic new investment rounds that were 
funded by GVCs. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.202 0.238 0 0.693 
7  GVC pure-PCT The percentage of number of new investment rounds of pure-
GVC investment to domestic new investment rounds that were 
funded by GVCs. 
 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.311 0.281 0 0.693 
8  Successful-GVC-
Exits 
The percentage of number of domestic successful exits 
participated by GVC funds in the source or destination country 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.591 1.163 0 4.845 
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 Variable Code Description Source N Mean SD Min max 
to total number of domestic new investment rounds by PVC. 
9  Unsuccessful-
GVC-Exits 
The percentage of number of domestic unsuccessful exits 
participated by GVC funds in the source or destination to total 
number of domestic new investment rounds by PVC. 
Thomson 
ONE 
10,400 0.187 0.579 0 3.611 
Control Variables 
1  GDP GDP per capita in the 2014 U.S. dollar. World Bank 10,400 9.934 1.134 6.055 11.50 
2  Market 
Capitalization 
Stock Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
(lagged one period of time). 
World Bank 
10,400 4.232 0.628 2.152 5.679 
3  R&D Expenditures Business Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 
(lagged one period of time). 
World Bank 
10,400 1.065 0.310 0.451 1.709 
4  Taxes Tax rates based on net income, corporate profits and capital 
gain (lagged one period of time). 
World Bank 
10,400 3.378 0.523 0.865 4.215 
5  Patents Number of patent granted to residents relative to countries’ 
GDP per capita in the 2014 U.S. dollar (lagged one period of 
time). 
 
World Bank 
10,400 0.648 0.975 0 4.487 
6  VC legal score Venture capital legal score (Venture capital is easily available 
for business) (lagged one period of time). 
IMD World 
Competitiven
ess 
10,400 1.791 0.242 1.069 2.260 
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To control for country-level factors that might affect domestic, outgoing cross-border and 
incoming cross-border VC investments, I include several control variables based on the literature 
regarding macroeconomic conditions. Base on the major studies in the field of cross-border VC 
(e.g. Guler and Guillén, 2010a; Schertler and Tykvová, 2012, 2011), I control for GDP per 
capita, stock market capitalization, research and development expenditures, corporate tax rate, 
patents, and VC legal score. The variable descriptions and summary statistics can be found in 
Table 3-1. 
3.3.3 Empirical Methodology 
I focus on whether GVC funds drive domestic PVC funds to invest in foreign markets.  I also 
focus on the impact of GVC funds on incoming PVC investment.  I transform the raw VC 
investment data from Thomson ONE into a bilateral country-level framework. The analysis uses 
the following equation: 
YSDt = ρ. YSDt−1 + β1. GVC_MixedSt−1 + β2. GVC_PureSt−1 + β3. GVC_MixedDt−1 +
β4. GVC_PureDt−1 +  ∑ αi. CONTROLSt−1 + ∑ αj. CONTROLDt−1 + εSDt           (1) 
Where YSDt is for variables 1-3 in the bilateral country-level framework in Table 2. S and D 
represent one of 26 countries as the source and destination countries of VC flows, respectively. 
In my model, the panel identifier is the ordered pair of ‘source country-destination country’ in 
the bilateral country-level framework. I also use country-fixed effects as well as year-fixed 
effects to control for time-varying heterogeneity. Moreover, I control within a country for 
macroeconomic changes that may affect international VC deal flows. Variables GVC_Mixed and 
GVC_Pure in equation 1 are for variables 4-5, or 6-7. 
Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity is the main issue in panel data analysis. One way of 
addressing this issue, in the context of my study, is to apply the within (demeaning) 
transformation or fixed effects panel data analysis (Greene, 2003). Dynamic panel data models 
contain one or more lagged dependent variables, allowing for the modeling of a partial 
adjustment mechanism (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). Dynamic panel data models have been 
extensively used in the area of country-level and cross-border VC investment to address possible 
heterogeneities (Schertler & Tykvová, 2012). I use Arellano and Bover (1995) / Blundell and 
Bond (1998) (hereafter called an ABBB method) dynamic panel data estimators for my 
regressions. ABBB is an AR(1) model with ρ < 1, in which a system of Generalized Method of 
 54 
Moments instrumental variables is used. Instruments in this model can be a combination of a 
lagged dependent variable, independent variables, and optional external instruments. In the 
regression specifications, I assume that the number of cross-border VC investments in a country 
is correlated with the previous year’s number (amount) of investments. The idea behind this 
argument is that the number (amount) of cross-border VC flows from country S to country D 
depends on the experience that VC funds in country S have gained while investing in the 
previous year (Liu & Maula, 2015). 
I follow the rules by Roodman (2006), who has provided detailed instructions on how to 
implement ABBB dynamic panel data in Stata. In the ABBB dynamic panel data, every regressor 
in the instrument matrix Z is one of three forms: 1) single column (IV-style), if the regressor is 
strictly exogenous or an instrument of an explanatory variable; 2) lags one and deeper in a matrix 
form, if a regressor is predetermined but not strictly exogenous, and 3) lags two and deeper in a 
matrix form, if the regressor is endogenous. From this study, one can claim that there can be an 
unobserved factor to drive both domestic GVC and cross-border PVC; i.e., it is likely that 
domestic GVC can be endogenous to cross-border PVC. Based on the above reasoning, I include 
domestic GVC and cross-border PVC in category 3, control variables, and dummy variables in 
category 1. I correct the lag structure of dependent variables based on the Arellano-Bond test for 
serial correlation of the error term for each regression separately. I use the lag structure of order 
three if the 2nd order autocorrelation is significant at the 5% level, and a lag structure of order 2 
in all other models. 
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Table 3-2--VC fund activities by country for 1998-2013. 
 
 
Total 
Domestic1 
  
Total 
GVC2 
Pure-GVC 
(%) 
Mixed-GVC 
(%) 
 Outgoing 
cross-
border 
Incoming cross-
border 
United States 81,874  3,631 55 45  8,988 7,862 
Canada 6,364  2,057 64 36  1,354 1,547 
China 5,239  187 48 52  289 1,402 
United Kingdom 5,008  189 37 63  1,909 2,305 
France 4,864  56 39 61  872 1,120 
South Korea 4,261  339 76 24  273 490 
Germany 3,760  352 46 54  1,432 1,165 
India 1,779  65 88 12  283 1,074 
Sweden 1,442  130 55 45  339 608 
Spain 1,205  128 87 13  105 236 
Japan 1,156  11 45 55  1,031 308 
Israel 1,140  7 0 100  830 1,050 
Australia 955  80 85 15  352 302 
Finland 861  68 87 13  174 254 
Denmark 683  130 72 28  339 230 
Ireland 640  148 22 78  163 352 
Belgium 628  113 65 35  402 232 
Norway 534  63 63 37  349 124 
Netherlands 526  67 84 16  522 405 
Switzerland 473  1 0 100  1,146 426 
Italy 367  3 67 33  128 168 
Portugal 340  58 71 29  58 23 
Brazil 337  2 100 0  19 193 
Singapore 326  234 38 62  843 285 
Russia 287  52 75 25  183 148 
Austria 261  15 67 33  71 145 
Total 125,310  8,186 59 41  22,454 22,454 
 
1- Number of domestic new investment rounds that were funded by domestic VCs. 
2- Number of domestic new investment rounds that were funded by government VCs. 
3- The percentage of pure-GVC new investment rounds to total new investment rounds by GVCs 
4- The percentage of mixed-GVC new investment rounds to total new investment rounds by GVCs 
5- Number of outgoing cross-border new investment rounds that were funded by domestic VCs. 
6- Number of incoming cross-border new investment rounds that were funded by foreign VCs. 
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Figure 3-2--The trend of New Investment Rounds (NIR) participated by VC funds based on 1--the world, 2--
the U.S. only, and 3-theworld, excluding the U.S. data for the period of 1998-2013. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-2 contains information on the number of new investment rounds and the number of new 
enterprises that were VC funded in 26 countries. It can be inferred from Table 6 that U.S. VC 
funds have the highest rank regarding new investment rounds. On average, 5% of new 
investment rounds are funded by GVCs. Overall, VC funds make up 16% of total new 
investment rounds in cross-border destinations. 
Figure 3-2 shows the annual trend of new investment rounds by VC funds over the sample 
period and the percentage of domestic versus foreign investments. I can readily see the 2000-
2001 Internet bubble and the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Focusing on U.S. data, I find that both 
U.S. VC funds and cross-border VC funds invested in the U.S. seem to have a fixed proportion 
of cross-border investments over time, as the proportion of outgoing and incoming cross-border 
new investment rounds by VCs remained stable, even during the 2007-2008 stock market crash, 
other than slight growth in 2000. 
 
3.4.2 Regression Analysis 
The main independent variables are the yearly number of government VC investments 
standardized by domestic private VC size, which we used in Table 3, and are standardized by the 
total size of government VC investments (the percentage of each group of government VC 
investments), which we use in Table 3-4. So, by the results from Table 3-3, we can investigate 
hypotheses 1 and 2. Also, Table 3-4, investigates hypotheses 3 and 4. Our main dependent 
variables ( i.e., the VC flow between countries) are standardized by the average of domestic 
private VC in the source and destination countries, but for simplicity in explaining the results we 
only use the terms ‘inflow’ and ‘outflow’ of private VC.  Also, for the following reasoning, we 
assume that domestic private VC is fixed. 
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Table 3-3--Bilateral country-level regression analysis using macroeconomic factors as controls. 
Main independent variables are logarithmic transformed count variables of GVC which are standardized by the size of local PVC (variables 4 and 
5 from Table 3-1). In models 1-3 dependent variable is the number of new investment rounds PVCSD NNIR (variable 1 in Table 3-1); in models 4-6 
dependent variable is the number of new enterprises PVCSD NNE (variable 2 in Table 3-1). In models 7-9 dependent variable is the number of new 
Funds PVCSD NF (variable 2 in Table 3-1). All regressions use the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond (ABBB) dynamic panel data regression 
model. The panel identifier is the ordered pair of ‘source country-destination country’. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR 
 
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE 
  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
GVC mixed-NNIRS -0.0446*  
-0.1307*** 
 
-0.0440** 
 
-0.1098*** 
 
-0.0514** 
 
-0.1165*** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.032) 
GVC mixed-NNIRD 0.0314  
0.0750* 
 
0.0139 
 
0.0425 
 
0.0150 
 
0.0574* 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.034) 
GVC pure-NNIRS  
0.0423 0.1022** 
  
0.0143 0.0764* 
  
0.0087 0.0918*** 
  
(0.071) (0.045) 
  
(0.057) (0.041) 
  
(0.062) (0.035) 
GVC pure-NNIRD  
-0.0508 -0.0547* 
  
-0.0587 -0.0388 
  
-0.0777* -0.0733** 
  
(0.048) (0.037) 
  
(0.044) (0.033) 
  
(0.043) (0.032) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.5656*** 0.5684*** 0.3149*** 
 
0.5806*** 0.5886*** 0.2770*** 
 
0.5738*** 0.5646*** 0.3169*** 
 
(0.100) (0.095) (0.107) 
 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.089) 
 
(0.107) (0.105) (0.112) 
GDPS 0.0808*** 0.0197 0.1369*** 
 
0.0571** 0.0246 0.1096*** 
 
0.0506** 0.0151 0.1007*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.036) 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028) 
Market CapitalizationS 0.0197 0.0176 0.0464 
 
0.0334 0.0067 0.0436 
 
0.0202 0.0125 0.0413 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.041) 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.033) 
 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.035) 
R&D ExpendituresS -0.0423 0.0851 -0.0433 
 
-0.0479 0.0340 -0.0706 
 
0.0016 0.0777 0.0157 
 (0.094) (0.102) (0.128) 
 
(0.069) (0.078) (0.097) 
 
(0.076) (0.089) (0.107) 
TaxesS -0.1556*** -0.1299*** -0.3107*** 
 
-0.1333*** -0.1057*** -0.2750*** 
 
-0.1339*** -0.1210*** -0.2561*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.072) 
 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.058) 
 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.056) 
PatentS 0.0557** -0.0038 0.1134*** 
 
0.0430** 0.0124 0.0858*** 
 
0.0358* 0.0056 0.0828** 
 
(0.028) (0.041) (0.042) 
 
(0.021) (0.036) (0.033) 
 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.035) 
VC legal scoreS 0.1799** 0.0556 0.2673** 
 
0.1690** 0.1142 0.2238*** 
 
0.1530** 0.0916 0.1763** 
 
(0.091) (0.096) (0.107) 
 
(0.066) (0.093) (0.081) 
 
(0.069) (0.096) (0.081) 
GDPD -0.0109 -0.0028 -0.0508 
 
-0.0159 0.0092 -0.0372 
 
-0.0227 0.0022 -0.0394 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.044) 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.038) 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.035) 
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Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR 
 
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE 
  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
Market CapitalizationD -0.0807** -0.1156*** -0.0990***  
-0.0771*** -0.0866*** -0.0823*** 
 
-0.0429 -0.0738** -0.0731** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) 
R&D ExpendituresD 0.1086 0.1553 0.2787*  
0.0571 0.0400 0.1545 
 
0.0857 0.0794 0.1711 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.158) 
 
(0.076) (0.081) (0.126) 
 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.127) 
TaxesD -0.0520 -0.0447 -0.0972*  
-0.0406 -0.0331 -0.0837** 
 
-0.0316 -0.0207 -0.0790* 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.053) 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.039) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.041) 
PatentD 0.0267 0.0462 0.0277  
0.0243 0.0512* 0.0281 
 
0.0142 0.0463 0.0225 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.056) 
 
(0.024) (0.029) (0.041) 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.042) 
VC legal scoreD 0.2394*** 0.3131*** 0.3389***  
0.2119*** 0.2487*** 0.3126*** 
 
0.2025*** 0.2779*** 0.3681*** 
 
(0.087) (0.085) (0.100) 
 
(0.073) (0.082) (0.081) 
 
(0.072) (0.082) (0.082) 
_cons -0.4113 0.0792 -0.3636 
 
-0.2048 -0.1084 -0.1780 
 
-0.1962 -0.0654 -0.2778 
 
(0.390) (0.434) (0.628) 
 
(0.293) (0.369) (0.474) 
 
(0.317) (0.336) (0.497) 
Number of observations 10,400 10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 10,400 
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (p-value) 
0.039 0.092 0.002 
 
0.063 0.042 0.003 
 
0.069 0.032 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.013 0.012 0.137 
 
0.007 0.007 0.191 
 
0.006 0.006 0.082 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.341 0.325 0.327 
 
0.426 0.412 0.438 
 
0.086 0.083 0.089 
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Table 3-4--Bilateral country-level regression analysis using macroeconomic factors as controls. 
Main independent variables are logarithmic transformed count variables of GVC which are standardized by the size of local GVC (variables 6 and 
7 from Table 3-1). In models 1-3 dependent variable is the number of new investment rounds PVCSD NNIR (variable 1 in Table 3-1); in models 4-6 
dependent variable is the number of new enterprises PVCSD NNE (variable 2 in Table 3-1). In models 7-9 dependent variable is the number of new 
Funds PVCSD NF (variable 2 in Table 3-1). All regressions use the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond (ABBB) dynamic panel data regression 
model. The panel identifier is the ordered pair of ‘source country-destination country’. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR  
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
GVC mixed-PCTS -0.2255**   
-0.1911** 
  
-0.1649** 
 
 
(0.112) 
  
(0.084) 
  
(0.082) 
 
GVC mixed-PCTD 0.1439   
0.1020 
  
0.1013 
 
 
(0.102) 
  
(0.083) 
  
(0.082) 
 
GVC pure-PCTS  
0.0207 
  
-0.0166 
  
-0.0057 
  
(0.120) 
  
(0.088) 
  
(0.093) 
GVC pure-PCTD  
-0.2502*** 
  
-0.1571* 
  
-0.1867** 
  
(0.095) 
  
(0.082) 
  
(0.081) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.5739*** 0.5612*** 
 
0.6192*** 0.6103*** 
 
0.6084*** 0.5930*** 
 
(0.077) (0.095) 
 
(0.059) (0.067) 
 
(0.064) (0.089) 
GDPS 0.0597** 0.0489*  
0.0467** 0.0273 
 
0.0464** 0.0402** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.020) (0.018) 
 
(0.019) (0.019) 
Market CapitalizationS -0.0003 0.0050  
0.0090 0.0158 
 
-0.0046 0.0161 
 (0.032) (0.033) 
 
(0.025) (0.026) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) 
R&D ExpendituresS 0.0305 0.0716  
-0.0403 0.0582 
 
-0.0128 0.0418 
 (0.088) (0.101) 
 
(0.070) (0.071) 
 
(0.070) (0.078) 
TaxesS -0.1269*** -0.1520***  
-0.1200*** -0.1141*** 
 
-0.1024*** -0.1305*** 
 (0.043) (0.048) 
 
(0.033) (0.032) 
 
(0.033) (0.038) 
PatentS 0.0549** 0.0366  
0.0458** 0.0171 
 
0.0379** 0.0261 
 
(0.027) (0.026) 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) 
VC legal scoreS 0.1396* 0.1570*  
0.1686** 0.1079 
 
0.1366** 0.1122 
 
(0.079) (0.082) 
 
(0.070) (0.068) 
 
(0.066) (0.071) 
GDPD -0.0153 -0.0335  
-0.0108 -0.0261 
 
-0.0182 -0.0299 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
 
(0.024) (0.025) 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Market CapitalizationD -0.1051*** -0.0811***  
-0.0920*** -0.0638** 
 
-0.0980*** -0.0687*** 
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Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR  
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 (0.034) (0.031) 
 
(0.029) (0.025) 
 
(0.030) (0.026) 
R&D ExpendituresD 0.0751 0.1732*  
0.0278 0.0899 
 
0.0600 0.1126 
 (0.094) (0.105) 
 
(0.069) (0.074) 
 
(0.075) (0.083) 
TaxesD -0.0240 -0.0754*  
-0.0178 -0.0565** 
 
-0.0163 -0.0517* 
 (0.038) (0.040) 
 
(0.028) (0.025) 
 
(0.027) (0.027) 
PatentD 0.0303 0.0205  
0.0211 0.0099 
 
0.0170 0.0103 
 
(0.030) (0.032) 
 
(0.021) (0.020) 
 
(0.024) (0.023) 
VC legal scoreD 0.2650*** 0.3012***  
0.2170*** 0.2531*** 
 
0.2486*** 0.2760*** 
 
(0.093) (0.088) 
 
(0.077) (0.066) 
 
(0.076) (0.071) 
_cons -0.1816 0.0759 
 
-0.1146 0.1329 
 
-0.0697 0.0561 
 
(0.334) (0.351) 
 
(0.269) (0.278) 
 
(0.259) (0.286) 
Number of observations 10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (p-value) 
0.032 0.020 
 
0.032 0.103 
 
0.050 0.062 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.008 0.012 
 
0.004 0.005 
 
0.002 0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.323 0.337 
 
0.409 0.416 
 
0.078 0.082 
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The overall results from the regression analysis listed in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 suggest 
that more mixed-GVC investment compared to pure-GVC investment will decrease the outflow 
of PVC investments, and will increase the inflow of international PVC.  
The overall results from the regression analysis listed in Tables 3-3 suggest that more 
mixed-government VC investment is associated with a decrease the outflow of private VC 
investments, and an increase the inflow of international private VC. Based on model 3 in Table 
3-3, in which we control for both mixed- and pure- government VC investments at the same 
time, we find that a 10 percent increase in mixed-government VC will cause a 1.3 percent 
decrease in outflow of private VC investment, and a 0.75 percent increase in the inflow of 
private VC investments. Alternatively, a 10 percent increase in pure-government VC is 
associated with one percent increase in the outflow, 0.5 percent decrease in the inflow of private 
VC investments. the same conclusions can be drawn from models 1 and 2 in Table 3-3, in which 
we control for the effects of mixed and pure government VC investments separately. As it can be 
seen from Table 1, the mean and standard deviation of “PVCSD NNIR” are 0.26 and 0.54 after 
our standardization process. These changes are in the range of one standard deviation of our 
main dependent variable.  
Moreover, overall, the results are not sensitive to the use of different dependent variables 
in the sample. More specifically, an increase in mixed-government VC is associated decrease in 
outflow and increase in the inflow of new companies funded by private VCs and private VC 
funds. Likewise, pure-government VC investments effects on new investment rounds hold for 
the number of new companies funded and the number of private VC funds to invest 
internationally, compared to using the main dependent variable.  
The results from Table 3 supports hypothesis 1a in 1% significance level, hypothesis 2a in 5% 
significance level, and hypotheses 1b and 2b in 10% significance level. The result show that 
overall, the association between government VC investments is more with international 
investment by domestic private VCs, compared with foreign VCs. 
Considering the percentage of mixed- and pure government VC investments as 
independent variables also provide same insight in Table 3-4. 10 percent increase in mixed 
government VC investments relative to total government VC investments in a country is 
associated with 2.2 percent decrease and 1.4 percent increase in outgoing and incoming private 
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VC investments respectively. This statement suggests that if we assume there are an equal 
number of mixed- and pure- government VC investments, and mixed government VC 
investments increase and pure government VC investment decrease by 10 percent at the same 
time in a country, the domestic VC market experience at least 3.6 percent increase in attracting 
domestic and foreign VC funds. Conversely, a 10 percent increase in pure-government VC 
percentage is associated 2.5 percent decrease in the inflow of private VC.  
The overall results from the regression analysis listed in Tables 4 suggest that more 
mixed-government VC investment compared to pure-government VC investment will decrease 
the outgoing, and will increase the incoming private VC investments. Conversely, more pure 
government VC investments compared with mixed government VC investments, increases the 
outgoing and decreases the incoming investments. Based on the results from Table 3-4, we can 
conclude more mixed-government VC compared with pure-government VC in source countries, 
crowd-in outgoing private VC investment, while more pure- versus mixed-government VC 
investments crowd-out incoming private VC investment. Moreover, the magnitude of effects of 
both of mixed- and pure- government VC is greater on domestic than international private VC. 
Considering the statistical significance, the results from Table 3-4 allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis for hypothesis 3a and 4b only. First, as more mixed-government VC compared to 
pure-government VCs in the fund country (i.e., the source country of VC flows) decrease the 
outgoing of private VC. This effect is significant in most of our analysis arrangements. Second, 
more pure-government VC compared to mixed-government VC investments, decrease the 
incoming private VC investment flow. 
3.4.3 Test for Endogeneity 
It is likely that GVC investments are endogenous to cross-border PVC; i.e., there would be an 
unobserved factor (embedded in the error term) that will affect both domestic GVC and cross-
border PVC simultaneously. To address such endogeneity, so far, I have used Arellano and 
Bover/Blundell and Bond dynamic panel data, which is appropriate for studies that encounter 
endogeneity (Roodman, 2006). However, I use instrumental variable analysis as well. A good 
instrument for my study should be correlated with domestic GVC and not correlated with the 
error term from equation 1. I will use the quality of GVCs in their exits from their investee 
companies as the instrument for mixed or pure-GVC investment strategies. Using exits to 
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measure VC quality is a common practice in VC literature (Dai et al., 2012; Nahata, 2008). The 
justification for such operationalization is straightforward in the context of private venture 
capital industry, where the success of the VC firm is closely tied to the exits, which determines 
the survival of private VC firms. Regarding GVCs though, the successful outcomes might refer 
to multiple contexts, such as promoting more active entrepreneurship environment in the society, 
being supportive of the VC industry; or, having successful exits from their investees (Colombo et 
al., 2014). Here I assume the major measure of GVC quality is their exit performance from their 
investee companies, as used by other scholars (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). As Thomson 
does not provide the returns of VC exits, I use successful and unsuccessful exits by GVC as 
instruments for mixed and pure-GVC investments respectively.  VC scholars have widely used 
successful exit, usually through IPO or a merger and acquisition as a proxy for success, and other 
exit outcomes as unsuccessful exit performance (Cumming and Johan, 2013). I use Thomson 
ONE Private Equity to access exit data of GVC investments. I count successful and unsuccessful 
exits by GVC for each country-year for all of the countries in my sample, and standardize them 
by size domestic private VC new investment rounds. Instrumental variables can be added to the 
main model by declaring the link between endogenous variables and instruments (Roodman, 
2006). Nevertheless, I also admit the limitations of this approach and believe that further 
research could clarify the causal effects.  
I analyze the endogeneity of domestic mixed- and pure-GVC with respect to cross-border PVC 
investments. The coefficients for both the number and amounts of domestic GVC as a driving 
source for both outgoing and incoming cross-border PVC investments remain positive in all 
cases and significant in most of the cases. Table 3-5 reports bilateral country-level regression 
using macroeconomic control variables for both the source and destination countries. I use 
successful and unsuccessful exits by GVC as instruments for mixed and pure-GVC investments 
respectively. After using instrumental variables, the effect of the domestic number of mixed- and 
pure- GVCs in both the source and destination countries of VC investment flows did not change 
in magnitude and significant. Overall, the results from table 5 are stable compared to my main 
results discussed earlier in regression analysis section. 
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Table 3-5--Bilateral country-level regression analysis using macroeconomic factors as controls and instruments for domestic GVC investments. 
Main independent variables are logarithmic transformed count variables of GVC which are standardized by the size of local PVC (variables 4 and 
5 from Table 3-1). In models 1-3 dependent variable is the number of new investment rounds PVCSD NNIR (variable 1 in Table 3-1); in models 4-6 
dependent variable is the number of new enterprises PVCSD NNE (variable 2 in Table 3-1). In models 7-9 dependent variable is the number of new 
Funds PVCSD NF (variable 2 in Table 3-1). All regressions use the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond (ABBB) dynamic panel data regression 
model. The panel identifier is the ordered pair of ‘source country-destination country’. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR 
 
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE 
  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
GVC mixed-NNIRS -0.0295*  
-0.1375*** 
 
-0.0382*** 
 
-0.1139*** 
 
-0.0351*** 
 
-0.1252*** 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.032) 
GVC mixed-NNIRD 0.0100  
0.0617 
 
-0.0079 
 
0.0307 
 
-0.0149 
 
0.0432 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.032) 
GVC pure-NNIRS  
0.0281 0.1082*** 
  
0.0084 0.0769** 
  
0.0109 0.0926*** 
  
(0.024) (0.041) 
  
(0.018) (0.036) 
  
(0.019) (0.032) 
GVC pure-NNIRD  
-0.0037 -0.0651* 
  
-0.0086 -0.0465* 
  
-0.0251 -0.0770*** 
  
(0.022) (0.034) 
  
(0.017) (0.026) 
  
(0.018) (0.029) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.5668*** 0.5743*** 0.3141*** 
 
0.5814*** 0.6000*** 0.2760*** 
 
0.5751*** 0.5742*** 0.3163*** 
 
(0.100) (0.095) (0.106) 
 
(0.085) (0.080) (0.089) 
 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.112) 
GDPS 0.0749*** 0.0204 0.1364***  
0.0546** 0.0196 0.1090*** 
 
0.0452** 0.0168 0.1025*** 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.036) 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.028) 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.029) 
Market CapitalizationS 0.0213 0.0200 0.0438  
0.0309 0.0073 0.0426 
 
0.0151 0.0143 0.0410 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.040) 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.034) 
R&D ExpendituresS -0.0331 0.0708 -0.0397  
-0.0463 0.0328 -0.0672 
 
0.0085 0.0692 0.0101 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.132) 
 
(0.068) (0.068) (0.101) 
 
(0.077) (0.075) (0.110) 
TaxesS -0.1528*** -0.1281*** -0.3068***  
-0.1302*** -0.1119*** -0.2707*** 
 
-0.1310*** -0.1221*** -0.2530*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.072) 
 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.058) 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.056) 
PatentS 0.0492* 0.0015 0.1122***  
0.0416** 0.0116 0.0872*** 
 
0.0322 0.0046 0.0847** 
 
(0.028) (0.025) (0.042) 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.033) 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.035) 
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Dependent variable: 
Number of new Investment Rounds 
 PVCSD NNIR 
 
Number of new enterprises 
 PVCSD NNE 
  
Number of new Funds  
PVCSD NF 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) 
VC legal scoreS 0.1600* 0.0870 0.2671** 
 
0.1636** 0.1302* 0.2296*** 
 
0.1379** 0.0878 0.1869** 
 
(0.090) (0.080) (0.106) 
 
(0.067) (0.070) (0.081) 
 
(0.070) (0.073) (0.083) 
GDPD -0.0051 -0.0058 -0.0437 
 
-0.0099 0.0056 -0.0293 
 
-0.0154 0.0019 -0.0311 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.043) 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.037) 
 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.035) 
Market CapitalizationD -0.0805** -0.1226*** -0.1032*** 
 
-0.0768*** -0.0841*** -0.0865*** 
 
-0.0412 -0.0772*** -0.0749** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.031) 
R&D ExpendituresD 0.1012 0.1374 0.2715* 
 
0.0561 0.0226 0.1439 
 
0.0767 0.0503 0.1622 
 (0.106) (0.100) (0.158) 
 
(0.076) (0.078) (0.126) 
 
(0.085) (0.081) (0.130) 
TaxesD -0.0564 -0.0560 -0.1023** 
 
-0.0410 -0.0459* -0.0846** 
 
-0.0359 -0.0355 -0.0793* 
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.051) 
 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.038) 
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.041) 
PatentD 0.0334 0.0348 0.0335 
 
0.0323 0.0367 0.0376 
 
0.0234 0.0330 0.0320 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.057) 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.040) 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.045) 
VC legal scoreD 0.2571*** 0.2947*** 0.3701*** 
 
0.2205*** 0.2178*** 0.3379*** 
 
0.2256*** 0.2580*** 0.3906*** 
 
(0.086) (0.083) (0.099) 
 
(0.073) (0.076) (0.078) 
 
(0.073) (0.076) (0.081) 
_cons -0.4063 0.1232 -0.4283 
 
-0.2341 0.0214 -0.2717 
 
-0.1998 0.0001 -0.4038 
 
(0.388) (0.364) (0.599) 
 
(0.303) (0.310) (0.448) 
 
(0.325) (0.285) (0.474) 
Number of observations 10,400 10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 10,400 
 
10,400 10,400 10,400 
Hansen test of joint validity of 
instruments (p-value) 
0.034 0.065 0.002 
 
0.047 0.029 0.003 
 
0.040 0.020 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.013 0.011 0.139 
 
0.007 0.006 0.193 
 
0.006 0.006 0.082 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in 
differences (p-value) 
0.340 0.326 0.327 
 
0.425 0.415 0.439 
 
0.085 0.081 0.090 
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3.4.4 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I show how the magnitude of the results is sensitive to the use of different 
structures in the regressions. I test for robustness by using different time periods and different 
countries in the sample. 
Regarding different time periods--four different periods are selected. First, I divide 1998-
2013 into two equal periods of eight years: 1998-2005 and 2006-2013. Moreover, I test for 
periods after the Internet bubble (2000-2007) and after the stock market crash (2008-2013). 
Table 3-6 shows the sensitivity of results for using different time periods. The significance of 
the results is not sensitive to different time periods, although the magnitude is the same in 
sign but different in weight for different time periods.  
Regarding different countries, I first exclude the U.S. as a fund (source) or investment 
(destination) country, from my sample. Second, as some countries in my sample have few 
GVC investments, I limit the sample to countries with at least 50 new GVC investment 
rounds from 1998-2013 (see Table 3-2 for a list of countries in the sample). Third, I limit my 
sample to include all country-years, in which at least one new GVC investment round has 
occurred. Finally, I limit the sample to European countries with at least 50 new GVC 
investment rounds from 1998-2013; these countries include Germany, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and 
France. Table 3-7 shows the sensitivity of results for different countries in the sample. 
Overall the results remain stable after including different countries in the sample. This shows 
that my main results are not due to the inclusion of specific countries in my main sample. 
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Table 3-6--Robustness test based on different time periods. 
Main independent variables are logarithmic transformed count variables of GVC which are standardized by the size of local PVC (variables 4 
and 5 from Table 1). In all models dependent variable is the number of new investment rounds PVCSD NNIR (variable 1 in Table 1). All 
regressions use the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond (ABBB) dynamic panel data regression model. The panel identifier is the ordered pair 
of ‘source country-destination country’. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Time period of sample 1998-2005   2006-2013  2000-2007  2008-2013 
Model (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
GVC mixed-NNIRS -0.0232**   
-0.0384* 
 
 
-0.0097* 
 
 
-0.0533** 
 
 
(0.036) 
  
(0.041) 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
GVC mixed-NNIRD 0.0071*   
0.0164 
 
 
0.0706 
 
 
0.0618 
 
 
(0.036) 
  
(0.044) 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
 
(0.062) 
 
GVC pure-NNIRS  
0.0418** 
  
0.1618** 
 
 
0.0328* 
 
 
0.0061* 
  
(0.089) 
  
(0.069) 
 
 
(0.125) 
 
 
(0.100) 
GVC pure-NNIRD  
0.1361 
  
-0.0760 
 
 
0.0177 
 
 
-0.0892 
  
(0.107) 
  
(0.061) 
 
 
(0.081) 
 
 
(0.088) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.7187*** 0.7558*** 
 
0.2960*** 0.2812*** 
 
0.5818*** 0.6277*** 
 
0.6914*** 0.6532*** 
 
(0.089) (0.083) 
 
(0.069) (0.071) 
 
(0.125) (0.100) 
 
(0.125) (0.143) 
GDPS 0.0724* 0.0324  
0.0177 -0.0095 
 
0.0205 -0.0319 
 
0.0446 0.1030** 
 (0.038) (0.044) 
 
(0.039) (0.038) 
 
(0.043) (0.050) 
 
(0.036) (0.046) 
Market CapitalizationS -0.0257 -0.0091 
 
0.0256 0.0085 
 
0.0607 -0.0003 
 
0.0020 -0.0242 
 (0.057) (0.059) 
 
(0.038) (0.042) 
 
(0.056) (0.074) 
 
(0.045) (0.049) 
R&D ExpendituresS 0.0243 0.0908  
0.2073 0.1712 
 
0.1432 0.2355* 
 
-0.0578 -0.1520 
 (0.123) (0.136) 
 
(0.126) (0.117) 
 
(0.118) (0.126) 
 
(0.117) (0.123) 
TaxesS -0.0835 -0.0263  
-0.0708 -0.1605** 
 
-0.1409* -0.1014 
 
-0.0122 -0.0954 
 (0.074) (0.077) 
 
(0.069) (0.067) 
 
(0.084) (0.083) 
 
(0.065) (0.076) 
PatentS 0.0473 0.0428 
 
-0.0024 -0.0980* 
 
0.0400 0.0116 
 
-0.0081 0.0413 
 
(0.043) (0.049) 
 
(0.044) (0.051) 
 
(0.045) (0.060) 
 
(0.038) (0.069) 
VC legal scoreS 0.2617 0.3344*  
0.0723 -0.1207 
 
0.2028 0.1174 
 
-0.1277 -0.0661 
 
(0.162) (0.175) 
 
(0.112) (0.118) 
 
(0.153) (0.211) 
 
(0.124) (0.176) 
GDPD -0.0282 -0.0297  
-0.0247 -0.0256 
 
-0.0610 -0.0837 
 
0.0264 -0.0052 
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 (0.047) (0.052) 
 
(0.044) (0.046) 
 
(0.058) (0.059) 
 
(0.061) (0.058) 
Market CapitalizationD -0.1372** -0.1782***  
-0.1488*** -0.0564 
 
-0.1641*** -0.0809 
 
-0.1388** -0.0924 
 (0.062) (0.067) 
 
(0.046) (0.046) 
 
(0.063) (0.076) 
 
(0.066) (0.062) 
R&D ExpendituresD 0.2998** 0.3521** 
 
0.2023 0.2221* 
 
0.2033 0.1865 
 
-0.1511 -0.0714 
 (0.145) (0.176) 
 
(0.131) (0.130) 
 
(0.135) (0.138) 
 
(0.173) (0.170) 
TaxesD -0.0313 -0.1354  
-0.0728 -0.0439 
 
-0.0384 -0.0554 
 
-0.0400 -0.0114 
 (0.053) (0.107) 
 
(0.054) (0.052) 
 
(0.067) (0.080) 
 
(0.049) (0.056) 
PatentD 0.0096 0.0031  
0.0101 0.0447 
 
-0.0016 -0.0312 
 
0.0181 -0.0290 
 
(0.047) (0.050) 
 
(0.044) (0.050) 
 
(0.061) (0.057) 
 
(0.055) (0.070) 
VC legal scoreD 0.1646 0.0985 
 
0.3949*** 0.3856*** 
 
0.1920 0.2432 
 
0.3123* 0.2024 
 
(0.179) (0.190) 
 
(0.115) (0.130) 
 
(0.154) (0.180) 
 
(0.169) (0.170) 
_cons -0.3347 0.0519 
 
0.1040 0.5862 
 
0.5203 1.0895 
 
-0.1077 -0.1049 
 
(0.652) (0.835) 
 
(0.501) (0.547) 
 
(0.744) (1.045) 
 
(0.579) (0.572) 
Number of observations 5,200 5,200 
 
5,200 5,200 
 
5,200 5,200 
 
3,900 3,900 
Hansen test of joint validity of instruments (p-value) 0.078 0.038 
 
0.083 0.600 
 
0.255 0.165 
 
0.683 0.551 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences (p-value) 0.027 0.024 
 
0.847 0.782 
 
0.064 0.044 
 
0.552 0.553 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in differences (p-value) 0.117 0.116   0.836 0.899   0.803 0.822   0.722 0.736 
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Table 3-7-- Robustness test based on different sample of countries. 
Main independent variables are logarithmic transformed count variables of GVC which are standardized by the size of local PVC (variables 4 
and 5 from Table 1). In all models dependent variable is the number of new investment rounds PVCSD NNIR (variable 1 in Table 1). All 
regressions use the Arellano and Bover/Blundell and Bond (ABBB) dynamic panel data regression model. The panel identifier is the ordered pair 
of ‘source country-destination country’. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Sample of countries: 
Without U.S.  
 
More than 50 GVC NNIR 
over 1998-2013  
 
European countries with 
more than 50 GVC NNIR 
over 1998-2013  
 
At least 1 obs of GVC 
NNIR per country-year  
Model: (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
GVC mixed-NNIRS -0.0558**  
 
-0.0404** 
 
 
-0.3347*** 
 
 
-0.0586** 
 
 
(0.027) 
 
 
(0.031) 
 
 
(0.091) 
 
 
(0.057) 
 
GVC mixed-NNIRD 0.0406  
 
0.0040* 
 
 
0.0762* 
 
 
0.0314 
 
 
(0.034) 
 
 
(0.044) 
 
 
(0.088) 
 
 
(0.052) 
 
GVC pure-NNIRS  
0.0263** 
 
 
0.0148** 
 
 
-0.2963* 
 
 
-0.0452* 
  
(0.060) 
 
 
(0.114) 
 
 
(0.234) 
 
 
(0.089) 
GVC pure-NNIRD  
-0.0723 
 
 
-0.2320** 
 
 
-0.1597** 
 
 
-0.1029 
  
(0.048) 
 
 
(0.115) 
 
 
(0.205) 
 
 
(0.092) 
Lagged dependent variable 0.5499*** 0.5563*** 
 
0.5729*** 0.5740*** 
 
0.4547*** 0.4739*** 
 
0.5086*** 0.5145*** 
 
(0.101) (0.096) 
 
(0.094) (0.092) 
 
(0.074) (0.073) 
 
(0.131) (0.129) 
GDPS 0.0757** 0.0328 
 
0.1015** 0.0045 
 
0.2016 0.1191 
 
0.0861 0.0480 
 (0.030) (0.025) 
 
(0.045) (0.049) 
 
(0.153) (0.135) 
 
(0.059) (0.041) 
Market CapitalizationS 0.0225 0.0320 
 
0.0548 0.0426 
 
-0.0472 -0.1126 
 
0.0053 0.0211 
 (0.035) (0.034) 
 
(0.047) (0.055) 
 
(0.154) (0.173) 
 
(0.049) (0.041) 
R&D ExpendituresS -0.0467 0.0444 
 
-0.1079 -0.0280 
 
0.3286 0.4062 
 
-0.0507 0.0462 
 (0.108) (0.102) 
 
(0.169) (0.184) 
 
(0.479) (0.390) 
 
(0.189) (0.160) 
TaxesS -0.1959*** -0.1495*** 
 
-0.2701*** -0.2490** 
 
0.1815 0.1158 
 
-0.1738** -0.1142 
 (0.053) (0.048) 
 
(0.072) (0.108) 
 
(0.226) (0.248) 
 
(0.076) (0.092) 
PatentS 0.0340 -0.0018 
 
0.0718 -0.0219 
 
0.5200** 0.3212 
 
0.0704 0.0208 
 
(0.028) (0.029) 
 
(0.050) (0.059) 
 
(0.246) (0.275) 
 
(0.065) (0.037) 
VC legal scoreS 0.1794* 0.0576 
 
0.3894*** 0.2710** 
 
0.7462** 0.6588* 
 
0.3855*** 0.1689 
 
(0.102) (0.092) 
 
(0.111) (0.117) 
 
(0.365) (0.368) 
 
(0.133) (0.127) 
GDPD -0.0104 -0.0090 
 
-0.0649 0.0027 
 
-0.1693 -0.1139 
 
-0.0907 -0.0464 
 (0.037) (0.033) 
 
(0.051) (0.058) 
 
(0.157) (0.181) 
 
(0.084) (0.057) 
Market CapitalizationD -0.0836** -0.1050*** 
 
-0.0695 -0.0533 
 
-0.0337 0.0230 
 
-0.0799 -0.0876* 
 (0.038) (0.034) 
 
(0.051) (0.042) 
 
(0.164) (0.160) 
 
(0.052) (0.048) 
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Sample of countries: 
Without U.S.  
 
More than 50 GVC NNIR 
over 1998-2013  
 
European countries with 
more than 50 GVC NNIR 
over 1998-2013  
 
At least 1 obs of GVC 
NNIR per country-year  
Model: (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
R&D ExpendituresD 0.1244 0.1464 
 
0.3018* 0.5224*** 
 
0.9777** 1.0560*** 
 
0.2518 0.1937 
 (0.123) (0.115) 
 
(0.160) (0.184) 
 
(0.386) (0.406) 
 
(0.185) (0.150) 
TaxesD -0.0753 -0.0717* 
 
-0.0849 0.0821 
 
-0.0523 -0.0586 
 
-0.0588 0.0083 
 (0.046) (0.040) 
 
(0.060) (0.096) 
 
(0.386) (0.320) 
 
(0.060) (0.076) 
PatentD 0.0138 0.0102 
 
-0.0099 0.1319 
 
-0.2018 0.0814 
 
-0.0189 0.0065 
 
(0.043) (0.038) 
 
(0.064) (0.092) 
 
(0.395) (0.341) 
 
(0.066) (0.053) 
VC legal scoreD 0.2904*** 0.2768*** 
 
0.2980*** 0.2243** 
 
0.3575 0.3584 
 
0.3238** 0.3713*** 
 
(0.100) (0.093) 
 
(0.103) (0.110) 
 
(0.304) (0.287) 
 
(0.142) (0.126) 
_cons -0.2219 0.2326 
 
-0.2941 -0.4050 
 
-3.0987 -2.2923 
 
-0.1193 -0.1688 
 
(0.437) (0.398) 
 
(0.634) (0.591) 
 
(2.099) (2.041) 
 
(0.662) (0.598) 
Number of observations 9,600 9,600 
 
5,662 5,662 
 
1,980 1,980 
 
3,464 3,464 
Hansen test of joint validity of instruments (p-value) 0.026 0.105 
 
0.001 0.004 
 
0.998 0.156 
 
0.267 0.282 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in differences (p-value) 0.015 0.013 
 
0.362 0.356 
 
0.196 0.169 
 
0.605 0.604 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in differences (p-value) 0.347 0.335 
 
0.788 0.800 
 
0.387 0.451 
 
0.947 0.949 
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3.5 Discussion 
I investigated whether and how government venture capital investment structure (i.e. pure- and 
mixed-government VCs) affects the domestic pool of private venture capital internationally. The 
analysis used a bilateral country-level framework. I transformed VC investment data from 
Thomson ONE, which contains 125,310 new investment rounds, into standard panel data, 
consisting of 10,400 observations.  
The contributions of the study are twofold. First, it sheds light on the intersection between 
government VC and international VC investment studies. Findings show that the presence of 
domestic GVC is a determinant of both incoming and outgoing cross-border VC investment. 
This area has not been empirically investigated by scholars, except for verbal arguments made by 
Lerner (2009). Second, I contribute to the literature on the crowding-out and crowding-in effect 
of different structures of GVC investments namely, mixed structured and pure structured 
government VC, using an international perspective.  
The results of this study are in line with recent literature, which shows that government VCs 
have successful outcomes in mixed structured investments (i.e. when they syndicate with PVC 
funds), and unsuccessful outcomes in pure structured investments (i.e. when they are sole 
investor) (Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Brander et al., 2015; Cumming et al., 2014; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014). I showed that more mixed versus pure structured government VC investments in 
a country is associated with more incoming foreign and less outgoing cross-border VC 
investments by private VC funds. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Revisiting Canadian Public Policy on Venture Capital: 
Crowding-out or Displacing 
4.1 Introduction 
Every country desires to have an entrepreneurial ecosystem like Silicon Valley’s; however,  
access to risk-oriented capital for entrepreneurs is a major block in promoting such ecosystems 
(Alperovych et al., 2015; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015; Cumming, 2007; Lerner, 2009). Thus, 
many governments have themselves been spending great amounts of money on venture capital 
(VC) efforts to promote such ecosystems (Cumming et al., 2016; Vanacker et al., 2014; 
Zacharakis et al., 2007). While the speciﬁc objectives and structure of GVC investment vehicles 
may vary, one of their underlying objectives is to compensate for the scarcity of private VC 
investments (Cumming, 2013). In this essay, I will revisit the topic of how the Canadian version 
of government VC practices affects private VC investments in that country. 
Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) and the Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC) have been Canada’s major programs supporting an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. As with every other government’s VC program, there is an academic interest in the 
following question: are government VC funds in Canada performing as intended to promote an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem? I investigate whether government VC in Canada ‘crowds-out’ 
domestic private VCs and whether adverse practices of government venture capital may displace 
domestic private VC to other countries. Although there is no doubt that either explanation 
highlights the harmful effects of government VC programs in Canada, the latter is less damning 
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than the former explanation. In this study, I analyze the effect of government VC on domestic 
and cross-border private VC investments in parallel to each other.  
To test my conjectures, I use Canadian VC investment data during 1994-2013 from the 
Thomson Private Equity database and event history (survival) analysis based on yearly 
observations. I set up two unique units of analysis to track the activities of private and 
government VC firms in different provinces and industries.  My contribution is that I 
disaggregate the domestic and cross-border VC investments and study the effect of government 
VC on each in parallel. This approach is different from prior studies that focused on the pool of 
domestic VC investments and omitted the cross-border venture capital investments (Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2007, 2006). Taking cross-border VC investments into consideration helps to 
explain whether adverse government VC practices in Canada have displaced or crowded-out 
private VC investments. The results show that the investments by all types of government VC 
firms in Canada were associated with an increased likelihood of private VC firm engaging again 
in domestic investment, although this effect was negligible. However, government VC practices 
tended to displace domestic private VC to cross-border investments, mainly to the United States. 
This essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related studies; Section 4.3 explores 
hypotheses development; Section 4.4 introduces the methodology of the study; Section 4.5 
covers results; and Section 4.6 contains concluding remarks. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Economic theory has provided sufficient grounds for government intervention in financing 
research and development (R&D) and innovation.  The theoretical basis for government 
intervention can be explained by asymmetric information. The main element of R&D 
undertaking is knowledge but there is a wide gap between a private investor’s valuation of a 
start-up’s knowledge capital and the entrepreneur’s expectation of its value.  This gap can lead to 
an undersupply of funds for R&D in the market. As described by Hall (2002), the more complex 
the new technology, the more difficult it is for an external investor to assess risk and the more 
difficult it is for the firm to obtain financing. Information asymmetry can cause agency problems 
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such as moral hazards, adverse selection, and free riding4. Market failures occur, as investors as 
agents are not willing to deal with entrepreneurs, who know the business better than investors 
and can easily underperform without principal knowledge. The reasoning above provides the 
motivation for government intervention in R&D to address market failures. In this section, I 
summarize studies that analyzed government VC. I categorize previous studies in government 
VC based on the region or countries analyzed: global studies, European Countries, the United 
States; and studies that analyze other countries (United Kingdom, and Australia). Finally, I 
provide an overview of Canadian Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs). 
4.2.1 Global Studies 
Brander et al. (2015) conduct an international analysis of government VC policies and show that 
more government VC funding results in more overall VC funding per enterprise.  They intend to 
answer the question of whether government VCs expand private venture capital funds and/or if 
government VCs increase the probability of successful exits. They claim that syndicated 
investments by government and private venture capital (called mixed government VC funding) 
are associated with higher total investment and more favorable exit outcomes. Their results show 
that for a mixed government VC investment (although the average investment per investor fund 
is lower) the number of syndicated investors and the investment amount is higher. On top of this, 
they also claim that mixed government VC investments increased the pool of investment funds 
of private VC investments. Conversely, they show that enterprises which have sole government 
investor funds (called pure government VC funding), have a lower investment amount. In the 
market level analysis, they found a positive relation between government VC funding and 
aggregate investment and number of enterprises. On assessing exit performance, they claim that 
the likelihood of successful exits increases with mixed government VC funding. 
4.2.2 European Countries 
Leleux and Surlemont (2003) studied public VC in 15 European countries to ascertain whether 
government VCs in Europe either had crowding-out effect (removing private VC industry) or 
                                                     
4 For a complete explanation and examples see (Cumming and Johan, 2013, pp. 46–56). 
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seeding effect (promoting private VC industry). They showed that there was a negative 
association between the magnitude of government VC investments and the size of the venture 
capital industry, while controlling for country-specific factors. However, they showed that public 
involvement had increased the amount of funds increased the level of VC funding available in 
different industries. They have also shown that government VC help develop investments in the 
areas which is not attractive for private VCs (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). 
Buzzacchi et al. (2013), drawing on European Investment Fund data, found that public 
investment showed a preference for long-term investment. Moreover, unlike private VCs, which 
are concerned only with profitability and returns on investments, public investors have diverse 
expectations from entrepreneurs, such as knowledge spill over. their analysis of public 
investment patterns in connection with the lower incidences of write-offs (unsuccessful exit from 
investment), suggested that higher public participation in the equity of investee companies are 
correlated with a lower probability of write-offs, but an extended duration for the investment 
(Buzzacchi et al., 2013).  
Cumming and his colleagues (2014) analyzed investor-side performance by comparing 
positive and negative exit outcomes. They focus ed on comparing the influence of government 
VC funds, private VC funds (Independent Venture Capitals), and their syndicated investments in 
positive exits. Exploring whether different exit outcome might arise with different investment 
syndication structures between private VC and government VC, they found that private VCs 
positively influence the likelihood of reaching an exit though IPO or M&A. In contrast, 
government VCs have a negligible impact.  Syndicated VC investments between private VCs 
and government VCs lead to a higher likelihood of a positive exit than do independent VC-
backed investments (Cumming et al., 2014). They also showed that VC size, which is the annual 
number of VC investors in the year before the analysis, makes a negative exit outcome less 
likely. On the other hand VC diversity, which means different fund types for each investee firm 
in the year preceding the analysis, will make a negative exit outcome more likely (Cumming et 
al., 2014). 
 77 
Grilli and Murtinu (2014) compared the impact of government VC and private VC on the 
growth of European high-tech entrepreneurial firms. In doing so, they analyzed the impact of 
government VC and private VC when they invest separately, co-financed (with first only one 
investing, followed by the other latter), and syndicated (when both invest at the same time). They 
also showed that young investee firms who get their financing from private VCs generate 
remarkable growth in sales and employees compared to firms supported by public VC financing. 
When government VCs are either the leader in syndicated investments or the sole investor, the 
growth of young companies is influenced only in the initial stages of development.  
Based on the study by Bertoni & Tykvová (2015), government VC does not spur innovation 
and invention in public companies and other ventures where VC is directed. The study found that 
there were fewer innovations in government VC invested companies as compared to private VC, 
which was evidenced by fewer or no patents of their products and services. Besides, it was 
evident that the performance of government VC companies was poor with low productivity 
compared to private VC firms. The private VC were found to foster patents, thus encouraging 
inventions. It was found that government VC management follows strict guidelines, and lacks 
autonomy, that affects the functioning of the management and thus restricts innovativeness. They 
found that companies that receive funding from a combination of government and private VCs 
will have more inventions, when compared with sole government VC investments. 
Bertoni et al. (2015) investigated different types of VCs with a sample of European VC 
investments between 1994 and 2004. They suggested that private venture capitals invest in low-
risk businesses like telecommunication and internet services as opposed to capital-intensive 
ventures like engineering and R&D. Bank-oriented VCs in Europe usually invest in low-risk 
ventures, and do not invest in new companies and those with few employees (less than ten). On 
the other hand, they show that government VCs invest in capital-intensive and high-technology 
businesses. Besides, they also invest in small and new companies as compared to other types of 
VCs. They found government VCs in Europe suffer from local bias, as they usually invest in 
companies located closer than 10 km to their head quarter. They have shown, overall, 
government VCs were unsuccessful in filling the equity gap in early stage deals, and possibly 
crowd out private VC investments (Bertoni et al., 2015). Luukkonen et al. (2013) evaluated the 
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added value of government VC in comparison to the private VC. They used survey data from 
investee companies in seven European countries  determine the benefits of private and 
government investors. The findings indicated that the government VC and private VC were 
different on some of the value adding profiles. Private VC performance was oriented to 
improvements of the business such as focusing on the management team, board members and 
exit strategies. Another finding was that, government VC contribution to the investment was 
little compared to private VCs, regarding the activities of that are related to the profitability of 
the business. However, they could not find any differences on having adverse effects between 
government VC and private VCs (Luukkonen et al., 2013). 
4.2.3 United States 
Lerner (1996) suggests that in the United States, the empirical analysis has shown that 
government venture capital had little effectiveness. The small business innovation research 
(SBIR) program has shown that even in the active promotion of government VC there is little 
economic impact in the United States. The reason that these funds have a slight effect is that 
most of them are used by the government for political purposes. However, Lerner showed that 
firms that won SBIR awards grew faster; in sales or employment; than non-awardees firms. Yet, 
these positive effects of SBIR awards were restricted to firms in areas with extensive private VC 
activity, mainly due to a huge prevalence of spillovers in the United States, suggesting the 
complimentary effect of government VC to private (Lerner, 1996). 
Lerner (2002) suggests that government should be involved in the provision of the finance to 
young firms that are using very high technology applications. The government VC would rather 
advance the subsidy investments to private investors rather than direct investments; the 
appropriateness of it is that it captures the spillover effects that are brought about by the research 
and development. The spillover may achieve the imitations that are brought into the market by 
the competitors and the enhancements of the complementary products. Lerner (Lerner, 2002) 
advances that the administrators of public venture capital should be very cautious in the issuance 
of these funds. They should be able to conduct the precommercial visibility studies and come up 
with a way of selecting the winners to be allocated the funds. They should also be able to remove 
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some bottlenecks that ensure that the companies are not afraid in the usage of their resources in 
venturing into risky businesses.  
Audretsch (2003) aimed at identifying the role of the United States’ public policy for 
development of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. His objective was to 
clarify if SBIR program linked international competitiveness and the promotion of small firms. 
He has shown that the SBIR program was successful in maintaining growth and innovation in 
high-technology small firms. 
4.2.4 Other Countries  
Munari, and Toschi (2015) investigated the provision of venture capital in the United Kingdom. 
In the UK, the government has supported programs that assist in improvement of the small firms 
so that they can secure the requisite financing for investment in innovation. Venture capital in the 
UK depends on the intensities of the innovation and how these funds do compare with private 
VCs. In the United Kingdom, the private venture capital fares better than government VC. 
Regarding the exit performance, the government VC ranks poorly as compared to the private 
VC. In the research carried out in this article, the results indicate that, in spite of the fact that the 
level of  public VC investments increased in the UK , government VC funds  had a lower 
influence on the success rate, staging and syndication of their VC investments. Moreover, they 
were unable to provide certification signal in order to attract private VC financing for their 
investee companies, mainly in poorly innovative areas. 
Australian government VC policies have been reported by:  Cumming (2007) for the 
Australian Investment Innovation Fund;  Cumming and Johan (2013) for the Australian Pre-Seed 
Fund program. Both studies show a positive effect in that government VC investment increases 
the level of investment from non-government VC firms in the domestic market. Australian 
venture fund that was introduced in the equity funds in the period during 1982-2005 (Cumming, 
2007). The program in Australia usually centers on the innovation investment fund (IIF). This 
program is made unique as it can partner with both the government and the private sector, 
through investing in the staging, portfolio, and the high-tech investments. 
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4.2.5 Canadian Government VC 
The venture capital industry in Canada has faced criticism due to the involvement of the 
government in VC investments that are considered to be inefficiently organized. Such programs 
include the Federal government direct VC investment programs called Business Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC), and the Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs).   
The federal government of Canada operates the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) 
and other entities5. They invest directly in young high-potential SMEs, and, recently, indirectly 
by contributing to other private VC funds. The BDC is reported to be ineffective in promoting 
private VC ecosystems (Guerini and Quas, 2016), mainly because its funds are entirely owned 
and managed by  government entities, and the evidence in sections 2.1 and 2.2, its investment 
structures tend to have unsuccessful outcomes. More scholarly work has been devoted to 
reviewing the practices and effectiveness of LSVCCs than of BDCs. 
LSVCCs are operated by provincial and federal government bodies in Canada. LSVCCs 
operated like mutual funds that are subsidized from taxes to attract funds from retail investors, 
and to invest the funds in private entrepreneurial firms (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). Both 
the federal government and provincial governments provide tax credits to LSVCC investors, to 
aid in the promotion and growth of small and midsized companies. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Canadian LSVCCs attracted billions of dollars in capital and 
would have been considered as the most dominant venture capital firm in Canada (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2006).  LSVCC program began in Quebec in the early 1980s. By early 1990, the 
federal government and other provinces had also adopted the same structure, making it the 
dominant venture capital program in Canada in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2006) . It aims at increasing the amount of venture capital funds that are available 
and attainable to Canadian investors, and providing the opportunity that individuals can invest in  
high-technology companies. There is no minimum investment amount, and anyone can invest 
                                                     
5 The major entity in charge of VC investments is Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC). The 
other entities include Export Development Bank of Canada (EDC) and other entities with very few VC investments. 
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regardless of their net worth and the amount they can contribute  (Cumming and MacIntosh, 
2006). 
An LSVCC fund can be incorporated in the various provinces that have passed the legislation 
requisite to allow its creation. In addition, provinces that have passed the federal legislation 
authorizing the operation of LSVCCs can also incorporate their fund in the jurisdiction. 
Depending on the provincial or federal government recognizing an LSVCC, several restrictions 
or statutory constraints may limit certain aspects of the program. The main restrictions are that 
(a) LSVCCs are subject to a constraint in operating in the jurisdictions they are sponsored in, and 
(b) there must be an eight-years investor lock-in period. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2007, 2006) investigated whether LSVCCs have crowded-out or 
displaced other venture capital organizations and whether they have been successful in 
expanding the pool of VC investments in Canada. They showed that in almost every jurisdiction 
in Canada, LSVCCs have displaced 100% of other VC types, and have not had a positive effect 
on increasing the pool of venture capital funds (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). One major 
specification of LSVCCs’ adverse impacts is that they are legislated to be created in the form of 
corporation administrators, which is in contrast to the limited partnership structure of ordinary 
VC funds (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007). The utilization of the corporate form additionally 
reduces legally binding adaptability in developing the combination of agreements that underlies 
LSVCC operation. Hypothetically, the utilization of the corporate form forces a more demanding 
disciplinary structure on LSVCC administration than I see in private, restricted associations. 
Mandatory corporate structure of LSVCCs requires that the shareholders choose the executives 
of the VC funds. Due to free-riding issues, this arrangement will compel shareholders to be less 
motivated in screening the VC fund managers.  
As a consequence of the unsuccessful experience that the government of Ontario and Canada 
had with LSVCCs, such as the crowding-out of the venture capital industry which led to the 
dollars in the venture company industry being decided by inferior investment managers, both 
governments staged a reduction of LSVCC tax subsidy. Thus, the government of Ontario 
declared on September 30, 2005, that it would slowly dispense with the tax credit for individual 
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speculators putting resources into LSVCCs (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). Taking out the tax 
credit decreased the engaging quality of the funding assets to retail speculators in this way 
affecting the inflow of capital into LSVCCs in Ontario. The government of Ontario finally 
eliminated the tax credits in 2011 while the government of Canada withdrew in 2012 (Cumming 
et al., 2016).  
4.3 Research Question Development 
In this section, I draw on neoclassical economic theory and literature on government VC to 
question the effect of Canadian government VC on both of domestic and cross-border private VC 
investment in Canada. 
Here I bring a heuristic discussion based on neoclassical economic theory on the effect of 
public capital on private capital (Aschauer, 1989). By assuming that similar individuals live 
competitively over a given period and building on neoclassical economics, Aschauer (1989) 
suggests that increase in public investment can either crowd-out or crowd-in private investments. 
The ambiguity of public investment expenditure will continue to affect private investment in a 
neoclassical economic sense. Two possible viewpoints exist which are: public and private stocks 
can be substituted, but the equilibrium can be attained if higher public investments crowd-out the 
same amount of private capital spending. Another viewpoint is that if government provision is 
strong enough, there can be an increase in private capital expenditures provided that public 
capital gives considerable external consequences on private elements of production.  
Aschauer (1989) shows when public capital substitutes private capital it is likely that 
crowding-out occurs. Whereas, in case public capital complement private investments mainly in 
the infrastructure sector, for example investment  in highways, airports, water systems etc., 
public capital will crowd-in private investments. Crowding out of private investment occurs 
when the higher the rate of public investment, the higher the national rate of capital growth 
beyond the desired level. He further elaborates that the crowding-out effect mainly depends on 
the extent to which the public investments substitute private investments, whether it provides 
productive benefits for private sector investment, whether the change in public investments is 
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permanent or temporary. if public capital substitutes, does not provide productive benefits based 
on its intended objectives, and is temporary the crowding-out effect prevails 6. Based on 
Aschauer’s reasoning (1989), the prediction for the effect of government VC on private VC in 
Canada is ambiguous. The time span of government VC programs in Canada is permanent, 
which suggests crowding-in effect. Whereas, the management and investment structure of 
government VC, makes it a substitute for private VCs in Canada, and suggests crowding-out 
effect. Moreover, the weak performance of government VC investments provides grounds for 
crowding-out effect. Cumming and MacIntosh (2007) reported that LSVCCs has weaker 
assessment and screening platforms in selecting and managing entrepreneurial firms than did 
private VCs. The obligatory utilization of the corporate form in LSVCC conceivably brings 
about these adverse impacts by reducing legally binding adaptability in developing the 
combination of agreements that underlies LSVCC operation. Consequently, Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2006) reported that LSVCCs had outbid other funds in the market by weakening the 
expected returns, as they get cheap tax subsidies. Consequently, institutional investors in the 
market had reduced their fund commitment with the increasing presence of LSVCCs (Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2006).  
Above discussion provides ground for development of my first research question on the effect 
of more provincial and federal government VC investments in a specific province and industry in 
Canada, on domestic VC investments by private VCs: 
                                                     
6 Aschauer’s model (1989) suggests that private investment in market 𝑖 = 𝑖(𝜙, 𝑖𝑔 , 𝑐𝑔) is function of 
𝜙=marginal product of private capital, 𝑖𝑔 public investment, and 𝑐𝑔 government consumption. 
 He presents the effect one unit increase in public spending on private investment can be modeled by: 
−((1 − 𝑢𝑔𝑐 − 𝑓𝑔𝑐) /𝜙) ∗  (𝑚𝑝𝑐
𝑓 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑚𝑝𝑐) 
where 𝑚𝑝𝑐 is marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and, 𝑢𝑔𝑐is the marginal rate of substitution of 
public for private services,  𝑓𝑔𝑐 is marginal product of public spending in private production, and  𝑚𝑝𝑐
𝑓  and 𝑚𝑝𝑐  
marginal propensity to consume wealth now and in the future respective. 𝑎 =1, if the future change in public is the 
same as now, and  𝑎 = 0 if the change in public investment is temporary. 
The detailed analysis is not within the scope of this study, and can be followed in studies by Arrow and 
Kurz (1970), Aschauer (1988), and Aschauer and Greenwood (1985). 
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Research Question 1: 
Does investment by Canadian government VC firms in the forms of LSVCC and BDC in a 
specific province-industry in Canada, increase or decrease the propensity of domestic private VC 
firms investing in that focal province-industry? 
Furthermore, because of  bidding-up of private VCs’ rate of returns, it is possible that private 
VCs will be forced in lower investments, as they can not compete with government VCs who 
have access to cheap tax funds. As suggested by Lerner (2009, p. 122) private VCs who face 
competition with government VCs will look for investment opportunities in  cross-border 
destinations. This suggestion is supported by international business and cross-border VC 
literature, which implies that convergence in culture enhances negotiations, and differences in 
culture discourage the formation of partnerships between local VCs and foreign companies. The 
fewer differences in the culture and language improve the nature of financial contracting, and 
lessen the severity of potential conflicts, and increases the overall performance of the investment 
(Dai and Nahata, 2016; Liu and Maula, 2016). Since Canada borders on the United States, who 
share the same language and a similar culture, and the United Kingdom, which has traditionally 
had a close relationship with Canada and shares a similar culture and language, Canadian private 
VCs can look to both of these countries for investment opportunities with fewer uncertainties. 
Consequently, the effect of more investments by Canadian government VC might displace 
domestic private VC investment to international markets or might attract them to invest in 
domestic companies. Therefore this ambiguity provides ground for the following research 
question: 
Research Question 2: 
Does investment by Canadian government VC firms in the forms of LSVCC and BDC in a 
specific province-industry in Canada, displace private VC firms located in that focal province to 
a cross-border VC investment in that focal industry? 
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4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Data 
The data are from Thomson ONE Private Equity owned by Thomson Reuters. The database 
includes private equity investments, buyouts, mergers, and acquisitions for more than 100 
countries from 1971 to the present. The empirical setting is venture capital firms in the Canada , 
which engage in VC cross-border or domestic investment. To test the effect of Canadian 
government VC on private the VC market in Canada, I divide all VC investments by Canadian 
private VC firms into two groups: domestic and cross-border. For domestic private VC 
investment data, I use an ordered triplet of “private VC firm-venture’s province-venture’s 
industry”. For cross-border private VC investment data, I use the ordered quadruplets “private 
VC firm-VC firm’s province- venture’s country -venture’s industry”. I use the classification by 
Venture Economics Industry Codes (VEIC) for the categorization of industry in my analysis. 
This classification includes: Biotechnology, Communications and Media, Computer Hardware, 
Computer Software and Services, Consumer Related, Industrial/Energy, Internet Specific, 
Medical/Health, Semiconductors and Other Electronics, and Other Products. 
From the database, I retrieved all domestic and cross-border VC investments by Canadian VC 
firms between 1994 and 2013. I excluded investment observations in which the VC firm’s name, 
venture’s name and/or venture’s country was not disclosed. I used independent venture capital 
funds and corporate venture capital funds as two major types of private VC investor types in 
Thomson database. I also limited the database only to “Venture Capital” deals (i.e. I excluded 
“buyouts”, “real estate” and “other” as types private equity investments). VC investments are 
usually staged and main decision of a VC firms occurs in the first stage, while later stages are 
conditional on future performance of entrepreneurial companies, I limited my sample to the first 
investments round, to avoid bias from emphasizing on later investment rounds. 
Between 1994-2014, 385 Canadian private VC firms invested in a total of 1,554 domestic VC 
investment. During the same period, 207 Canadian private VC firms invested in 619 cross-border 
ventures in other countries. It is notable that from the cross-border investments, 563 were in the 
United States and 19 were in the United Kingdom. 
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Table 4-1— Overview of VC investment by government and private VC firms in Canada between 1994-2013. 
 
VC investor type: LSVCCs 
 
Federal BDC 
 
Domestic private  
VC 
 Cross-Border 
private VC 
Venture Economics Industry Codes 
(VEIC) 
Frequency Percent 
 
Frequency Percent 
 
Frequency Percent 
 
Frequency Percent 
   
 
     
 
  
Biotechnology 492 9.0%  304 4.2% 
 
167 10.7%  83 13.4% 
Communications and Media 384 7.0%  234 3.2% 
 
143 9.2%  72 11.6% 
Computer Hardware 199 3.6%  186 2.6% 
 
62 4.0%  22 3.6% 
Computer Software and Services 846 15.5%  722 9.9% 
 
328 21.1%  130 21.0% 
Consumer Related 584 10.7%  2,044 28.2% 
 
102 6.6%  19 3.1% 
Industrial/Energy 605 11.1%  959 13.2% 
 
130 8.4%  53 8.6% 
Internet Specific 344 6.3%  255 3.5% 
 
221 14.2%  118 19.1% 
Medical/Health 509 9.3%  285 3.9% 
 
140 9.0%  48 7.8% 
Other Products 1,196 21.9%  1,961 27.0% 
 
124 8.0%  30 4.8% 
Semiconductors/Other Electronics 305 5.6%  311 4.3% 
 
137 8.8%  44 7.1% 
   
 
     
 
  
Total 5,464 100  7,261 100 
 
1,554 100  619 100 
 
 
 
 87 
 
 
4.4.2 Empirical Methodology 
For both of domestic and cross-border datasets, I set up an event history framework for each 
ordered triplet unit of analysis for domestic data, and for each ordered quadruplet unit of 
analysis for cross-border data which is “private VC firm-venture’s province-venture’s 
industry” and “private VC firm-VC firm’s province- venture’s country -venture’s industry” 
respectively, starting with the date of its first domestic and international cross-border 
investment. Then I arrange the data into yearly observations periods. Obviously there has not 
been an observation each year in units of analysis, i.e. not all VC firms invest in all industries 
and provinces in each year. To track the effects Canadian government VC on private VC firms 
I add missing observations in which there has not been any domestic or cross-border 
investment on the unit of analysis. This action made the domestic database with 24,817, and 
cross-border database with 8,459 observations. 
I use event history (survival) analysis based on yearly observations on my units of analysis 
(i.e. ordered triplet unit of analysis for domestic data, and ordered quadruplet unit of analysis 
for cross-border data). In my case, event history analysis is a suitable analytical method, since, 
I am analyzing the effect government VC investments on VC firms’ propensity to invest in 
domestic and cross-border venture. Similar studies in the government venture capital context  
used event history analysis (Bertoni and Groh, 2014; Guerini and Quas, 2016). Each VC firm 
is considered at risk (i.e. is likely to invest in a cross-border venture in the country-industry) 
the year after its last event (the year a cross-border investment occurs) and until the next event. 
If the VC firm does not have a new investment in a province and industry that it had before for 
domestic model, and in country and industry that it had before for cross-border model, until 31 
December 2013, then that unit of analysis is considered right-censored. 
In my context the hazard rate in the domestic case is the propensity of a VC firm to invest in 
a venture located in a province and industry at time t, given that the VC firm’s previous 
investment was at time 𝑡𝑛 . The hazard rate for the cross-border case is the propensity of a VC 
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firm located in a province to invest in a foreign venture in a specific country and industry at 
time t, given that the VC firm’s previous investment was at time 𝑡𝑛. If I call the hazard rate 
function h, then it can be defined as: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑡𝑛) =  lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡𝑛 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡𝑛 + ∆𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡𝑛)
∆𝑡
 (1) 
In event history analysis, the probability distribution function of the hazard function can be 
either parametric (Tuma & Hannan, 1984) or semi-parametric (Cox, 1975), In the parametric 
method a specific probability distribution should be assumed for the probability distribution of 
the hazard function. On the other hand, in semi-parametric methods few restrictions will be 
made on the probability distribution function of hazard function. Instead of assuming that all 
data fits a predetermined probability distribution, an underlying baseline hazard function is 
assumed for all the observation units. I employ Cox proportional hazard model to identify the 
effects of my independent variable on the hazard rate: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑡𝑛) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝑋(𝑡)
′β),      𝑡 > 𝑡𝑛 (2) 
, where 𝑋(𝑡) is the vector of covariates. In the Cox regression, the vector of covariates are 
estimated by applying a partial likelihood maximization methodology. 
 
4.4.3 Variables 
In this section I introduce the variables that I am going to use in the regression analysis. The 
detailed description of all variables can be found in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 for domestic and 
cross-border data introduced above respectively. 
4.4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
In this study, I intend to analyze cross-border and domestic private VC investments in effect of 
government VC investments. Regarding the cross-border venture capital investment, which is 
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an investment by a domestic VC fund into a foreign company, I define cross-border displacing 
effect to be an increase in the aggregate pool of outgoing private VC investment, and cross-
border attraction effect to be a decrease in the aggregate pool of outgoing private VC 
investment. To test my hypotheses, I set my dependent variables to be the VC firm’s 
propensity whether to invest in a venture in specific province and industry for domestic model, 
and the VC firm’s propensity whether to invest in a cross-border venture in an industry for 
cross-border model. 
4.4.3.2 Main Independent Variables 
The main independent variables are cumulative number of first round investment by Labour-
Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) and Business Development Bank of 
Canada (BDC) in a province and industry during two years before any focal private VC 
investment. 
4.4.3.3 Control Variables 
In the domestic case for a focal Canadian VC firm, a specific province, and, a specific industry 
I use the cumulative number of first round investment of that VC firm in that province and 
industry in the past two years, to be the domestic experience of the VC firm in the specific 
province-industry. In the cross-border case for a focal Canadian VC firm located in a specific 
province, a specific country, and, a specific industry I use the cumulative number of first round 
investment of a VC firm in that foreign country and industry in the past two years, to be the 
cross-border experience of the VC firm in the specific country-industry. 
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Table 4-2--Variable descriptions for Canadian domestic VC case. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
* shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable 
value. 
 Variable name Description Source 
Main Variables 
10  Domestic VC investment event 
 (Fi,Pj ,Sk)t 
A dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC 
investment by Canadian VC firm Fi in a 
Canadian venture in province Pj and industry Sk 
at year t. 
Thomson 
ONE 
11 * LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t  Number of VC investments by LSVCCs in a 
Canadian venture in province Pj and industry Sk 
during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson 
ONE 
12  Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  Number of VC investments by BDCs in a 
Canadian venture in province Pj and industry Sk 
during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson 
ONE 
13  Total GVC (Pj ,Sk)t  Number of VC investments by LSVCCs and 
BDCs in a Canadian venture in province Pj and 
industry Sk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson 
ONE 
Control Variables 
1  Domestic Experience  
(Fi, Pj, Sk) t * 
The Experience of VC firm Fi in investing in 
domestic ventures in province Pj and industry Sk 
during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson 
ONE 
2  GDP (Pj) t * the lagged level of GDP in province Pj in the 
2014 U.S. dollar. 
Statistics 
Canada 
3  Bubble Dummy A dummy variable equals to 1 for the Internet 
bubble during 1998-2000 
 
4  Crisis Dummy A dummy variable equals to 1 for the financial 
crisis during 2008-2010 
 
 
  
 91 
Table 4-3--Variable descriptions for Canadian cross-border VC case. 
All the variables with subscript t are yearly basis and for each year between 1994-2013.  
* shows the variables that are transformed by a natural logarithm one plus the original variable 
value. 
 Variable name Description Source 
Main Variables 
1  Cross-Border VC investment event 
(Fi,Pj ,Cz,Sk)t 
A dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC 
investment by Canadian private VC firm Fi in 
a Canadian venture located in province Pj in 
country Cz industry Sk at year t. 
Thomson ONE 
2 * LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk)t  Number of VC investments by LSVCCs in a 
Canadian venture in province Pj and industry 
Sk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
3  Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk)t  Number of VC investments by BDCs in a 
Canadian venture in province Pj and industry 
Sk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
4  Total GVC (Pj ,Sk)t  Number of VC investments by LSVCCs and 
BDCs in a Canadian venture in province Pj and 
industry Sk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
Control Variables 
1  Cross-Border Experience  
(Fi,Pj ,Cz,Sk)t * 
The Experience of VC firm Fi in investing in 
domestic ventures in province Pj and industry 
Sk during 2 years before year t. 
Thomson ONE 
2  GDP (Pj)t * the lagged level of GDP in province Pj at year t 
in the 2014 U.S. dollar. 
Statistics 
Canada 
3  Bubble Dummy A dummy variable equals to 1 for the Internet 
bubble during 1998-2000 
 
4  Crisis Dummy A dummy variable equals to 1 for the financial 
crisis during 2008-2010 
 
5  GDP (Cz)t * the lagged level of GDP per capita of country 
Cz in the 2014 U.S. dollar at year t. 
World Bank 
6  Market Capitalization (Cz)t * the lagged level of Stock Market capitalization 
of listed companies as percentage of GDP at 
year t. 
World Bank 
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For the domestic model, I control for the internet bubble years (1998-2000), global financial 
crisis years (2008-2010), stock market capitalization, and the lagged level of GDP in all 
Canadian provinces in 2014 U.S. dollars. For the cross-border case I use the same controls as 
the domestic case. I also use GDP per capita in 2014 U.S dollars, and stock market 
capitalization of the foreign investee company’s country in the cross-border case. 
4.5 Results 
I present the results for Canadian domestic VC case in Table 4-4 and for each industry 
separately in Table 4-5. I also present the result for Canadian cross-border VC case in Table 
4-6, and for each industry separately in Table 4-7. In these tables the effect of LSVCCs’ and 
BDC investments are reported in model 1, and the effect of aggregated GVC investments are 
reported in model 2. In Table 4-4 and Table 4-6 the marginal effects of independent variables 
on my dependent variable are reported at the means of those variables in a separate column. 
The marginal effects of independent variables for tables that analyze industries separately, are 
not reported to save space and ease in readability. 
In Table 4-4, I test the effect of investment by LSVCCs and BDC on the Canadian private 
VC firm propensity to invest in domestic ventures. Results do not show any crowding-out 
effect of either government VCs firms in Canada and these effects are statistically significant 
(p<0.001). However, the marginal effects at the mean of these variables are not big enough for 
incurring crowding-in effect. The linear effects from model 1 Table 4-4 show one unit increase 
in number of investments by LSVCCs is associated with 0.005% increase in propensity of 
private VC firms to invest in domestic VC market. The corresponding figure for one unit 
increase in number of BDC investments is 0.001 increase in hazard rate in the same model. 
The results in Table 4-4 about domestic private VC in Canada is in line from what is already 
known about inefficiency of Canadian government VC. For all models in Table 4-4 the 
coefficients for LSVCCs and federal BDC are positive and significant at 1% level, but the 
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magnitude is not big enough. This fact shows the investments by different types of government 
VC firms in Canada does not have enough force to promote a domestic private VC industry. 
Other studies showed that LSVCCs have crowded-out other VC types and have not had a 
positive effect on increasing the pool of venture capital funds (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007, 
2006). This difference can be due to my unique unit of analysis that focuses on VC firms, 
industry, and province level data to avoid possible biases in merely using aggregate province-
level analysis. Based on the results from Table 4-4, I cannot support the crowding-out effect or 
crowding-in effect of government VC investments in Canada. 
Moreover, other consistent result is the coefficient for the internet bubble period and 
provincial GDP in Table 4-4. These results show that during internet bubble period a private 
VC at least 20% more likely to make a domestic VC investment. The coefficients for global 
financial crisis model are not significant. It is interesting to point out to the provincial GDP’s 
coefficients, which show in case of increase in provincial GDP, private VC firms were less 
likely to invest in the province. This fact provides ground that in the case of economic growth 
in provinces in Canada, and most probably the increase in available fund, the increase in 
number of investments for government VC firms was associated with decrease in the 
likelihood of a domestic VC investment by private VCs. 
Overall, the Results from Table 4-5Table 4-5 are in-line with the results in Table 4-4 for all 
industries. Other than the computer hardware industry that the BDC investments, on average, 
had a crowding-in effect, government VC programs did not have a positive and reasonable 
effect on increasing the probability of a private VC investing in domestic market.  
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Table 4-4—Results for Canadian domestic VC case. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects of Canadian government venture capital investment 
on the VC firm propensity to invest in domestic ventures  
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC investment by Canadian VC firm 
Fi in a Canadian venture in province Pj and industry Sk at year t. 
The marginal effects in the independent variable at the means of variables are reported in a separate 
column for each model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Domestic VC investment event 
Model: (1)  (2)  
Covariates: Effect on 
hazard rate 
Marginal 
effects 
Effect on 
hazard rate 
Marginal 
effects 
LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0363*** 1.0052 
 
 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0070*** 1.0010 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
 1.0142*** 1.0034 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.006) 
Domestic Experience (Fi, Pj, Sk) t * 2.2294*** 1.1240 2.7726*** 1.2775 
 (0.150) (0.259) (0.182) (0.567) 
GDP (Pj) t * 0.9346 0.9902 0.9795 0.9950 
 (0.043) (0.019) (0.038) (0.011) 
Stock Market Capitalization t * 0.7538 0.9596 0.7449 0.9317 
 
(0.308) (0.029) (0.276) (0.045) 
Bubble Dummy 3.3167*** 1.1911 2.9990*** 1.3018 
 (0.744) (0.426) (0.556) (0.637) 
Crisis Dummy 0.7165 0.9526 0.7344 0.9286 
  (0.147) (0.079) (0.149) (0.107) 
Number of observations 23,416  23,416  
Number of Clusters 385  385  
Number of Events 1,384  1,384  
𝜒^2 1,857.266  1,747.422  
Degree of Freedom 7  6  
Adjusted R2 0.219  0.242  
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Table 4-5—Results for Canadian domestic VC case-Sample restriction to each industry. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects of Canadian government venture capital investment on the VC firm 
propensity to invest in domestic ventures  
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC investment by Canadian VC firm Fi in a Canadian 
venture in province Pj and industry Sk at year t. 
The marginal effects in the independent variable associated with 10% increase in the covariates and occurrence of the 
dummy variables are reported in bold formatting. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Biotechnolo
gy     
Communications and 
Media   
Computer Hardware 
  
Computer Software and 
Services   
Consumer Related 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Covariates:     
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t  
1.1291*** 
 
 
1.1292*** 
 
 
1.7315 
 
 
0.8807*** 
 
 
1.0659**
*  
 
(0.930) 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
 
(0.617) 
 
 
(0.413) 
 
 
(0.728) 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  
0.6963** 
 
 
1.0877*** 
 
 
1.8472*** 
 
 
1.1893 
 
 
1.0091 
 
 
(0.124) 
 
 
(0.027) 
 
 
(4.543) 
 
 
(0.145) 
 
 
(0.405) 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
1.114*** 
 
 
1.2880*** 
 
 
1.75*** 
 
 
0.8913*** 
 
 
1.2*** 
 
 
(0.249) 
 
 
(0.475) 
 
 
(0.974) 
 
 
(0.165) 
 
 
(0.164) 
Domestic Experience (Fi, Pj, 
Sk) t * 
0.8176*** 0.8260** 
 
0.8790 0.8647** 
 
1.2466 1.3007 
 
0.8103** 0.7773** 
 
2.156*** 1.799*** 
 
(0.055) (0.069) 
 
(0.074) (0.061) 
 
(0.300) (0.277) 
 
(0.080) (0.079) 
 
(0.277) (0.190) 
GDP (Pj) t * 
0.6884*** 0.7673* 
 
0.3818*** 0.3488*** 
 
0.4134*** 0.4037*** 
 
0.5293*** 0.5038*** 
 
0.569*** 0.51*** 
 
(0.094) (0.113) 
 
(0.058) (0.047) 
 
(0.065) (0.059) 
 
(0.037) (0.038) 
 
(0.042) (0.034) 
Stock Market Capitalization t * 
0.2040* 
0.0681**
* 
 
0.1445** 0.1234** 
 
15.62 
24.7583**
* 
 
0.202** 0.1821** 
 
0.1906** 0.124** 
 
(0.183) (0.065) 
 
(0.141) (0.126) 
 
(26.557) (30.136) 
 
(0.160) (0.152) 
 
(0.158) (0.104) 
Bubble Dummy 
2.1572 1.9081 
 
17.87*** 21.26*** 
 
17.21*** 9.623*** 
 
3.09*** 3.016*** 
 
1.2623 1.1721 
 96 
Dependent Variable: Biotechnolo
gy     
Communications and 
Media   
Computer Hardware 
  
Computer Software and 
Services   
Consumer Related 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Covariates:     
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
(1.540) (1.406) 
 
(11.707) (13.949) 
 
(10.076) (7.009) 
 
(1.210) (1.197) 
 
(0.369) (0.340) 
Crisis Dummy 
0.3777** 
0.3290**
* 
 
0.6609 0.6650 
 
2.5963*** 2.1363*** 
 
1.5109 1.8998 
 
1.1795 1.5160 
  
(0.153) (0.135) 
 
(0.380) (0.385) 
 
(0.902) (0.618) 
 
(0.792) (0.975) 
 
(0.631) (0.918) 
Number of observations 
1,828 1,828 
 
1,970 1,970 
 
1,128 1,128 
 
3,532 3,532 
 
2,408 2,408 
Number of Clusters 
87 87 
 
102 102 
 
64 64 
 
158 158 
 
113 113 
Number of Events 
152 152 
 
131 131 
 
55 55 
 
279 279 
 
87 87 
 
774.879 710.618 
 
719.666 595.641 
 
175.944 279.920 
 
741.925 857.129 
 
362.393 296.393 
Degree of Freedom 
7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
Adjusted R2 
0.347 0.351 
  
0.380 0.404 
  
0.511 0.529 
  
0.311 0.336 
  
0.354 0.405 
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Table 4-5—Results for Canadian domestic VC case-Sample restriction to each industry. 
Dependent Variable: 
Industrial/Energy 
  
Internet Specific 
  
Medical/Health 
  
  
Other Products 
  
  
Semiconductors/Other 
Electronics 
Model: (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Covariates:                         
LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0523**
*   
1.0303 
  
1.1438**
*   
1.0214**
*   
1.0962*** 
 
 (0.013) 
  
(0.019) 
  
(0.015) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.014) 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0186**
*   
1.2689**
*   
0.8999**
*   
1.0176**
*   
1.0600*** 
 
 (0.006) 
  
1.0303 
  
(0.019) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.011) 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
1.0298**
*   
1.0911**
*   
1.2994**
*   
1.0444**
*   
1.0755*** 
 
 
(0.192) 
  
(0.295) 
  
(0.199) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.006) 
Domestic Experience (Fi, Pj, Sk) t 
* 
1.8185** 1.5374** 
 
0.9436 0.8535 
 
0.7477**
* 
0.5821**
*  
1.5024* 1.3493** 
 
0.7665* 0.7725* 
 (0.452) (0.323) 
 
(0.114) (0.087) 
 
(0.067) (0.074) 
 
(0.325) (0.183) 
 
(0.107) (0.114) 
GDP (Pj) t * 0.6108**
* 
0.5293**
*  
0.4705**
* 
0.3658**
*  
0.3828**
* 
0.4667**
*  
0.3956**
* 
0.3739**
*  
0.4343*** 0.4356*** 
 (0.073) (0.057) 
 
(0.037) (0.029) 
 
(0.037) (0.038) 
 
(0.046) (0.035) 
 
(0.046) (0.040) 
Stock Market Capitalization t * 1.6770 1.5633 
 
0.9229 0.1784 
 
0.1357** 0.0738** 
 
0.3065 0.1610 
 
0.0646** 0.0661** 
 
(1.011) (1.040) 
 
(1.052) (0.191) 
 
(0.124) (0.080) 
 
(0.560) (0.297) 
 
(0.078) (0.087) 
Bubble Dummy 
1.7727** 2.0601** 
 
5.0355**
* 
4.2771**
*  
1.2005 1.8586 
 
0.9010 0.8547 
 
14.7144*** 
14.2464**
* 
 (0.511) (0.615) 
 
(2.424) (2.110) 
 
(0.497) (0.751) 
 
(0.382) (0.345) 
 
(8.873) (9.279) 
Crisis Dummy 
2.8789* 3.8617** 
 
4.1581**
* 
3.4460**
*  
0.1196**
* 
0.1046**
*  
0.4091 0.2831 
 
2.4585* 3.1241** 
  (1.654) (2.247) 
 
(2.140) (1.639) 
 
(0.094) (0.074) 
 
(0.373) (0.249) 
 
(1.297) (1.496) 
Number of observations 2,845 2,845 
 
2,784 2,784 
 
1,689 1,689 
 
3,401 3,401 
 
1,831 1,831 
Number of Clusters 128 128 
 
137 137 
 
86 86 
 
154 154 
 
95 95 
Number of Events 117 117 
 
198 198 
 
130 130 
 
109 109 
 
126 126 
 
641.611 802.065 
 
625.901 837.374 
 
497.518 540.247 
 
427.434 432.581 
 
648.418 651.411 
Degree of Freedom 7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
 
7 6 
Adjusted R2 0.347 0.396   0.258 0.309   0.301 0.296   0.438 0.480   0.353 0.377 
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The results in Table 4-6 show that the investments by LSVCCs are associated in an increase 
in private VC propensity to do a cross-border investment. But, the results show investments by 
federal BDCs are associated with a decrease in cross-border investments. The linear effects 
from model 1, Table 4-6 show a unit increase in number of investments by LSVCCs is 
associated with 1.4% increase in the hazard rate (i.e. the propensity of a VC firm invest in a 
cross-border company). The corresponding figure for one unit increase in federal BDC 
investments is 1.3% decrease in the hazard rate in the same model.  
Based on the results from Table 4-6 I can support the displacing effect LSVCC investments, 
but I cannot support the displacing effect for federal BDC investments. The displacing effect of 
LSVCC investments is consistent with the arguments from (Lerner, 2009). The coefficients of 
the internet bubble and financial crisis periods in Table 4-6 are consistent with general 
expectations from these periods. Canadian private VC firms were at least 140% more likely 
and 60% less likely to invest in cross-border companies during the internet bubble period and 
global financial crisis periods respectively (90% of these companies were in the United States).  
Overall, the Results from Table 4-7 are in-line with the results in Table 4-6 for all industries. 
The results show that LSVCCs had displaced private VC firms, in “Computer Software and 
Services” and “Semiconductors/Other Electronics” industries. 
Overall the results from domestic case show that both LSVCC and federal BDC investments 
have increased the probability of Canadian private VC firms to invest in domestic markets. 
However, the magnitude of such effects has been negligible. Moreover, LSVCCs investments 
have displaced private VC firms to invest in cross-border investments. This is notable to 
consider that more than 90% percent of cross-border VC investments were in the United States. 
Moreover, my results show that federal BDC investments attracted the VC firms’ investments 
toward domestic market rather than forcing them to invest abroad, again with negligible force. 
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Table 4-6—Results for Canadian cross-border VC case. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects of Canadian government venture capital investment 
on the  VC firm propensity to invest in cross-border ventures. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC investment by Canadian private 
VC firm Fi in a Canadian venture located in province Pj in country Cz industry Sk at year t. 
The marginal effects in the independent variable at the means of variables are reported in a separate 
column for each model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable:   Cross-border VC investment event 
  
Model: (1) (2) 
Covariates: Effect on 
hazard rate 
Marginal 
effects 
Effect on 
hazard rate 
Marginal 
effects 
LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0049* 1.0144 
 
 
 (0.003) (0.029) 
 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  0.9958* 0.9877 
 
 
 (0.002) (0.025) 
 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
 0.9986 0.9955 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.010) 
Domestic Experience (Fi, Pj, Sk) t * 4.1420*** 64.2349 4.2052*** 93.6981 
 (0.295) (529.547) (0.304) (794.116) 
GDP (Pj) t * 0.8781 0.6833 0.9058 0.7314 
 (0.093) (0.386) (0.096) (0.291) 
GDP (Cz)t * 1.0937 1.2999 1.0793 1.2729 
 
(0.152) (1.084) (0.138) (0.961) 
Market Capitalization (Cz)t * 1.4124* 2.7492 1.3705 2.7079 
  (0.276) (5.934) (0.267) (5.550) 
Bubble Dummy 2.4368** 13.5819 2.5815** 20.0407 
 (1.003) (75.409) (1.064) (120.237) 
Crisis Dummy 0.7312* 0.3998 0.7506 0.4038 
 (0.128) (0.761) (0.132) (0.728) 
Number of observations 8,459  8,459  
Number of Clusters 206.000  206.000  
Number of Events 557.000  557.000  
 605.344  593.214  
Degree of Freedom 8  7  
Adjusted R2 0.065  0.064  
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Table 4-7—Results for Canadian cross-border VC case- Sample restriction to each industry. 
Partial likelihood estimates of covariate effects of Canadian government venture capital investment on the  VC firm propensity to invest in 
cross-border ventures. 
Dependent variable is the dummy variable equals to 1 for each VC investment by Canadian private VC firm Fi in a Canadian venture located in 
province Pj in country Cz industry Sk at year t. 
The marginal effects in the independent variable  associated with 10% increase in the covariates and occurrence of the dummy variables are 
reported in bold formatting. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Biotechnology 
  
Communications and Media 
  
Computer Hardware 
  
Computer Software and 
Services 
  
Consumer Related 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Covariates:     
            LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t 0.9876 
 
 
1.0008 
 
 
1.1602 
 
 
1.1137** 
 
 
0.9865 
 
 (0.015)  
 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.110) 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0139 
 
 
0.9671 
 
 
0.8570 
 
 
0.9991 
 
 
1.0017 
 
 (0.017)  
 
(0.025) 
 
 
(0.115) 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
0.9989 
  
0.9890 
  
1.0707 
  
1.0061 
  
1.0004 
 
 
(0.005) 
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.062) 
  
(0.004) 
  
(0.004) 
Domestic Experience 
(Fi, Pj, Sk) t * 
3.702*** 3.671*** 
 
3.712*** 3.711*** 
 
7.71*** 8.015*** 
 
4.051*** 4.003*** 
 
13.060** 12.922** 
 (0.393) (0.372) 
 
(0.426) (0.446) 
 
(4.914) (5.129) 
 
(0.398) (0.385) 
 
(13.059) (13.279) 
GDP (Pj) t * 0.7679 0.7511* 
 
0.9506 0.9870 
 
2.0428 1.2602 
 
0.8554 0.9371 
 
0.9480 0.9236 
 (0.126) (0.120) 
 
(0.238) (0.241) 
 
(1.822) (1.124) 
 
(0.193) (0.181) 
 
(0.277) (0.267) 
GDP (Cz)t * 0.3487 0.3532 
 
0.9954 0.9430 
 
0.5346 0.5314 
 
0.8123** 0.8200** 
 
0.7549 0.7442 
 
(0.264) (0.253) 
 
(0.761) (0.725) 
 
(0.453) (0.459) 
 
(0.083) (0.079) 
 
(0.205) (0.198) 
Market Capitalization 
(Cz)t * 
13.832** 13.027** 
 
0.898 0.933 
 
0.780 0.841 
 
2.475** 2.396** 
 
12.308 14.644 
 
(16.253) (15.232) 
 
(0.563) (0.591) 
 
(0.560) (0.623) 
 
(1.027) (0.954) 
 
(22.871) (27.582) 
Bubble Dummy 4.181** 4.053** 
 
7.2667** 7.8040** 
 
6.99*** 6.89*** 
 
0.5428 0.5484 
 
0.2100 0.1102 
 (2.754) (2.697) 
 
(5.965) (6.504) 
 
(4.326) (4.456) 
 
(0.342) (0.342) 
 
. . 
Crisis Dummy 1.2826 1.3920 
 
0.1849** 0.1912** 
 
0.8256 0.7832 
 
0.8089 0.8698 
 
1.0729 0.9548 
  (0.868) (0.874)  (0.145) (0.148)  (0.644) (0.583)  (0.373) (0.403)  (0.821) (0.638) 
Number of observations 739 739 
 
759 759 
 
550 550 
 
1,316 1,316 
 
678 678 
Number of Clusters 47.000 47.000 
 
49.000 49.000 
 
33.000 33.000 
 
78.000 78.000 
 
41.000 41.000 
Number of Events 72.000 72.000 
 
68.000 68.000 
 
20.000 20.000 
 
116.000 116.000 
 
18.000 18.000 
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Dependent Variable: 
Biotechnology 
  
Communications and Media 
  
Computer Hardware 
  
Computer Software and 
Services 
  
Consumer Related 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Covariates:     
             282.087 286.040 
 
175.816 139.188 
 
48.168 1,968.987 
 
497.097 461.208 
 
8.014 7.114 
Degree of Freedom 8 7 
 
8 7 
 
7 7 
 
8 7 
 
7 6 
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.141   0.099 0.098   0.065 0.055   0.080 0.080   0.061 0.060 
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Table 4-7—Results for Canadian cross-border VC case- Sample restriction to each industry. 
Dependent Variable: 
Industrial/Energy 
  
Internet Specific 
  
Medical/Health 
  
Other Products 
  
Semiconductors/Other Electronics 
Model: (1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(1) (2) 
Covariates: 
              LSVCCs (Pj ,Sk) t 0.9857 
 
 
0.9977 
 
 
0.9972 
 
 
0.9994 
 
 
1.1437** 
 
 (0.018) 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.028) 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
 
(0.030) 
 
Federal BDC (Pj ,Sk) t  1.0030 
 
 
0.9816 
 
 
1.0322* 
 
 
1.0030 
 
 
1.0086 
 
 (0.011) 
 
 
(0.027) 
 
 
(0.043) 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
 
(0.017) 
 
Total GVC (Pj ,Sk) t  
 
0.9965 
 
 
0.9929 
 
 
1.0123* 
 
 
1.0011 
 
 
1.1244* 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.013) 
Domestic Experience (Fi, Pj, Sk) t * 7.0240*** 6.6747*** 
 
5.28*** 5.29*** 
 
5.05*** 5.09*** 
 
6.02*** 5.98*** 
 
7.36*** 7.06*** 
 (1.301) (1.076) 
 
(0.706) (0.711) 
 
(1.074) (1.117) 
 
(3.340) (3.304) 
 
(3.312) (3.044) 
GDP (Pj) t * 0.8684 0.9153 
 
0.9379 0.9355 
 
1.0523 0.9146 
 
0.8704 0.9114 
 
0.3784** 0.4141*** 
 (0.185) (0.202) 
 
(0.239) (0.238) 
 
(0.368) (0.286) 
 
(0.266) (0.250) 
 
(0.151) (0.135) 
GDP (Cz)t * 8.6281 8.4286 
 
1.2861 1.2907 
 
0.7111** 0.7258* 
 
1.0353 1.0414 
 
1.3978 1.4338 
 
(18.590) (19.623) 
 
(0.231) (0.239) 
 
(0.123) (0.121) 
 
(0.318) (0.322) 
 
(0.607) (0.610) 
Market Capitalization (Cz)t * 0.1494 0.1832 
 
0.7897 0.7867 
 
3.7360 3.4159 
 
2.3500** 2.3702** 
 
1.1481 1.1215 
 
(0.202) (0.240) 
 
(0.205) (0.209) 
 
(3.929) (3.535) 
 
(1.007) (1.018) 
 
(0.682) (0.653) 
Bubble Dummy 0.8198 0.0000 
 
5.6180*** 5.8704*** 
 
2.59E-13 9.20E-14 
 
2.59E-13 9.20E-14 
 
8.38E-15 3.29E-14 
 . . 
 
(2.735) (2.807) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis Dummy 0.8208 0.7834 
 
1.1317 1.1218 
 
1.4946 1.1726 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
 
1.6688 1.7429 
  (0.247) (0.220)   (0.466) (0.454)   (1.270) (0.804)   . .   (1.065) (1.110) 
Number of observations 753 753 
 
1,343 1,343 
 
588 588 
 
1,124 1,124 
 
609 609 
Number of Clusters 47.000 47.000 
 
81.000 81.000 
 
37.000 37.000 
 
60.000 60.000 
 
36.000 36.000 
Number of Events 45.000 45.000 
 
110.000 110.000 
 
41.000 41.000 
 
27.000 27.000 
 
40.000 40.000 
 
167.362 164.338 
 
228.428 229.793 
 
591.157 624.133 
 
1,007.882 1,414.084 
 
753.536 543.412 
Degree of Freedom 7 6 
 
8 7 
 
8 7 
 
7 6 
 
8 7 
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.168   0.078 0.077   0.118 0.117   0.049 0.049   0.100 0.098 
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4.6 Discussion 
In this essay, I investigated the effect of government VC investment in Canada on the domestic 
private VC ecosystem. Major government VC programs in Canada has been Labour-Sponsored 
Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) and Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC). 
Previous empirical evidence suggested that government VC practices in Canada crowded-out 
domestic private VC investments (Cumming et al., 2016; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2007, 2006).  
Unlike previous studies, the result does not provide ground for a pure crowding-out effect of 
government venture capital investments in Canada. Rather, the results show mixed effects of 
supportive role and displacing. Consistent with the evidence presented by Leleux and Surlemont 
(2003) for European countries, the results do not show any crowding-out effect of either LSVCC 
or federal BDC  firms in Canada. Although both of LSVCC and BDC investments showed to 
have supportive effect on Canadian private VC firms to invest in domestic markets, the 
magnitude of these effects was negligible. I show that the investments by all types of government 
VC firms in Canada were associate with a negligible increase in the likelihood that a private VC 
firm invest another domestic VC investment. Unlike Cumming and MacIntosh (2007, 2006), 
who showed that Canadian LSVCCs crowded out private VC in almost all provinces, and 
Cumming et al. (2016),  who found that LSVCCs in the province Quebec crowded out private 
VC investments, the evidence presented in this essay shows that LSVCCs neither crowded-out 
nor crowded-in private VC types. This advancement in the explanation can be due to my unique 
methodological approach in selecting a multi-level unit of analysis that focuses on VC firms, 
industry, and province level data to avoid possible biases in merely using aggregate province-
level data. Furthermore, I showed that LSVCCs displaced private VC investment to cross-border 
investments. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
This dissertation contained three essays in the international venture capital research subject area. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the essays, brings together the main points, and provides 
overall concluding remarks and suggests possible topics for future research. 
5.1 Summaries and Conclusions 
Below is a brief recap of the main points discussed along with the conclusions in the three 
essays. 
5.1.1 The First Essay 
In the first essay, I focused on two components of organizational learning theory, namely 
experiential learning and vicarious learning, to explain how venture capital (VC) firms make 
international investment decisions. I focused on recent incidences of experiential and vicarious 
learning and offered systematic evidence that recent experience of a focal VC, and the recent 
investment pattern of other VCs, shape VCs’ cross-border investment decisions. The analysis 
used event history analysis of US venture capital firms investing in a cross-border company 
during 2000-2013. I used a unique unit of analysis, namely, the ordered triplet of “VC firm-
venture’s country-venture’s SIC code”, which enabled  a robust empirical analysis.  
The most obvious finding to emerge from the first study is that recent experience of a VC firm 
in investing in a foreign company and the recent pattern of other VC firms investing in a foreign 
country are important sources of knowledge in shaping that VC firm;s subsequent international 
investment decisions. I showed that recent experience of a VC firm in investing in a foreign 
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company positively affects that focal VC firm’s subsequent decision to invest again in that 
company’s country. Also, recent experience of a VC firm in investing in a foreign company 
positively affect that focal VC firm’s subsequent decision to invest again in that companies’ 
country-industry. Moreover, the country-industry specific experience of a focal VC firm has 
more affect than the country-specific experience in forming that VC firm’s decision to again 
invest in that country and industry. In other words, a VC firm is more likely to reinvest in 
country-industry in which it has had recent experience. 
Additionally, the first essay discussed the reasons why VC firms learn vicariously from the 
recent international investment patterns of other VC firms located in their home country or home 
state when investing in international companies. Additionally, it has identified that a venture 
capital firm’s decisions to invest in a country-industry are influenced more by its 
competitors/fellows at a closer geographical distance--in our case, the  home state/province. In 
other words, the effect of state level-imitation is more than that of country-level imitation in this 
context. 
Furthermore, this study has found that, generally, when both the focal VC firm’s experience 
and other VCs’ investment-patterns converge, i.e., when that focal VC firm and other VC firms 
located in the same state/province as the focal VC firm have recently invested in a specific 
country-industry, the reinforcing effect of that VC firm’s recent experience grows substantially. 
In other words, experience has more effect than the urge to imitate other VC firms activities 
does, when imitation and experience effects converge. Nevertheless, the first essay has provided 
evidence that the size of venture capital firms is a moderating factor in these effects; i.e., smaller 
VC firms put more weight on vicarious learning than experiential learning when deciding on 
whether to invest in an international company. In general, therefore, it seems that for smaller VC 
firms, the effect of imitating other VC firms’ recent experience increases. I have showed that the 
recent history of international VC investment in a country and industry is a knowledge source 
that can be used for future decisions to invest in that country-industry,  
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5.1.2 The Second Essay 
In the second essay, I focused on the effect of mixe-structured and pure-structured government 
venture capital investments on international private VC flows. I answered this question: do 
government venture capital funds crowd-in or crowd-out international private venture capital 
investment? I investigated whether and how pure- and mixed- government venture capital 
investment structures affect domestic private VCs, as well as international private VCs. The 
analysis used a bilateral country-level framework. I transformed VC investment data from 
Thomson ONE, which contains 125,310 new investment rounds, into standard panel data, 
consisting of 10,400 observations.  
Multiple regression analysis revealed that mixed structured investments crowd-in and pure 
structured investments crowd-out private VC investments. The results of this investigation 
identified that having more mixed structured government VC investments than  pure-structured 
government investments in a country crowds-in domestic and foreign private venture capitalists 
internationally. In other words, more mixed- than pure-GVC investment structures have a 
crowding-in effect overall; i.e., they attract domestic and international private VC funds to invest 
in the domestic VC market, and lead to an increase in overall private venture capital funding in 
the domestic market. Similarly, more pure-structured government VC investment crowds-out 
private investment internationally; i.e., more investments that are solely managed by 
governments compared with syndicated government-private investments have a crowding-out 
effect. The crowding-in and crowding-out effect of both structures of GVC are greater on 
domestic capital than on international private venture capital. 
The findings from the second essay add to a growing body of literature on beneficiary states of 
syndicated VC investment by government bodies together with private. We showed that more 
mixed structured government VC in a country promotes the domestic private VC ecosystem by 
attracting both domestic and international VC funds to invest in domestic companies. 
5.1.3 The Third Essay 
The third essay was designed to determine the effect of government VC investment in Canada on 
the domestic private VC ecosystem. The major government VC programs in Canada have been 
 107 
the Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) and Business the Development 
Bank of Canada (BDC). I used Canadian VC investment data during 1994-2013 for the analysis, 
and event history analysis for the analytical framework.  
The results of this investigation show that Canadian government VC practices have not been 
successful in promoting a private VC ecosystem. Government VC investments had positive, but 
not major, impacts on private investments. Also, the results show that on average, LSVCCs have 
displaced private VC investments to other countries, mainly the US. The results show that the 
LSVCCs’ displacing effect was more pronounced in “Computer Software and Services” and 
“Semiconductors/Other Electronics” industries (Lerner, 2009, p. 122)(Lerner, 2009, p. 122).  
The third essay adds to the body of academic work on the existence of links between 
government VC and both the domestic and cross-border behavior of private Vs, by analyzing the 
effect of government VC on domestic and cross-border private VC investments in parallel to 
each other.  
5.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
• The first essay is one of only a limited number of scholarly efforts to fully investigate 
vicarious and experiential learning in the international venture capital research stream. 
Many related topics need more considerations. Future research is required to empirical 
investigation the effect of vicarious learning using global VC investment data or data 
from other countries that have a major stake in international VC investments.  
• In the first study, I found that a VC firm’s size moderates the effects of vicarious and 
experiential learning. Therefore, future research could also be conducted to investigate 
other possible moderating factors of experiential and vicarious learning, i.e., the 
conditions under which vicarious learning will have more effect than experiential 
learning in the international VC context. 
• Another important aspect of mixed-GVC investments is that GVCs co-invest with 
many non-GVC funds in mixed-GVC investments. In other words, a question exists on 
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whether  more non-GVC funds in a syndicated mixed-GVC investment deal lead to 
favorable micro- and macro- level outcomes. 
• More broadly, research is also needed to determine the conditions, sectors, and 
industries where government VC has stronger effects on promoting private VC 
ecosystems. 
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Appendix A 
 
 Downloading the Data of Private Equity Investments 
This appendix contains the explanation on venture capital investment data downloaded from 
Thomson and other sources and also explanations on the steps which generate a panel data using 
the raw database and macro-economic factors downloaded from World Bank Portal 
The data for Private Equity (VC) investments has been downloaded via Thomson ONE Private 
Equity by Thomson Reuters companies. Before, this service was available through VentureXpert 
supported within the SDC Platinum platform, but it has been migrated to Thomson ONE Private 
Equity. Private Equity page can be reached through Screening & Analysis menu in Thomson 
ONE website. Different types of searches can be done through Private Equity page, including 
Companies and Investors as well as fundraising, investments, exits, and fund performance data. 
For an observed investment in the database, it is possible to access to information about the 
Company receiving funds, PE firms, PE funds, investment and limited partners (LPs). 
Moreover, to control for country-level factors that might affect domestic, outgoing cross-
border, and incoming cross-border VC investments, we include several control variables based 
on the literature regarding macroeconomic conditions. Also, we select the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) as powerful instruments of domestic GVC. WGI. The WGI 
measures six dimensions of governance of 215 countries over period 1990-2013. Tables below 
provides explanation of the control and instrumental variables. 
Thomson puts limitations on accessing the data, including: (1) number of variables can be 
retrieved from the database in a single download action, cannot exceed 16; (2) number of 
observations can be retrieved from the database in a single download action, cannot exceed 
15000. This makes accessing to data hard for academic researchers, as they need to access a 
comprehensive set of variables and observations 
Considering the limitations mentioned above, I had to do the following considerations to 
access to worldwide PE investment data for the period from 1975 to 2013: I Divide the time 
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periods of 1975-2003 to time intervals, in which number of PE investment observations does not 
exceed the 15000 limitation. These time intervals can be seen in the following table. 
 
Time Intervals of downloading the PE investment data 
 Starting Date Ending Date  Starting Date Ending Date 
1  01/01/1975 12/31/1982 25.  07/01/2002 12/31/2002 
2  01/01/1983 12/31/1984 26.  01/01/2003 06/30/2003 
3  01/01/1985 12/31/1986 27.  07/01/2003 12/31/2003 
4  01/01/1987 12/31/1988 28.  01/01/2004 06/30/2004 
5  01/01/1989 12/31/1990 29.  07/01/2004 12/31/2004 
6  01/01/1991 12/31/1992 30.  01/01/2005 06/30/2005 
7  01/01/1993 12/31/1994 31.  07/01/2005 12/31/2005 
8  01/01/1995 12/31/1995 32.  01/01/2006 06/30/2006 
9  01/01/1996 12/31/1996 33.  07/01/2006 12/31/2006 
10  01/01/1997 12/31/1997 34.  01/01/2007 06/30/2007 
11  01/01/1998 09/30/1998 35.  07/01/2007 11/30/2007 
12  10/01/1998 12/31/1998 36.  12/01/2007 04/30/2008 
13  01/01/1999 06/30/1999 37.  05/01/2008 09/30/2008 
14  07/01/1999 11/30/1999 38.  10/01/2008 12/31/2008 
15  12/01/1999 02/29/2000 39.  01/01/2009 06/30/2009 
16  03/01/2000 04/30/2000 40.  07/01/2009 12/31/2009 
17  05/01/2000 07/31/2000 41.  01/01/2010 06/30/2010 
18  08/01/2000 10/31/2000 42.  07/01/2010 12/31/2010 
19  11/01/2000 12/31/2000 43.  01/01/2011 06/30/2011 
20  01/01/2001 03/31/2001 44.  07/01/2011 12/31/2011 
21  04/01/2001 06/30/2001 45.  01/01/2012 06/30/2012 
22  07/01/2001 10/31/2001 46.  07/01/2012 12/31/2012 
23  11/01/2001 12/31/2001 47.  01/01/2013 06/30/2013 
24  01/01/2002 06/30/2002 48.  07/01/2013 12/31/2013 
 
1. Repeat the process of downloading with above time intervals, six times to access 
different variables. These variables are listed in the following table. 
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Variables in PE investment raw database  
 Variables Downloaded in Round 1  Variables Downloaded in Round 2 
1 Company Name  Company Name 
2 Investment Date  Investment Date 
3 Firm Name  Firm Name 
4 Fund Name  Fund Name 
5 Investment Location - World Location 18  Firm World Location 
6 Investment Location - World Sub Location 19  Firm World Sub Location 
7 Investment Location - State 20  Firm Nation 
8 Investment Location - Nation 21  Firm State / Region 
9 Deal Value (USD Mil) 22  Firm Zip Code 
10  Equity Amount Disclosed (USD Mil) 23  Firm - First Investment Date 
11  Equity Amount Estimated (USD Mil) 24  Firm - Last Investment Date 
12  New or Follow on Investment 25  Firm - Total Number of Deals 
13  No. of Funds at Investment Date 26  Firm Industry Focus 
14  No. of Firms in Total 27  Firm Preferred Investment Role 
15  
No. of Funds in Total 
28  Firm Preferred Maximum Investment (USD 
Mil) 
16  
Round Number 
29  Firm Preferred Minimum Investment (USD 
Mil) 
17  
Investment Security Type(s) 
30  Total Number of Companies Invested in by 
Firm 
 Variables Downloaded in Round 3  Variables Downloaded in Round 4 
31  Company Name 48  Company Name 
32  Investment Date 49  Investment Date 
33  Firm Name 50  Firm Name 
34  Fund Name 51  Fund Name 
35  Company World Location 52  Company Technology Application 
36  Company World Sub Location 53  Company VE Primary Industry Class 
37  
Company State / Region 
54  Company VE Primary Industry Major 
Group 
38  
Company Nation 
55  Company VE Primary Industry Minor 
Group 
39  
Company Zip Code 
56  Company VE Primary Industry Sub-
Group 1 
40  Company Investment Stage 1 at Round 
Date 
57  Company VE Primary Industry Sub-
Group 2 
41  Company Investment Stage 2 at Round 
Date 
58  Company VE Primary Industry Sub-
Group 3 
42  Company Investment Stage 3 at Round 
Date 
59  
NAIC Code  
43  Valuation at Transaction Date (USD Mil) 60  SIC Code 
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44  Type of Preferred Stock 61  Company Founded Date 
45  Company IPO Date 62  First Investment Received Date 
46  Company Status 63  Last Investment Received Date 
47  Total Funding To Date (USD Mil) 64  Round of Financing 
 Variables Downloaded in Round 5  Variables Downloaded in Round 6 
 Company Name  Company Name 
 Investment Date  Investment Date 
 Firm Name  Firm Name 
 Fund Name  Fund Name 
65  Total Estimated Equity Invested by Firm to 
Date (USD Mil) 
78  
Fund World Location 
66  Total Known Equity Invested by Firm to 
Date (USD Mil) 
79  
Fund World Sub Location 
67  Fund Nation 80  Fund Zip Code 
68  
Fund - First Investment Date 
81  Total Number of Companies Invested in 
by Fund 
69  
Fund - Last Investment Date 
82  Total Known Equity Invested by Fund to 
Date (USD Mil) 
70  
Fund - Total Number of Deals 
83  Total Estimated Equity Invested by Fund 
to Date (USD Mil) 
71  
Fund Estimated Equity Invested in 
Company at Investment Date (USD Mil) 
84  Fund Known Equity Invested in 
Company at Investment Date (USD 
Mil) 
72  Fund Industry Focus 85  Fund Status 
73  Fund Stage 86  Firm Status 
74  Fund Type 87  Firm Type 
75  Fund Founded Date 88  Firm Founded Date 
76  
Fund Investor Type 
89  Firm Capital Under Management (USD 
Mil) 
77  Fund Size (USD Mil) 90  No. of Funds Managed by Firm 
 
As there has been a slight difference in data retrieved in each round of downloading the data, 
four variables: company name, investment date, firm name, and fund name; are repeated in each 
round as an identifier to merging the final database. 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Code and Programs Used in Chapter 2 
 
 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.cbvc_temp ( 
    id_cbvc INT NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
    PRIMARY KEY (id_cbvc) 
) SELECT m.firm_name, 
    m.inv_loc_nation AS inv_country, 
    m.year_inv AS yr, 
    m.sic_code, 
    m.firm_state, 
    1 AS cbvc_event, 
    m.fund_name, 
    m.company_name, 
    m.inv_date, 
    m.company_nation AS company_country, 
    m.firm_zip_code, 
    m.fund_zip_code, 
    m.firm_capital_under_management, 
    m.firm_type, 
    m.fund_investor_type, 
    m.new_or_follow_on_inv, 
    m.fund_esequity_company_atinv, 
    m.fund_ind_focus, 
    m.fund_size, 
    m.fund_stage, 
    m.no_of_funds_at_inv_date, 
    m.total_est_byfund_todate, 
    m.total_est_firm_to_date, 
    m.total_funding_to_date, 
    m.total_known_eq_byfund_todate, 
    m.total_known_firm_to_date, 
    m.type_of_preferred_stock, 
    m.equity_amount_disclosed, 
    m.equity_amount_estimated, 
    m.company_founded_date, 
    m.company_technology_application, 
    m.company_ve_ind_major_group, 
    m.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
    m.company_ve_indclass, 
    m.naic_code FROM 
    vc_project.vc_inv AS m 
WHERE 
    m.fund_nation != m.inv_loc_nation 
        AND m.inv_loc_nation != 'United States' 
        AND m.fund_nation = 'United States' 
        AND m.firm_nation = 'United States' 
        AND m.firm_name != 'Undisclosed Firm' 
        AND m.year_inv >= 2000 
        AND m.sic_code IS NOT NULL 
ORDER BY m.firm_name , inv_country , sic_code , yr; 
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#----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CALL vc_project.standard_panel(); 
 
#----------------------------------------------------------- 
#----------------------------------------------------------- 
#Count experiences 
 
CREATE table vc_project.domexp 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM ( 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.domexp_sic 
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
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FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        sic_code , 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.sic_code = t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR 
(t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, yr; 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.domexp_sic_state 
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.firm_state, 
        t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        firm_state, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
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        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, firm_state, sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        firm_state, 
        sic_code , 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, firm_state, sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.firm_state = t2.firm_state AND t1.sic_code = 
t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, firm_state, sic_code, yr; 
 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.fcexp  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
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FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND ((t1.yr -1= 
t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_country, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.fsicexp  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.sic_code = t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR 
(t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
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GROUP BY firm_name, sic_code, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.fcsicexp  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND t1.sic_code = 
t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_country,sic_code, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.fexp 
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SELECT 
  t1.firm_name, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY firm_name, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_c 
 
SELECT 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
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        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY  inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY inv_country, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_sic  
 
SELECT 
  t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
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GROUP BY sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.sic_code = t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY sic_code, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_csic  
 
SELECT 
  t1.inv_country, 
        t1.sic_code,      
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND (t1.sic_code = t2.sic_code) AND ((t1.yr -1= 
t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY inv_country, sic_code,  yr; 
 
#--------------------- based on States---------------------- 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_c_state  
 
SELECT 
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  t1.firm_state, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and firm_state!='.' 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  and firm_state!='.' 
         
GROUP BY  firm_state,inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_state = t2.firm_state AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND ((t1.yr -1= 
t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_country, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_sic_state  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_state, 
        t1.sic_code, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
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FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        sic_code, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_state = t2.firm_state AND t1.sic_code = t2.sic_code AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) 
OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY firm_state,sic_code, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.imi_csic_state  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_state, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.sic_code,      
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
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(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.firm_state = t2.firm_state AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND (t1.sic_code 
= t2.sic_code) AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_country, sic_code,  yr; 
 
 
CREATE TABLE vc_project.size_csic_state  
 
SELECT 
  t1.firm_state, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.sic_code,      
        t1.yr, 
  #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.exp, 0)) exp, 
  SUM(IF(t2.yr>=2000, t2.size, 0)) as size 
         
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp, 
  SUM(fund_size) AS size 
 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_state, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        sic_code,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp, 
  SUM(fund_size) AS size 
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FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='United States' and firm_nation='United States' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and sic_code IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_loc_nation,sic_code, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.firm_state = t2.firm_state AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND (t1.sic_code 
= t2.sic_code) AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY firm_state,inv_country, sic_code,  yr; 
#-----------------------------------------------------------         
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Appendix C 
 
Sample Code and Programs Used in Chapter 3 
 
CREATE table vc_project.vc_bilateral 
#CREATE VIEW vc_project.t1 AS 
  (id_bilateral INT NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT,PRIMARY KEY (id_bilateral)) 
SELECT  
        fund_nation AS fund_country, 
        inv_loc_nation AS inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        SUM(IF(fund_nation != inv_loc_nation, 1, 0)) AS num_nir_total 
 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation 
GROUP BY fund_country , inv_country , yr; 
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
 
CALL vc_project.standard_panel(); 
 
CREATE VIEW vc_project.t2 AS 
SELECT  
        fund_nation AS fund_country, 
        inv_loc_nation AS inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        ifnull(SUM(IF(fund_nation = inv_loc_nation AND gvc = 1, 
            1, 0)),0) AS ngvc_total 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_inv 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation 
GROUP BY fund_country , inv_country , yr; 
 
#--------------------------------------  Attach two above tables  
 
CREATE VIEW vc_project.t3 AS 
SELECT  
        t1.fund_country, 
  t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.num_nir_total, 
        ifnull(t2_1.ngvc_total,0) as ngvc_total_src, 
        ifnull(t2_2.ngvc_total,0) as ngvc_total_dst 
FROM 
        vc_project.vc_bilateral as t1 
        left join 
  vc_project.t2 as t2_1 on (t1.fund_country=t2_1.fund_country and 
t1.yr=t2_1.yr ) 
        left join 
        vc_project.t2 as t2_2 on (t1.inv_country=t2_2.inv_country and t1.yr=t2_2.yr) 
         
GROUP BY fund_country , inv_country , yr 
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order by fund_country , inv_country , yr 
; 
 
#-------------------  Attach a sample Macro-economic Indice   
create view vc_project.temp as 
SELECT  
    t3.fund_country, 
    t3.inv_country, 
    t3.yr, 
    t3.num_nir_total, 
 t3.ngvc_total_src, 
    t3.ngvc_total_dst, 
 
    s_gdp_us.value AS src_gdp,  d_gdp_us.value AS dst_gdp 
     
 
FROM 
    vc_project.t3 
    LEFT JOIN 
    vc_project.gdp_us AS s_gdp_us ON (t3.fund_country = s_gdp_us.country  AND t3.yr = 
s_gdp_us.year) 
    LEFT JOIN 
     vc_project.gdp_us AS d_gdp_us ON (t3.inv_country = d_gdp_us.country AND t3.yr = 
d_gdp_us.year) 
  
GROUP BY fund_country , inv_country , yr; 
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Appendix D 
 
Sample Code and Programs Used in Chapter 4 
CREATE TABLE gvc.gvc_lsvcc  
 
SELECT 
        t1.f_state, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM( t2.exp ) cum_exp 
 
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
        and  fund_investor_type ='Retail' 
 
         
GROUP BY f_state,inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
                and  fund_investor_type ='Retail' 
 
         
GROUP BY f_state,inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.f_state = t2.f_state AND (t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = 
t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group) AND  
((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr) ) 
 
GROUP BY f_state, company_ve_ind_minor_group,  yr; 
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#-----------------------------------------------------------         
 
  CREATE TABLE gvc.gvc_gov 
 
SELECT 
        t1.f_state, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM( t2.exp ) cum_exp 
 
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
        and  fund_investor_type ='Government' 
 
         
GROUP BY f_state,inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
                and  fund_investor_type ='Government' 
 
         
GROUP BY f_state,inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.f_state = t2.f_state AND (t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = 
t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group) AND  
((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr) ) 
 
GROUP BY f_state, company_ve_ind_minor_group,  yr; 
 
#-----------------------------------------------------------         
 
 
 
 
#----------------------------------------------------------- 
 143 
#----------------------------------------------------------- 
#Count experiences 
 
CREATE table gvc.domexp 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM ( 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, yr; 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE table gvc.domexp_sic 
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
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FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = 
t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, yr; 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CREATE table gvc.domexp_state 
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.f_state, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
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        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.f_state = t2.f_state AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR 
(t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, yr; 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CREATE table gvc.domexp_sic_state 
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.f_state, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_state as f_state, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group , 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation = inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
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        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.f_state = t2.f_state AND 
t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) 
OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, f_state, company_ve_ind_minor_group, yr; 
 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE table gvc.fcexp  
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND ((t1.yr -1= 
t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_country, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE table gvc.fsicexp  
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = 
t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, company_ve_ind_minor_group, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE table gvc.fcsicexp  
 
SELECT 
        t1.firm_name, 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM(t2.exp) cum_exp 
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FROM(  
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        firm_name, 
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_loc_nation, company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.firm_name = t2.firm_name AND t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND 
t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) 
OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
) 
GROUP BY firm_name, inv_country,company_ve_ind_minor_group, yr; 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CREATE TABLE gvc.imi_c 
 
SELECT 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM( t2.exp ) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
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GROUP BY inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm'  
         
GROUP BY  inv_loc_nation, year_inv) as t2 
ON t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY inv_country, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE gvc.imi_sic  
 
SELECT 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM( t2.exp ) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        company_ve_ind_minor_group, 
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
 150 
ON t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group AND ((t1.yr -1= 
t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY company_ve_ind_minor_group, yr; 
 
 
 
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CREATE TABLE gvc.imi_csic  
 
SELECT 
        t1.inv_country, 
        t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        t1.yr, 
        t1.exp, 
        #(@cnt:=@cnt+ temp.exp) as dom_exp 
        SUM( t2.exp ) cum_exp 
FROM  
(SELECT  
         
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t1 
JOIN 
(SELECT  
        inv_loc_nation as inv_country, 
        company_ve_ind_minor_group,      
        year_inv AS yr, 
        count(firm_name) AS exp 
 
FROM 
        vc_source.vc_all 
WHERE 
        fund_nation != inv_loc_nation and  
        fund_nation='Canada' and firm_nation='Canada' and 
        firm_name!='Undisclosed Firm' and company_ve_ind_minor_group IS NOT NULL 
         
GROUP BY inv_loc_nation,company_ve_ind_minor_group, year_inv) as t2 
ON  t1.inv_country = t2.inv_country AND (t1.company_ve_ind_minor_group = 
t2.company_ve_ind_minor_group) AND ((t1.yr -1= t2.yr) OR (t1.yr-2= t2.yr)) 
 
GROUP BY inv_country, company_ve_ind_minor_group,  yr; 
 
 
